resigned their positions. That article was translated and published in
Middle East Economic Survey, February 18, 2002, vol. 45, no. 7.
* * *
154
F . Gregory Gause, III
19. Prince Turki’s article appeared in al-Sharq al-‘Awsat on January 20,
2002, in the religion section. See www.asharqal-awsat.com/pcdaily/
2001-2002/religion/religion.html. The article by Prince Talal was
referred to in al-Hayat, February 6, 2002, p. 2.
20. On the phenomenon of salafi political activism and opposition in Saudi
Arabia in the 1990s, see F. Gregory Gause, III, Oil Monarchies: Domestic
and Security Challenges in the Arab Gulf States (New York: Council on
Foreign Relations Press, 1994), pp. 31–44, 94–98; Mamoun Fandy,
Saudi Arabia and the Politics of Dissent (New York: Palgrave, 1999);
Joshua Teitelbaum, Holier Than Thou: Saudi Arabia’s Islamic Opposition,
Policy Paper No. 52 (The Washington Institute for Near East Policy,
2000); Gwenn Okruhlik, “Networks of dissent: Islamism and Reformism
in Saudi Arabia,” Current History, January 2002.
21. See in particular his article on “al-tatarruf wa al-tatarruf al-mudad”
[Extremism and counter-extremism], December 12, 2001, on the web-
site http://www.islamtoday.net. On that same site, one can find in
English his condemnation of the 9/11 attacks and the full text of his
interview with New York Times correspondent Douglas Jehl, which was
the basis for the Times article of December 27, 2001.
22. See his interview in al-Hayat, February 4, 2002, p. 15.
23. For his criticisms of the philosophical underpinnings of Western notions
of freedom, see his “al-‘islam wa al-gharb: mudakhala ma’a fukuyama fi
harb ‘fashia al-qarn al-hadi wa al-‘ashrin,” al-Hayat, January 18, 2002,
p. 10. For his specific criticisms of American policy, see his English-language
statements at www.islamtoday.net.
24. “al-qarni: tazayud ‘adad al-harakat wa al-madhahib al-fikriyya al-‘islamiyya
‘alamat marad,” al-Hayat, February 4, 2002, p. 15.
25. See, for example, nashrat al-‘islah number 317, June 3, 2002 (www.
miraserve.com/monitors/amt.htm) for al-Faqih’s analysis of the “future
of the battle between bin Ladin and America”; and nashrat al-‘islah,
no. 311, April 22, 2002 (same URL) for his analysis of the future
prospects of bin Laden’s confrontation with the Al Sa’ud.
26. See, for example, his criticism of Safar al-Hawali in nashrat al-‘islah
no. 287, October 22, 2001; and his criticism of other salafi dissidents in
nashrat al-‘islah no. 290, November 12, 2001 (both at www.miraserve.
com/monitors/amt.htm).
27. For that fatwa, see http://www.aloqla.com/mag. On al-Shu’aybi, see
Douglas Jehl, “For Saudi cleric, battle shapes up as infidel vs. Islam,”
New York Times, December 5, 2001.
28. nashrat al-‘islah number 366, May 12, 2003 (www.miraserve.com/
monitors/amt.htm).
29. The statement and list of signatories can be found at www.
propositionsonline.com/html/fighting_for.htm.
30. I found an English-language version at www.islamtoday.net/english,
which is the website of Shaykh Salman al-‘Awda, in the section entitled
“Special Articles.”
* * *
Saudi Perceptions of the United States
155
31. I obtained a copy of “The Alternative Statement” via fax from a source in
Saudi Arabia in June 2002. There were no signatures attached to it, so it
is difficult to determine how widespread these sentiments are. However,
the debate over the original statement and this response has been dis-
cussed by Sa’d al-Faqih in nashrat al-‘islah no. 317, June 3, 2002 (www.
miraserve.com/monitors/amt.htm). He reports that a number of signa-
tories of the original call for dialogue with the West were forced by the
negative reaction to issue a “clarification” of their views. Those retractions
were confirmed in interviews in Saudi Arabia in January 2003, though I
have been unable to find texts of the “clarifications.”
32. The text of the petition and the signatories can be found in al-Quds
33. Anecdotal evidence can be found in Neil MacFarquhar, “A few Saudis
defy a rigid Islam to debate their own intolerance,” New York Times, July 12,
2002 and in the newspaper columns of prominent Saudi writers like
Turki Al Hamad, who writes in al-Sharq al-Awsat, Da’ud al-Shiryan, who
writes in al-Hayat, and Jamal Khashogji, who is now editor of al-Watan.
One can also discover this fact by talking to Saudis.
34. See the article by Ghazi al-Qusaybi, until recently Saudi ambassador in
London and now the minister of Water in the Saudi cabinet. Al-Qusaybi
had been very critical of the Bush administration in the past. “laysa min salih
al-sa’udiyya dukhul muwajaha ma’a ‘amrika,” al-Hayat, August 21, 2002,
p. 9. See also Muhammad bin Abd al-Latif Al Alshaykh, “man al-mustafid
min ta’miq al-sharakh al-sa’udi-al-‘amriki?,” al-Hayat, August 23, 2002,
p. 9. For an account of Saudi fears that the backlash in the United States
against the kingdom might be permanently damaging U.S.-Saudi relations,
see Dawud al-Shiryan, “al-‘alaqat al-sa’udiyya-al-‘amrikiyya fi mahkamat
al-ra’i al-‘am,” al-Hayat, August 18, 2002, pp. 1, 6.
35. I examine these social changes in Saudi Arabia and their potential conse-
quences for Saudi politics in earlier articles: F. Gregory Gause, III, “Political
opposition in the Gulf monarchies,” European University Institute
Working Papers, RSC No. 2000/61, 2000; and F. Gregory Gause, III,
“Be careful what you wish for: the future of U.S.-Saudi relations,” World
Policy Journal, vol. 49, no. 1 (spring 2002).
* * *
8
T he Palestinian Perception
of America after 9⁄11
Camille Mansour
It is difficult to say anything new about Palestinian perceptions of
America after 9/11; all what can be done is to rearrange, to catego-
rize, to compare. One way to categorize is to say that Palestinians do
not all have the same perception of America, and that it is necessary to
distinguish between different Palestinian groups according to certain
criteria. These would include socioeconomic class; political affiliation;
whether people are from an urban environment, a village, or a refugee
camp; whether they are long-time residents of the West Bank and Gaza,
“returnees” arriving after the signing of the Oslo accords, or refugees
living outside Palestine in Lebanon, Syria, or Jordan. I cannot pretend
to be able to describe the perceptions of each group or sub-group, but
perhaps such a systematic enquiry, while important as a research proj-
ect, is not necessary for our purposes here. Rather, it seems to me that
our purpose is determined by why we are interested in Palestinian
perceptions, in other words, what is at stake as far as these perceptions
are concerned. Since perceptions of the “other” are linked to percep-
tions of oneself (in many ways being a kind of self-affirm
ation), I think
that the answer lies in what these perceptions say that is meaningful
about future trends as seen by the perceiving actor (in this case, the
Palestinians), about actions they might undertake, about the object
perceived (in this case, America), and finally about how these images,
mirror-images, and counter-images might affect the policies of the
various actors (in this case, the United States, Israel, and the European
and Arab countries).
If the study of perceptions has such a functional relevance, then this
chapter can be restricted to dealing only with those Palestinians who
appear to have the greatest influence on the Palestinian internal
* * *
158
C amille Mansour
debate and policy, that is, those who live in the West Bank and the Gaza
Strip. Similarly, I will limit myself to the following categories only: the
Palestinian street, the Islamists, Leftist and secular (including Fatah)
activists, and the leadership. I will conclude with the Palestinian internal
debate and its relation to the image of America.
The Palestinian Street
By “Palestinian street,” I mean the spontaneous, knee-jerk reactions
and outlook of the broadest spectrum of the population, encom-
passing, for example, Islamists, secularists, the elite, and so forth. How
is America after 9/11 (and in many respects, before 9/11) perceived
by these people? It is interesting to note, from the outset, that people
differentiate between U.S. official policy and American society and
culture. While the attitude toward the former is overwhelmingly neg-
ative, as we shall see, the latter are viewed with a kind of fascination.
In a survey conducted in March–April 2002 in five Arab countries
(Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Kuwait, Lebanon, and the United Arab Emirates)
by Zogby International, Arabs who were polled “had strong favorable
attitudes toward American ‘Science and Technology,’ ‘Freedom and
Democracy,’ ‘Education,’ ‘Movies and Television,’ and also had largely
favorable attitudes toward the American people.”1 Everything points
to the fact that the Palestinians share this positive Arab outlook: this
is attested by the sheer numbers (several hundred thousand) of
West Bank and Gaza Palestinians who have visited or emigrated to the
United States, or who wish to do so.
On the perception of official America, the Zogby International
study reveals “extremely negative attitudes toward U.S. policy vis-à-vis
the Arab world, Iraq and most especially toward Palestine.”2 A broader
survey weeks later by the same organization (this time adding to the
five Arab communities cited above three more groups: Morocco,
Jordan, and the Arabs in Israel) on the overall impression of America
and other selected countries, indicates a very low “favorability score”
for America. This does not imply, the author of the survey asserts,
“an anti-Western sentiment at work,” because Canada and France, for
example, receive a “consistently net positive rating.”3 Other polls in
Arab and Islamic countries conducted during 2002 all indicate a
dramatic deterioration of the global image of the United States.4
Specifically concerning the Palestinians living in the West Bank and
Gaza, a survey commissioned by the British Council (which also
covered other countries) in February–March 2002 found that the
United States attracted a very high “unfavorability.”5
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The Palestinian Perception of America
159
The following, in my view, are the main perceptions held by
Palestinians concerning America, which explains their negative attitudes
toward it:
1. The United States is fundamentally anti-Arab and anti-Muslim.
People do not find any other explanation for its double-standards
approach toward Israel and other countries, such as Syria.
2. The United States considers itself above international law and
international obligations.
3. The global antiterrorism campaign after 9/11 is a pretext to
tighten U.S. domination over the Arab–Muslim world.
4. The United States is blindly pro-Israel; the ties that bind these
two countries are unshakable. Israel represses the Palestinians
with American weapons. There is “a total subjugation of American
decision making to the priorities and policies of the Israeli
government.”6
5. U.S. foreign policy seems double-faced: “Human rights, the great
Wilsonian concept of the people’s right to self determination
seems to stop when the subject of discussions are Palestinians.”7
6. The U.S. characterization of all forms of Palestinian military struggle
as “terrorism” (not only suicide operations against Israeli civilians,
but also operations against the Israel’s occupying army) is a cover
whose aim is to give Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon a free hand
in the Palestinian territories. For the Palestinian in the street,
the reoccupation of the entire West Bank in spring 2002, the death
of hundreds of people, the demolition of thousands of houses,
the uprooting of tens of thousands of trees, would not have been
possible without American approval.
7. The Palestinians are asked to accept whatever the U.S.-Israel alliance
offers them in the framework of a peace settlement. Neither inter-
national law nor the Palestinian struggle may be legitimate factors
in such a settlement.
8. The campaign against Iraq is not only an American design. Israel
has played an important role in pushing for such a campaign. “In
the eyes of the prime minister [Ariel Sharon], the war in Iraq is
an opportunity to change the balance of power in the area. Sharon
proposes a division of labor: Israel will take care of Arafat. America
will smash the sources of Arab power.”8 Ordinary Palestinians concur
with this assessment of Sharon’s motives made by many in the
Israeli press, and even fear a scenario whereby a mass expulsion of
Palestinians outside the West Bank is provoked.
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C amille Mansour
It is important to stress at this point that Palestinian perceptions of
America have been exacerbated by the intensity of the Palestinian–
Israeli confrontation since September 2000, almost a year before 9/11.
The Palestinian street considers that they have paid a heavy price
because of U.S. policy. The exacerbated character of Palestinian
perceptions of America has sometimes led to defiant attitudes, such
as raising portraits of Osama bin Laden or Saddam Hussein during
demonstrations. At certain times, the more Palestinians have been
accused of terrorism because of suicide operations, the more they have
supported them. Some commentators have argued that in so doing,
the Palestinians have fallen into Sharon’s trap. This may be true, but
the issue here is the spontaneous reactions of the people, not the
rational choices made by policymakers.
One question that emerges from this overview of the Palestinian
negative perception of
America is whether it fuels organized mobiliza-
tion and action against the United States? To answer this question, it
is time to consider those groups whose behavior—contrary to the
spontaneity of the street—is marked by a measure of organization and
intentionality.
The Islamists
As stated earlier, the Palestinian Islamists, that is, Hamas and Islamic
Jihad, share the Palestinian street’s negative perception of America
and its role in Palestine and the region. Interestingly, however, they
appear to be very keen on avoiding statements that could be seen
as going beyond the vague anti-Americanism of the street. Thus,
Palestinian Islamists, as of spring 2001, have announced that Israeli
military actions in the West Bank and Gaza, including the killing of
Palestinian civilians and extra-judicial executions of activists, would be
met by suicide operations against civilian targets in Israel. Dozens of
such operations have, in fact, taken place since then, but in the one
or two instances where U.S. citizens were among the casualties, the
Islamists were quick to declare that Americans had not been targeted.
The question is, why this concern?
It seems to me that Hamas and Jihad consider themselves to be
Palestinian organizations, and not worldwide Islamic organizations.
Their focus is the Israel–Palestine arena, and they appear to gear any
support they get from other Islamic groups or countries toward their
Palestinian agenda. To use Farish Noor’s terms, the Palestinian Islamists
do not “localize” the anti-American struggle but try to “universalize”
their local anti-Israeli struggle. The enemy is at home and can be
* * *
The Palestinian Perception of America
161
targeted, so why look to an enemy who is far away? A symbolic example
can illustrate the point. During 2002, there was a call to boycott
American products in several Arab countries as a response to the U.S.
administration’s support of Israeli policy. This call was effective in
many instances, but in the West Bank and Gaza it was practically absent:
what would be the point of boycotting American products when people