be linked to a group of 19 Saudis who were being sought by the gov-
ernment for their involvement in a suspected terrorist plot disrupted
by Saudi police just days before the May 12 bombings. Sa’d al-Faqih’s
website published selections from what purported to be a statement
by the 19 suspects on May 12, the same day as the bombings. That
statement accused the Saudi regime of having lost whatever Islamic
legitimacy it once had because of its cooperation with the United
States “in making war on the Muslims of Afghanistan and Iraq.” It
went on to say that killing Saudi leaders was legitimate, because they
“were in the line of the Jews and the Christians.”28
A telling sign of divisions within the salafi movement is the debate
that emerged within Saudi Arabia over an overture by some salafis
toward “dialogue” with Western intellectuals. The genesis of this
overture was a statement published by a number of prominent American
intellectuals shortly after the attacks of 9/11 entitled “What We’re
Fighting For.”29 It set out a defense of Western liberal values and the
right of self-defense in the face of the 9/11 attacks. In response, Saudi
intellectuals, including many prominent salafis (e.g., Safar al-Hawali,
‘Ayd al-Qarni, Muhammad al-Fawzan, Muhsin al-‘Awaji) published a
response entitled “How We Can Coexist.”30 The signatories “welcome
dialogue and exchange,” and acknowledge that there are “mutually
beneficial relationships and common interests between the Muslim
world and the West.” However, the bulk of the statement is highly
critical of American (and, more generally, Western) policies, not only
with regard to Israel but more generally in the region. The signatories
contend that “policies of conflict in the West are bringing about
the destruction of civil security throughout the world in the fame of
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149
fighting terrorism . . . [I]t is important for the West to realize that
civil security in the Islamic World has not seen stability for decades and
a lot of the impediments to civil security have come about under the
umbrella of Western policy and quite possibly due to the direct actions
of the West.”
This was hardly a statement of common ground with American
policy toward the Middle East and the Muslim world. However, the
signatories were criticized by some Saudi salafis for being too will-
ing to engage in dialogue with the West. In a statement entitled
“The Alternative Statement” circulated in the Kingdom, the attacks
of 9/11 were justified on the basis that, from Hiroshima through
Israel’s response to the Palestinian intifada through sanctions on
Iraq, American policy has deliberately targeted civilians for attack.
The “Statement” said that it was the obligation of Islam to domi-
nate the world, and that conflict between Islam and the West is
inevitable: “those who wish to turn this confrontation into a peaceful
dialogue will not succeed.” The Statement viewed the attacks of 9/11
as an effort to redress the imbalance of forces in that confrontation.
It concluded saying that it would take another such attack for the
United States to learn its lesson. The only course by which dialogue
is possible with the “West” is if the United States reverses its policies
in the Middle East, apologizes for the past and pays compensation to
Muslims for its past crimes.31
With the American focus on confronting Iraq, which accelerated
in the fall of 2002, those in the Saudi salafi trend advocating dia-
logue with the West became even more critical of American policy,
and implicitly of the Saudi relationship with the United States. In
November 2002, 209 Islamist activists published a petition in the
London-based Arabic newspaper al-Quds al-‘Arabi condemning
American policy toward Iraq. Of the 209 signatories, 160 were from
Saudi Arabia, including Salman al-Awda and Muhsin al-‘Awaji. Much
like the earlier “How We Can Coexist,” this document did not posit
an unalterable confrontation between Islam and the West, or support
a bin Laden interpretation of jihad. The signatories called on Muslim
in the ‘umma, and the middle way (al-tawassut) and tolerance based
on the correct interpretation of the message of Islam.” They made
a special plea to those in the United States “who are supporters of
justice, lovers of peace and opponents of war” to stand against American
policy.
However, their criticism of the American stand on Iraq was harsh.
They said that “the insistence of the American administration on
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F . Gregory Gause, III
using force and hostility toward the states of the region brings to
mind the Crusader campaigns and the era of colonialism . . . Just as
those ages opened the gates of jihad and just resistance and ended
with the destruction of the hostile Crusader forces of evil, so any form
of aggression against the ‘umma or contempt for it will open the
gates of jihad and legitimate just resistance which will end in the
destruction of the attacking Crusader and Zionist forces of evil, by
the will of God.” They saw American aims as going far beyond Iraq,
to “destroy the Muslim identity of the ‘umma, spread American
culture in the region, control its oil and non-oil resources” as well as
support Israel and put an end to the Palestinian intifada. The signato-
ries called on Muslim government to oppose the American interven-
tion, and to build stronger relations with the countries of Europe and
East Asia as an alternative to reliance on the United States.32 Even
among those who accept the need for dialogue with the West, oppo-
sition to American policy in the region continued to grow as the crisis
of 9/11 led to the crisis over Iraq.
It is difficult to judge the extent of support within Saudi Arabia, or
even within the salafi trend there, for either the call for dialogue with the
West or the criticism of it. We know the outline of the debate, but not
the relation of forces on either side of it. It is also important to recognize
that the salafi trend is not the only factor in political discourse in the
Kingdom. While much less organized than the salafis, and with access to
fewer institutional resources, there are other currents of thought in the
country, almost all of which are more open to the “dialogue of
civilizations” than the salafi critics are (though many are very critical of
U.S. policy in the Middle East themselves).33 In fact, there was some-
thing of a popular backlash against the religious establishment in the
spring of 2002, following a fire at a girls’ school in Mecca in which a
number of the students died. Saudi religious police reportedly impeded
rescue efforts, to prevent the girls from being seen unveiled. They were
severely criticized in the Saudi media, and the event led the Saudi gov-
ernment to remove control of the female e
ducation system from the
Special Presidency for Girls’ Education, dominated by the religious
establishment, to the Ministry of Education. The May 2003 bombings
also elicited a considerable number of denunciations of the Islamist
monopoly on political discourse in the country from more liberal Saudis.
Conclusion: Does it Mean Anything?
All indications point to relatively high levels of anti-American feeling
in Saudi Arabia in the period after the attacks of 9/11, with the
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Saudi Perceptions of the United States
151
prospect of war against Iraq serving to intensify those feelings among
many in the country. The roots of these feelings vary considerably,
from a relatively simple rejection of American support for Israel to a
deep-seated, religiously based rejection of dialogue with non-Muslims.
But the widespread nature of these feelings cannot be denied. The
Saudi government itself recognizes this fact. Saudi officials from
Crown Prince Abdallah down have emphasized repeatedly that they
see the Saudi–American relationship as solid and unshakeable. The
Saudi government has taken a number of steps aimed at improving
initiative on the Arab–Israeli front (revealed to New York Times
columnist Thomas Friedman, a harsh critic of Saudi Arabia after 9/11)
through his visit to President Bush’s ranch in Texas and his open letter
to President Bush on the first anniversary of the attacks, to his January
2003 initiative in the Arab League to put the organization on record
in favor of greater political and economic openness in Arab countries.
While these steps are largely aimed at improving the public view of
Saudi Arabia in the United States, they are also a signal to Saudi public
opinion that there are limits to the amount of anti-Americanism at
home that the regime will tolerate. Elite intellectuals close to the regime
have picked up on these signals, with a number of articles appearing in
August 2002 arguing that a complete break with the world’s only
superpower will not serve Saudi, Arab, or Muslim interests.34
The question then presents itself: do these widespread public feel-
ings of anti-Americanism make any difference on the policy level? I
argue they do, but indirectly. The Saudi regime is sufficiently insu-
lated from public pressures that it would not abandon its ties to the
United States simply in reaction to public opinion. In a situation
where it saw its own direct interests threatened, the Al Sa’ud would
ignore public opinion and cooperate openly with the United States, as
was the case with the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990. However, the
Al Sa’ud realize better than outsiders that their public is increasingly
educated, urban, and informed about the world, and thus more readily
“politicized” than might have been the case in the past.35 In cases
where there immediate security is not at risk, the Saudi leadership will
pay more attention to that public opinion. The fact that the leadership
so publicly disassociated itself from the immediate American reaction
to 9/11, by denying the United States the right to use Saudi bases
for attacks on Afghanistan (at least publicly), and from American
policy on Arab–Israeli questions is an indication that public opinion,
while not determinative, is increasingly important in the Saudi policy
process.
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F . Gregory Gause, III
The tensions between the United States and Saudi Arabia since
9/11 have highlighted an uncomfortable truth about the relationship
that dates back to its very beginnings. On neither side is there a strong
public constituency for the relationship. It is a relationship between
elites, based on very clear understandings of mutual interest. There is
no sentiment in it. The myths propagated by those whose business it
is to maintain the relationship ring hollow once exposed to public
scrutiny. Each country is the perfect foil for publicists and propagan-
dists in the other country, culturally and politically. Will the relation-
ship end soon? No. Those interests that tie the elites together are very
strong. But public opinion trends on both sides constrain the rela-
tionship. It will not get closer. More likely, it will revert to something
like the level of the pre-1990 period: close and cooperative, but less
publicly close on the military level, with greater political distance
between Riyadh and Washington. It is on oil that the relationship
began, and it will be on oil that the relationship will, in the future,
revolve. If there comes a breaking point between Saudi Arabia and the
United States, it will not be from public opinion pressures on either
side, but rather on fundamentally different conceptions of how the
Saudis should use their “oil power” in the world market.
Notes
1. Poll cited in Dr. James J. Zogby, “New poll shows damage
done,” December 24, 2001. Accessed via “Gulf Wire,” e-newsletter,
www.arabialink.com.
2. As late as December 2001, Saudi Interior Minister Prince Na’if ibn Abd al-
Aziz Al Sa’ud told an American reporter: “Until now, we have no evidence
that assures us that they [Saudis on board the airplanes] are related to Sept.
11. We have not received anything in this regard from the United States.”
Douglas Jehl, “Saudi minister asserts that bin Laden is a ‘Tool’ of
Al Qaeda, not its mastermind,” New York Times, December 10, 2001.
It was not until February 2002 that Prince Na’if publicly admitted that
Saudis were involved in the attacks. “15 of 19 Suicide Hijackers were
Saudi,” Associated Press, February 6, 2002.
3. For one example, see Karen DeYoung, “Saudis seethe over media reports
on anti-terror effort,” Washington Post, November 6, 2001.
4. The quote is taken from a long article about Abdallah’s letter and
U.S.–Saudi relations before 9/11: Sulayman Nimr, “qisat al-rasa’il
al-mutabadil bayn al-amir abd allah wa bush,” al-Hayat, November 6,
2001, p. 7. For the first account in the Western press of Abdallah’s discus-
sion of Saudi–American tensions before 9/11, see James M. Dorsey,
“Saudi leader warns US mideast policy may force kingdom to review
relationship,” Wall Street Journal, October 29, 2001.
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Saudi Perceptions of the United States
153
5. This is the interpretation put forward in the Saudi account of the meeting
conveyed in the al-Hayat article referenced above.
6. For an account of such comments from a number of Saudi newspapers,
see “ ‘amrika wa ‘al-‘irhab al-nifsi’ wa ‘ahdaf al-hamla al-‘askariyya,”
al-Hayat, October 16, 2001, p. 6.
7. Richard Burkholder, “The U.S. and the West—through Saudi eyes,”
Gallup Tuesday Briefing, August 6, 2002, www.gallup.com/poll/tb/
goverpubli/20020806.asp.
8. “The 10 nation ‘Impressions of America’ poll report,” Zogby International,
August 7, 2002, www.zogby.com/news/ReadNews.dbm?ID�
��610.
9. Elaine Sciolino, “Don’t weaken Arafat, Saudi warns Bush,” New York
Times, January 27, 2002.
10. An anecdotal account of such boycotts can be found in Neil MacFarquhar,
“An anti-American boycott is growing in the Arab world,” New York
Times, May 10, 2002. American exports to Saudi Arabia in the first
half of 2002 were 30% lower than in 2001, the lowest level in 12 years.
Roger Hardy, “Saudi-US trade plunges,” BBC, August 23, 2002, http://
news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/world/middle_east/2213250.stm. Given the
downturn in oil prices in the months immediately following the 9/11
attacks, it is difficult to determine how much of the decline in American
exports to Saudi Arabia is the result of consumer boycotts and how much
is the result of more general economic factors.
11. “Back Palestinians with words, not deeds says Naif,” Arab News (Jidda),
April 6, 2002.
12. The petition was published in al-Quds al-‘Arabi (London), April 20–21,
2002, p. 4.
13. A similar conclusion was reached by seasoned Middle East observer Eric
Rouleau after his visit to the Kingdom following the attacks. See his “Trouble
in the Kingdom,” Foreign Affairs, vol. 81, no. 4 (July/August 2002).
14. “Saudi Grand Mufti condemns terrorist acts in U.S.,” September 15,
2001, www.saudiembassy.net/press_release/press_release00.htm.
15. Statement by H.E. Shaikh Salih bin Muhammad Al-Luheidan,
Chairman of the Supreme Judicial Council of the Kingdom of
Saudi Arabia, “Condemnation of Terrorism,” September 14, 2001,
www.saudiembassy.net/press_release/01-spa/terrorism-01.htm.
16. “al-minhaj al-salafi didd al-tayarat al-mughaliyya wa takfir al-‘afrad wa
al-hukumat laysa min al-‘ islam,” al-Hayat, February 18, 2002, p. 10.
17. “wali al-‘ahd al-sa’udi li kibar rijal al-din wa al-‘ulama: fi hadhihi al-‘ayyam
al-‘asiba ‘alayna al-ta’ani wa tawdih al-haqa’iq,” al-Hayat, November 15,
2001, p. 8.
18. The leaves of absence were reported in James A. Dorsey, “Saudi leader
seeks to rein in clergy,” Wall Street Journal, March 14, 2002, pp. A9,
A12. The London-based Arabic newspaper al-Quds al-‘Arabi reported in
an article published on February 1, 2002 that a number of imams had