gious scholars and officials) in October and November 2001 to
explain his policy and the state of U.S.-Saudi relations. In one of these
meetings, he revealed that, in August 2001, he had sent a letter to
President Bush complaining of the American stand on the Arab–
Israeli issue. In that letter, he said that differences between the two
countries on that issue had grown so great that “from now on, you
have your interests and the Kingdom has its interests, and you have
your road and we have our road.”4 The context of Abdallah’s public
revelation of tensions with the United States was actually a defense of
* * *
Saudi Perceptions of the United States
143
the value of the U.S.-Saudi relationship for the Palestinians. He went
on to say that, because of his letter, the Bush administration shortly
thereafter announced public support for the idea of a Palestinian
state.5 However, the fact that a Saudi leader publicly acknowledged
such a dispute with the United States, undoubtedly, was meant to
demonstrate that Riyadh was reflecting the views of its citizens on this
issue.
These signals from the top of the Saudi ruling elite that all was not
well in its relationship with the United States were taken by the Saudi
media as a green light for criticism of the American response to the
attacks of 9/11. Saudi accounts of the “media campaign” against the
Kingdom in the United States accused the American media of practicing
“psychological terrorism” against Saudi Arabia, emphasized that such
criticism was inspired by “Zionist” elements, and called into question
the “real” goals behind the American “war on terrorism.”6 Saudi news-
paper coverage of the war in Afghanistan highlighted civilian deaths
due to American bombing. The Saudi press published a number of
stories about Saudis detained in the United States, some of which
accused American authorities of mistreating those detained. During a
visit to Saudi Arabia in January 2002, when I saw these stories in the
local Saudi press, I was asked by a young Saudi journalist why the
United States had a deliberate policy of mistreating Saudis in custody.
When I questioned both the logic and the evidence underlying his
assumption, he responded, “This is what is being said in the streets.”
Public opinion polling in Saudi Arabia after 9/11 confirms wide-
spread disagreement with, even hostility toward, the United States. A
Gallup poll, conducted in late January–early-February 2002, reported
that 64 percent of Saudi respondents viewed the United States either
very unfavorably or most unfavorably. Majorities in the poll associated
America with the adjectives “conceited, ruthless and arrogant.” Fewer
than 10 percent saw the United States as either friendly or trustworthy.7
A Zogby International poll, conducted in March 2002, reported similar
results. Only 30 percent of the Saudis polled supported American-led
efforts to fight terrorism, while 57 percent opposed it; and only
43 percent had a favorable opinion of the American people, and
51 percent an unfavorable opinion—the highest unfavorable rating of
the 8 Muslim countries in which the poll was conducted. The Zogby
poll focused on specific sources of Saudi public antipathy toward
Washington. Majorities looked favorably upon American science
and technology (71 percent), American freedom and democracy
(52 percent), American movies and television (54 percent), American
education (58 percent). However, fewer than 10 percent viewed
* * *
144
F . Gregory Gause, III
U.S. policy in the Arab world or the Palestinian issue in a favorable
light. Of those polled, 64 percent said that the Palestinian issue was
either the most important or a very important political issue to them,
and 79 percent said that they would have a more favorable view
toward the United States if it “would apply pressure to ensure the
creation of an independent Palestinian state.”8
polling data that Saudi public opinion has been distinctly anti-
American in the period following 9/11. Prince Nawwaf ibn Abd al-Aziz,
the head of the Saudi foreign intelligence bureau (al-‘istikhbarat), told
the New York Times in January 2002 that the vast majority of Saudi
young adults felt sympathy for bin Laden’s cause (which parts of the
bin Laden agenda his “cause” included is not made clear), even though
they rejected the attacks on New York and Washington. The paper
reported that a Saudi intelligence survey conducted in October 2001
of educated Saudis between the ages of 25 and 41 concluded that
95 percent of them supported Mr. bin Laden’s cause.9 While it is
difficult to judge their effectiveness, there have been a number of
grassroots initiatives in Saudi Arabia urging the boycott of American
products and American franchises since 9/11.10
The upsurge of Israeli–Palestinian violence in April 2002, with
Israel reoccupying major West Bank towns, saw popular demonstra-
tions in the Kingdom, very unusual events in this tightly controlled
political system, in support of the Palestinian cause and in protest of
the strong American–Israeli relationship. One of the demonstrations
was held in front of the American consulate in Dhahran.11 While a
large part of the general anti-Americanism evident in Saudi public
opinion comes from salafi and other Islamist political quarters, it is
not restricted to the Islamist tendency. The April 2002 Israeli–
Palestinian violence, led about 70 Saudi public intellectuals, many
identified with more liberal interpretations of politics and of Islam, to
issue a very anti-American statement, including the following lines:
“We consider the United States and the current American administra-
tion to be the nursemaid of international terror. It forms with Israel
the real axis of terror and evil in the world.”12
Saudi public opinion anger toward the United States over the
Palestinian issue is relatively easy to document, given the Saudi gov-
ernment’s willingness to allow its citizens to express themselves on
this issue. It is harder to gauge how important other parts of bin
Laden’s “cause”—his objection to the presence of American military
forces in Saudi Arabia, to the American position on Iraq, to American
support for undemocratic regimes in the Arab world, including
* * *
Saudi Perceptions of the United States
145
Saudi Arabia—are in accounting for anti-American sentiment in the
Kingdom. Undoubtedly, all play a role, but it is difficult to tell how
much of a role. What is unquestionable, however, from both anec-
dotal and more scientific methods, is that anti-Americanism in Saudi
Arabia since 9/11 has been a substantial public opinion force.13
The Debate in SALAFI Saudi Circles
about 9⁄11 and the United States
Much of the public opinion discourse on the United States, as on any
politic
al issue in Saudi Arabia, is driven by religious circles—both the
official Islamic establishment supported by the Saudi state, by dissi-
dent salafis both at home and abroad, and by an interesting group of
salafi Islamists who float in between those two groups. It is these
circles that have had a monopoly on state-permitted discourse in
Saudi Arabia, and in turn been promoted by the Saudi state both at
home and abroad, for decades. They, therefore, have access to the
institutional resources to be heard, even when what they are saying
might discomfort the Saudi rulers. They certainly do not encompass
the entire universe of opinion in Saudi Arabia, but they represent the
most important (though very possibly not a numerical majority) and
organized public opinion tendency in the Kingdom.
The official religious establishment in Saudi Arabia, closely allied to
the state, denounced bin Laden and the attacks of 9/11 from the out-
set, and in unambiguous terms. The Mufti of Saudi Arabia, Shaykh
Abd al-Aziz Al Alshaykh, on September 15, 2001, issued a statement
saying the attacks “run counter to the teachings of Islam,” character-
izing them as “gross crimes and sinful acts.”14 One day earlier, the
chairman of Saudi Arabia’s Supreme Judicial Council, Shaykh Salih
bin Muhammad Al-Ludhaydan, termed the attacks a “barbaric act . . .
not justified by any sane mindset, or any logic; nor by the religion of
Islam. This act is pernicious and shameless and evil in the extreme.”
He also condemned those who commit “such crimes” as “the worst of
people.”15 Both statements also cautioned against blaming Islam, or
Muslims in general, for the attacks. Some months after the attacks,
when Al Qaeda’s responsibility had been acknowledged by Saudi
authorities; the Saudi minister of Awqaf and Islamic affairs, Shaykh
Salih bin Abd al-Aziz Al Alshaykh told al-Hayat: “It seems to me that
Al-Qaeda’s thought and approach, from what I have heard of it, is
based on two things: first on declaring as apostate (takfir) governments,
and second on the necessity of jihad against unbelievers (al-kufar) and
governments, and inflaming massacres in order to announce jihad.
* * *
146
F . Gregory Gause, III
These things, from the perspective of shari’a, are in error and a deviation
in the understanding of shari’a.” He went on to say that “whenever
religiosity (al-tadayyun) increases without proper knowledge, deviation
will increase.”16
The Saudi authorities also indicated to the clerical establishment
that they would not tolerate any of the state clergy contravening the
government line in the crisis atmosphere after 9/11. In November
2001, Crown Prince Abdallah met with leading members of the
‘ulama, and told them in no uncertain terms that there should be no
“going beyond the boundaries” in religion (la ghulu fi al-din).17 Reports
that some mosque preachers had taken “leaves of absence” because of
their differences with the government over post-9/11 policy can also
be seen as an indication of the government’s control over the religious
establishment.18 Those who even indirectly questioned that arrange-
ment were quickly rebuked. During the November 2001 meeting
with Crown Prince Abdallah, a senior religious functionary, Abd al-
Muhsin al-Turki, the secretary-general of the Muslim World League,
apparently made a comment to the effect that the ‘ulama shared with
the Al Sa’ud family the responsibilities of rulership in the country. In
January 2002, two senior members of the ruling family, Prince Talal
bin Abd al-Aziz and Prince Turki Al Faysal, both known for their lib-
eral views, wrote newspaper articles refuting this claim, forcefully reit-
erating the fact that the rulers ruled, and the ‘ulama advised the rulers.19
Given this strong control by the state over the religious establish-
ment, it is not surprising that the credibility of the religious pro-
nouncements condemning bin Laden and the 9/11 attacks from that
establishment were called into question by many in the salafi trend.
To fill this “credibility gap,” the Saudis were able to mobilize the sup-
port of a number of past critics of the regime, notable salafi dissidents
of the early 1990s, many of whom had spent time in Saudi prisons.
These salafi dissidents condemned bin Laden and supported the gov-
ernment’s handling of the post-9/11 crisis.20 Shaykh Salman al-‘Awda
is a good example. A fiery critic of Saudi policy in the Gulf War, he was
jailed in 1994, and subsequently held under house arrest until 1999.
Since 9/11, he has condemned extremism in the Muslim world, calling
it a “deviant understanding” of Islam, or a “deviant application of
legitimate teachings.”21 Another example is Shaykh ‘Ayd al-Qarni.
Al-Qarni had been banned by the government from conducting reli-
gious and proselytizing activities for some time, but after 9/11, he
returned to the field. He asserted in an interview that his return was
with the permission of the Saudi rulers, with whom he shared the view
that they had to “unite ranks, unify Muslim discourse, call to God and
* * *
Saudi Perceptions of the United States
147
avoid exaggeration” in religion (using the same words that Crown
Prince Abdallah had earlier used in his November 2001 meeting with
the ‘ulama). Al-Qarni criticized the rush to jihadist activities among
Muslim youth, cautioned against anything that would threaten
national unity in Saudi Arabia and reminded Saudis of their obligation
to loyalty to their rulers.22
This coming together of the Saudi leadership and its former
Islamist critics is the most interesting development in Saudi politics
since 9/11. It certainly signals some decline in the credibility of the
official ‘ulama, as the regime clearly has seen the necessity of reinforcing
the official condemnations of bin Laden with support from religious
figures who have more credibility in salafi circles. It also could indi-
cate that Saudi Islamist thinkers and activists realize that, in the new
world atmosphere of rejection of religious extremism, they need to
trim their sails and seek the protection of the Saudi rulers. It could
simply be that these activists disagree with bin Laden. But one thing
that this phenomenon does prove is the continuing ability of the
Al Sa’ud to rally support around them in a time of crisis.
However, this entente between the Saudi rulers and their former
salafi critics does not imply any change in the views of those critics
toward the United States. Al-Awda, while calling for mutual respect
between Islam and the West, is extremely critical of Western society
philosophically and of American policy in the Middle East specifically.
While he condemned the attacks of 9/11 as “a horrible thing born of
arrogance,” he labeled them “the bitter fruit of a tree planted by
America, for American has succeeded brilliantly in making enemies for
itself.”23 Al-Qarni called the United States after 9/
11 “an oppressor
in the guise of an oppressed,” and accused it of using the pretext of
9/11 to initiate wars that it had previously planned. He called Israel
“a cancer in the body of the Islamic world, which will not be healed
except by tearing it out from its roots.”24 In some measure, the regime
has been able to garner support from its salafi critics because of the
Saudi perception that the United States is conducting a campaign of
criticism and pressure against its rulers since 9/11. How long this
entente will last, as the Saudi government now seeks to repair ties with
the United States, remains an open question.
There are elements within the Saudi salafi movement that were not
reconciled to the Saudi government in the post-9/11 period. Saudi
salafis in exile, represented by Sa’d al-Faqih and the Movement for
Islamic Reform in Arabia (www.miraserve.com), continued their crit-
icism of the government and their opposition to the U.S. role in the
Middle East. Al-Faqih, the most credible spokesman for the salafi
* * *
148
F . Gregory Gause, III
exile opposition, never criticized the attacks of 9/11 and continued to
refer to bin Laden as “Shaykh” in the MIRA publications, emphasizing
his leadership role and putative religious credentials.25 He has also
been very critical of the salafis who did reconcile with the Saudi gov-
ernment after 9/11.26 In Saudi Arabia itself, some salafis opposed
the government’s stance indirectly, either by refusing to rally to the
regime or by speaking out against specific government policies. One
‘alim, Shaykh Humud bin ‘Uqla’ al-Shu’aybi, published an incendiary
fatwa early in the crisis condemning any Muslim government that
cooperated in any way with the United States.27 While the Saudis were
able to maintain control over the violent salafi tendency in the country
in the immediate post-9/11 period, they were not able to eliminate it.
On May 12, 2003, suspected Al Qaeda sympathizers attacked three
residential compounds in the city of Riyadh with car bombs, killing
34 people, including 9 Americans. The perpetrators were believed to