frames/t906401.html. Answering to the question of when, if ever, they
wanted to emigrate to the West, 57% said they desired to do so during
Yeltsin’s rule. See http://www.fom.ru/reports/frames/t907309.html.
38. ФOM-ИHФO. Moscow: POF, 1999, no. 45.
39. Mониторинг общeствeнного мнeния: экономичeскиe и социaльныe
пeрeмeны. Journal of ACSPO, 1994, no. 1, c. 16.
40. Sergei Dovlatov recalled what irritated the Russians who met Americans
for the first time: “Americans are naïve, callous, heartless. One cannot be
friends with Americans. They drink vodka in microscopic doses. It’s like
drinking from toothpaste caps. They are not concerned with global
problems. Their main slogan is ‘Look at things simply!’ And no ecu-
menical grief! When they divorce, they go to a lawyer. (Instead of pour-
ing out their hearts to colleagues.) They describe their dreams to
psychoanalysts. (Instead of calling a friend in the middle of the night.)
The country is in disorder. Gas is getting expensive. The blacks are every-
where. Most importantly—democracy is threatened. If not today then
tomorrow it will stagger and collapse. But we will save it!” Dovlatov,
Прозa, p. 135.
41. One amusing but typical example of the persistence of stereotypes is a
magnum opus prepared in the years of perestroika by a large collective of
leading Americanists and published under the editorship of Yevgeny
Primakov, G. Arbatov, and others: Cоврeмeнныe Cоeдинeнныe Штaты
Aмeрики: Энциклопeдичeокий спрaвочник (Moscow: Political Literature
Publishing House, 1988). In it, the chapter devoted to the Communist
Party of the United States is longer than the space devoted to the rest of
the political parties combined, including the Democratic and the
Republican. (pp. 94–101). American foreign policy is described as unam-
biguously aggressive, militaristic, and conducted in bad faith (pp.
262–271), the economy is described as constantly in crisis (pp.
136–140), and the mass media are characterized as having a “propaganda
complex” (p. 404).
42. An interesting fact related to this is that the number of Russians who are
against American investment into their regional economy grew from 32%
in June 1995 to 40% in October 1998 to 46% in June 1999. See
http://www.fom.ru/reports/frames/t905314.html.
43. Cоврeмeнноe российскоe общeство: пeрeходный пeриод, p. 22.
44. In August 1999, 44% considered the United States as the biggest source
of threat for a nuclear conflict. http://www.fom.ru/reports/frames/
of 19993406.html.
45. Oбщeствeнноe мнeниe-2000. По мaтeриaлaм исслeдовaний (Moscow:
ASCPO, 2000), p. 86. A POF survey from April 1999 showed that from
August 1997 to April 1999—the month of the NATO bombings in
Yugoslavia—the number of people who thought Russia had foreign
enemies grew from 44 to 73%. See http://www.fom.ru/reports/
frames/short/of1999160.html.
46. http://www.fom.ru/reports/frames/of19992704.html.
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138
N ikol ai Zlobin
47. http://www.fom.ru/reports/frames/of19991601.html.
48. www.fom.ru/survey/dominant/310/761/2510.html.
49. Incidentally, such an approach has remained popular after 9/11; 40%
assess Russian–American relations from this point of view. www.fom.ru/
survey/dominant/310/761/25510.html.
50. http://www.fom.ru/reports/frames/of19991503.html.
51. http://www.fom.ru/reports/frames/o904402.html. The same ten-
dency can be observed in surveys conducted by VTsIOM. See
www.wciom.ru/vciom/new/press/press020909_22.htm.
52. http://www.fom.ru/reports/frames/t904209.html.
53. http://www.fom.ru/reports/frames/of19991703.html.
54. http://www.fom.ru/reports/frames/of19991802.html.
55. http://www.fom.ru/reports/frames/t905406.html.
56. http://www.fom.ru/reports/frames/t904208.html; http://www.fom.
ru/reports/frames/of19993003.html; http://www.fom.ru/reports/
frames/o904803.html; http://www.fom.ru/reports/frames/o904402.
www.fom.ru/reports/frames/of19991703.html; http://www.fom.ru/
reports/frames/of19991802.html; http://www.fom.ru/reports/frames/
t905406.html. It must be noted that this didn’t prevent public opinion
from accusing Yeltsin of inaction and the betrayal of fellow Slavs, and led
to his popularity falling to its lowest point.
57. VTsIOM Press Release #9, March 25, 2003; www.wciom.ru/vciom/
new/press030325_09.htm. Press Release #9, April 30, 2003;
www.wciom.ru/vciom/new/press030430_13.htm.
58. FOM, April 24, 2003; www.fom.ru/survey/finfo/804/1616/
6992.html.
59. FOM, May 5, 2003; www.fom.ru/survey/dominant/810/1629/6251.
html.
60. FOM, April 24, 2003; www.fom.ru/survey/dominant/806/1620/
6216.html.
61. Only 8% of Russians judged the U.S. withdrawal from the treaty in posi-
tive terms, and only 5% thought that it may positively reflect on
Russian–American relations. See http://www.fom.ru/reports/frames/
of014901.html.
62. According to a POF survey from March 2002, 79% of Russians sup-
ported a ban on the import of U.S. poultry. As main reasons for their sup-
port, they said that it would be a response to the limitations on Russian
steel exports to the United States, the judging scandals at the Olympics
and the appearance of American military inspectors in Georgia. The poul-
try ban, in the opinion of the majority, demonstrated “Russian inde-
pendence from American and even an ability to oppose it.” See
http://www.fom.ru/reports/frames/d021130.html; http://www.fom.
ru/reports/frames/d021108.html.
63. http://fom.ru/survey/finfo/578/1315/4564.html.
64. www.wciom.ru/vciom/new/press/press020909_22.htm.
* * *
The Special Russian Way
139
65. CDI Russia Weekly # 243, February 7, 2003.
66. Interestingly, according to surveys conducted in France and Russia in the
summer of 2002, Russians and French hold similar opinion of America;
i.e., Russian perceptions have shifted closer to the European ones. See
http://www.wciom.ru/vciom/new/public/public_own/020909_
usa.htm.
67. Thorough (lat.).
68. Oбщeствeннoe мнeниe-2000. По мaтeриaлaм исслeдовaний, p. 82.
69. Ibid., pp. 81–82. Since the 1990s, the great majority of citizens support
“the special Russian way.” See L. Gudkov, Pусский нeотрaдиционaлизм.
In the journal Mониторинг (Moscow: ASCPA, 1997), no. 2, pp. 5–8;
G. Dilegenskiy, «Зaпaд» вроссийском общeствeнном сознaнии, in the
journal Oбщeствeнныe нaуки и соврeмeнность (Moscow: INION, 2000),
no. 5, pp. 71–89.
70. The Eurasian idea has once again begun gaining popularity in Russian
society. Its intellectual elaborator has become the “Eurasia” party, with
Alexa
nder Dugin at the helm. See A. Dugin, Eврaзийский путь кaк
нaционaльнaя идeя (Moscow: Arktogea-Center, 2002). It contends, in
part, that “Russia either has a Eurasian future or none at all. Our task is
to comprehend and triumphantly solidify around the world the Russian
Eurasian truth” pp. 15, 17.
71. Danilevskii showed in his famous book Pоссия и Eврoпa [Russia and
Europe] not only Russia’s uniqueness, but even the uniqueness of the Slav
people, to which, in the words of philosopher Nikolai Strakhov, “belongs
an exclusive position among other nations, to which history has no ade-
quate equal,” Nikolai Strakhov, O книгe Caнилeвского «Pоссия и Eвропa»,
In Nikolai Danilevsky, Pоссия и Eвропa (Moscow: Kniga, 1991), p. 515.
72. See Fyodor Tyutchev: “You cannot reason Russia out / you cannot meas-
ure it with tape / It is a wholly different state / With Russia, you should
just have faith.” This famous poem was used as a traditional form of self-
justification for Russians, not only for the West, but even more frequently
for themselves. I could cite a poem of Mikhail Lermontov, which is also
frequently used to justify Russia’s “uniqueness”: “I love my land, but
with a curious love / My reason cannot conquer it / No glory bought
with blood / No calmness filled with prideful trust / No cherished oaths
of cloudy pasts / Can stir within me pleasant dreams.”
73. As an extreme example, I could cite an article by the editor-in-chief of a
popular newspaper Зaвтрa Alexander Prokhanov, author of the novel
Господин Гeксогeн, which received the most prestigious Russian literature
award in 2002: “Once again the dreadful starred-and-striped cobra is ris-
ing across the ocean on its sinister tail, suspended over the world, fixing
its merciless reptile gaze toward Iraq. America, gone mad on Yugoslavian
and Afghani blood, drunk from its unpunished acts, delirious with world
dominations, is continuing to control the history of the world, fixing its
course with its super-smart weapons, with its spent uranium cores, its
vile provocations comparable to the Gulf of Tonkin incident, or the
* * *
140
N ikol ai Zlobin
destruction of its own skyscrapers in Manhattan. Americans are disgust-
ing to everyone. Nations look with repulsion upon the transatlantic boor,
who has only one ally—Israel, the yellowest, most six-sided star on the
American flag, which will inevitably fade with the next sunrise. ‘Dear
Lord, bring ruin upon America,’ ”—pray people on all the continents at
the dawn and dusk of their days. A. Prokhanov, Ирaк, брaт мой, in
Зaвтрa, August 20, 2002, Even more picturesque is the opinion of the
leader of LDPR, vice-speaker of the state, Duma Vladimir Zhirinovsky:
http://www.compromat.ru/main/zhirinovskiy/bushu.htm.
74. Same for others (lat.).
75. In May of 2001, POF asked this question of the Russian elite: “Do you
think the majority of Russians see America favorably, unfavorably, or neu-
trally?” Surprisingly, the answers were the opposite of the masses’ opin-
ion: 20% thought the Russians see the United States favorably,
40%—unfavorably. See Oslon, Aмeрикa: взгляд из Pоссии. Cо и послe
11 сeнтября, p. 31.
76. It’s interesting to note that Putin’s support for the United States in the
immediate wake of 9/11 increased his rating in Russia. See Oslon,
“Peaкция нa 11 сeнтября в российском общeствeнном мнeнии,” in
Aмeрикa: взгляд из Pоссии. Cо и послe 11 сeнтября, p. 34.
77. Bыступлeниe прeзидeнтa Pоссийской Фeдeрaции B. B. Путинa нa
рaсширeнном совeщaнии с учaстиeм послов Pоссийской Фeдeрaции в MИC
Pоссии, July 12, 2001, http://www.president.kremlin.ru/text/appears/
2002/07/17449.shtml.
78. It must be said that the majority of Russians (60% in the summer of
2002) did not think that the Cold War was over, and among those who did
think it was, the ending date was “when Yeltsin began drinking with the
Americans.” See http://www.fom.ru/reports/frames/d022233.html.
79. Oslon, Aмeрикa: взгляд из Pоссии. Cо и послe 11 сeнтября, pp. 27, 167.
80. Ibid., pp. 31, 137, 166, 201. It should be noted that according to sur-
veys by the ASCPA, a year after the tragedy, the Russians’ opinions did
not change significantly—52% continued to believe that the Americans
got what they deserved and that “now they know first-hand how the people
in Hiroshima and Nagasaki, in Iraq and Yugoslavia felt during the bomb-
ings”; 42% did not believe so. See http://gazeta.ru/print/2002/09/ 11/
vrossiinezal.shtml.
81. Oslon, “10 тeзuсов о Hовой Эпохe”, in Aмeрикa: взгляд из Pоссии. Cо и
послe 11 сeнтября, p. 10.
82. http://www.wciom.ru/vciom/new/public/public_own/020909_
usa.htm; http://www.wciom.ru/vciom/new/press/press020517_12.htm.
83. http://www.wciom.ru/vciom/new/public/public_own/020507_
politru20.htm.
84. http://gazeta.ru/print/2002/09/11/vrossiinezal.shtml; Aмeрикa: взгляд
из Pоссии. Cо и послe 11 сeнтября, pp. 50–54.
* * *
7
S audi Perceptions of the
U nited States since 9⁄11
F. Gregory Gause, III
There is no bilateral relationship that was more affected by the 9/11
attacks than the Saudi–American relationship. On the American side,
the reason is obvious: of the 19 hijackers of the 4 planes that crashed
into the World Trade Center, the Pentagon, and a field in central
Pennsylvania, 15 were from Saudi Arabia. Osama bin Laden, the
leader of the group behind the attacks, also is from Saudi Arabia. As
Americans learned more about the hijackers, bin Laden, and the more
general salafi movement, popular anger against Saudi Arabia grew.
According to a poll by Zogby International, in January 2001, 56 per-
cent of Americans polled viewed Saudi Arabia favorably and 28 per-
cent unfavorably. In December 2001, those numbers had basically
reversed, with only 24 percent viewing Saudi Arabia favorably and
58 percent unfavorably.1 Much of the American political and media
elite, which had generally accepted the U.S.–Saudi relationship—an
exchange of security for oil, to simplify—began to question the value
for the United States of a close relationship with Riyadh. While the
Bush administration has asserted since 9/11 that the relationship with
Saudi Arabia remains solid, there is no question that the unprece-
dented public focus on Saudi Arabia (even greater than during the
1973–1974 oil embargo, I would argue) has shaken the foundations
of the bilateral relationship.
A similar process took place in Saudi Arabian public opinion after
the 9/11 attacks. Popular disaffection with the United States was
already substantial before the attacks. American policy on the Israeli–
Palestinian conflict and on Iraqi sanctions was generally unpopular.
Bin Laden and other Saudi dissidents had successfully raised the issue
of the American military presence in the Kingdom. Reacting to the
* * *
142
F . Gregory Gause, III
intense media scrutiny on Saudi Arabia in the United States that
followed the attacks, the Saudi government took a number of steps to
distance itself from the United States. These moves, in effect, opened
the door to more open expression of anti-Americanism in Saudi
Arabia than is usually permitted. The Saudi government, perhaps
taken aback by the vigor of those sentiments, began, in the spring of
2002, to send signals that there are limits to the anti-Americanism
that it will tolerate at home. While this was happening, a vigorous
debate emerged within Saudi salafi circles about the appropriateness
of even considering dialogue with the West in general and the United
States in particular.
This chapter will consider the question of Saudi views toward the
United States from these various perspectives, with special attention
to how the government’s policy is both affected and affects general
public opinion and the debates within the salafi trend.
The Saudi Government and Public
Opinion Post-9⁄11
The first response of officials in the Saudi government to the attacks
of 9/11 was to deny any Saudi responsibility for them, even to deny
that any Saudis were involved (carefully noting that bin Laden,
stripped of his citizenship in 1994, was no longer a Saudi).2 The focus
on Saudi Arabia in the American media led a number of Saudi offi-
cials, including Crown Prince Abdallah, to complain publicly that the
Kingdom was being targeted in a “campaign” against it.3 The Saudi
government very publicly denied American forces the right to use
Saudi bases for the air campaign in Afghanistan, even while quietly
allowing the U.S. to use the command and control center at Prince
Sultan Airbase, south of Riyadh, to coordinate that campaign.
Public disquiet over the course of events after 9/11 led Crown
Prince Abdallah to hold a series of meetings with Saudis from a number
of sectors (educators, police and security officials, army officers, reli-