battle against corruption and favoritism, the rule of law, and respect
for human rights and ethnic minorities. Americanization went too
far—the elite began losing control over the news agencies, which it
had only recently been using in its own interests to Americanize the
country and prevail over communist bureaucrats. In other words, the
further popularization of the American theory and practice became, in
its own way, a censor morum, and undermined the strength and
omnipotence of the new Russian authorities. They couldn’t allow that
to happen.
The Russian elite began to feel first-hand the consequences of the
fall in international influence and the loss of choices for their country.
A sense of jealousy toward the American elite began to increase—not
material jealousy (most Russian politicians have more wealth and
assets than their American counterparts), but “geopolitical jealousy”
of America’s military, political, and diplomatic choices, jealousy
toward their ability to fulfill their agenda. At the beginning, the new
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elite naively assumed that it would play the same role in the world
as the Soviet elite once did, that is, idem et caeteris.74 The realization
that this was not to be turned into anti-Americanism among the new
ruling elite.
By the end of the 1990s, Russia began transforming itself into a
country with a pro-American or neutral population, and a political
elite that viewed the United States with skepticism, suspicion, and
hostility.75 Yet, a small but powerful pro-American group also formed
in the elite—one that after 9/11 began to be associated with
President Putin and his inner circle.76 Speaking in front of Russian
diplomats in July 2002, Putin declared that the Russian–American
relationship was based on “a new reading of the national interests of
both countries, as well as a common understanding of the nature of
global threats.” He called for the development of a “trusting partner-
ship between Russia and the US.”77
The terrorist acts of 9/11 became events of historic magnitude,
altering many global processes. It is too early to speak of their influ-
ence on the Russian citizens’ objective perceptions of the United States.
Not enough time has passed for emotions to cease playing a defining
role. The uniqueness of the Russian reaction is tied to the fact that
the event that started a new epoch happened not in Russia, as it did
10 years ago, but on the territory of a former foe, which had defeated
Russia in the Cold War. Many Russians saw this as the true end of that
war, because both countries now had common priorities.78 Thus,
40 percent believe that the terrorist threat is a global one, and that the
attack could have occurred in Europe or in Russia. Yet, 63 percent
believed that this was payback for America’s foreign policy.79
Immediate reactions to the terrorist attacks were extremely emotional.
“Pity and compassion” were named by 50 percent of the respondents,
“fear, anger, and shock” by another 36 percent, “indifference” by
only 2 percent. Seventy-nine percent said they condemn the people
who celebrated the attacks. If before the terrorist acts only 20 percent
thought that the United States played a positive role in the world,
while 58 percent thought it played a negative role, the numbers after
the attack changed to 26 and 48 percent, respectively. The number of
those who saw America as an unfriendly state decreased from 52 to
43 percent, while the number of those who saw it as a friend increased
from 32 to 43 percent.80
The 1990s saw the development of the unchallenged and undeni-
able power of the United States. But on September 11, “a nameless
and omnipotent evil not only destroyed the power of the US, but
called into question the possibility of the existence of a power that can
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withstand such evil.”81 For Russians, who, in the words of an old
remark by Winston Churchill, respect and fear nothing more than
power, the blatant vulnerability of America was an important psycho-
logical factor. There was a reassessment of the concepts of “us” versus
“them.” Gradually, in both countries, an understanding emerged that
our differences, for all their relevance, are immeasurably smaller than
traditionally thought. It could be said that after 9/11, a real long-
term basis for strategic union, one that isn’t politically adversarial, could
be created. In many ways, it is still a tabula rasa. But Putin’s course of
rapprochement with America began receiving widespread support.
After George Bush’s visit to Moscow in May 2002, Putin’s rating rose
another 7 points and reached 75 percent. Many judged the meeting
itself in a positive light as well.82
The popularity of Putin’s foreign policy is based on the fact that he
doesn’t go for concessions, but demands “equal cooperation”—so
think 50 percent of Russians. Twelve percent think he received unilateral
concessions from America, and 13 percent think he makes concessions
to America. By comparison, 42 percent think that Gorbachev made
unilateral concessions to America, 46 percent think Yeltsin did so,83
and neither put “a trusting partnership” with America as one of their
goals. In public opinion, Putin’s pro-Americanism does not contradict
his image as a protector of Russian interests.
The number of people who condemn America for something reg-
ularly exceeds 50 percent, while 70 percent of Russians are for “Russia
and the US having a closer relationship.” Many think that the terrorist
acts helped America understand Russia. This gives Moscow a chance
for a substantial increase of its global influence—not at the cost of
American influence, but in tandem with it. America can effectively
respond to the threat it was given and carry the burden of global lead-
ership only in a union with Russia, accepting Russia’s just and uncom-
promising stance on battling global terrorism. So think 60 percent of
Russians.84
Russia is an example of a country where there is a perpetual dis-
tinction between the deep-seated objective perception of America and
the public sentiment at any given time. That is why it is so easy to
make a mistake, to build a political trajectory, or make decisions on
the basis of the latest opinion poll. By the time the decisions are
enforced, the moods will change and the policy will be dissonant with
the sentiment. Such miscalculations, on the parts of both Russian and
American elites, are not uncommon. On the other hand, to construct
an agenda based on fundamentals is also dangerous, since public opinion
could the politician’s popularity shift dramatically, thus calling into
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question. But in a Russian–American relationship, only such an
approach will be strategically successful. Such was Putin’s decision, for
example, to support America after 9/11.
Alexander Pushkin once noted that he was annoyed by many
Russian attitudes, but became even more annoyed when foreigners
pointed them out. Even today, many Russians would concur with the
words of their great poet. Isn’t “Love it or leave it!” a famous American
expression? The evolution of Russian perceptions about America
reflects a centuries-old Russian conflict between a tendency to inte-
grate with the Western world and a desire to maintain its uniqueness.
No one really knows if this conflict will reach a solution, but we can
be sure that the United States will remain a yardstick by which Russians
continue to measure themselves.
Notes
The author wishes to thank Leon Aron, director of Russian studies at the
American Enterprise Institute, and Barbara Friedman from the University of
Missouri for valuable comments made during the preparation of this chapter.
1. Vasily Klyuchevsky, Cочинeния в дeвяти томaх, vol. 9 (Moscow: Mysl’,
1990), p. 386.
2. Suffice it to say that the Russian language has no word for “privacy”—
evidence, in my opinion, of the existence of two widely divergent principles
of society in Russia and the United States.
3. As a February 2, 2002 survey by Russia’s Public Opinion Fund (hereafter
POF) showed, the Olympics sharply changed Russian opinion of the
United States. Only 17% of Russians called the United States a friendly
nation, while 71% thought it hostile. As a result of the Olympics, the num-
ber of Russians who viewed the United States positively, decreased sharply
by 12%, which equaled the increase in the number of people who thought
that the United States was Russia’s enemy. By comparison, before the
Olympics, 29% of people saw America unfavorably, and 32% favorably. A
few weeks after the Olympics, the surge of anti-Americanism began to
decline once again. The United States was viewed favorably by 49%, and
unfavorably by 41%. See http://top.rbc.ru/index2.shtml for 03.07.2002
and 04.01.2002.
4. See A. Oslon, “Peaкция нa 11 сeнтября в российском общeствeнном
мнeнии,” in Aмeрикa: взгляд из Pоссии. Cо и послe 11 сeнтября (Moscow:
POF, 2001), p. 31.
5. See Dominant, no. 6, 19, 23, 37, 47; 2002, no. 6,19 (Moscow: POF,
2001).
6. See G. Diligensky, «Зaпaд» и российскоe общeство (Moscow: POF, 2001),
July 12, http://www.fom.ru/reports/frames/d012541.html.
7. See Alexander Zinoviev, Зaпaд (Moscow: Tsentrpoligraf, 2000).
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The Special Russian Way
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8. Alexander Block formulated this forcefully in his poem “Scythians.”
9. Sergey Soloviev, Чтeния и рaсскaзы по русской истории (Moscow:
Pravda, 1990), p. 439.
10. Nikolai Danilevsky, Pоссия и Eвропa (Moscow: Kniga, 1991), p. 498.
11. Ibid., pp. 68–69.
12. This conflict unfolds in War and Peace as well. For this reason, the tradi-
tional English-language translation of the title may confuse the reader. In
Russian, the word “mir” can mean both “world” and “peace.” A more
correct translation would probably be “War and the World.”
13. Lev Gumilev, Oт Pуси до Pоссии: очeрки зтничeской истории (Moscow:
Svarog and K, 2002), p. 217.
14. Memoirs of V. Pecherin, Зaмогильныe зaписки (Apologia pro vita mea)
were published in the book Pусскоe общeство 30-х годов X1X вeкa. Люди
и идeи: Meмуaры соврeмeнников (Moscow: Nauka, 1989), pp. 148–311.
Pecherin propounded the idea of rejecting “the tyranny of materialist civ-
ilization,” and thought that humankind’s salvation lay in religion, not sci-
ence. Pitirim Sorokin thought that Russia and the United States are
bound to have a binding peace, since they have similar systems of values
and institutions. See Pitirim Sorokin, Pоссия и Cоeдинeнныe Штaты
(New York: Chekhov Publishing, 1944).
15. An interesting related fact is that in the initial drafts of his novel, The
Idiot, Fyodor Dostoyevsky calls his protagonist Count Myshkin “a Count
of Christ.” See F. Dostoyevsky, Cобрaниe сочинeний в 10 томaх, vol. 6
(Moscow: State Literature Publishing House, 1957), p. 709.
16. This idea is widespread in Russian culture. Recall that in Crime and
Punishment, Dostoyevsky brings together Raskolnikov and Sonya
Marmeladov, juxtaposing pragmatic reason with emotion. Sonya is also a
criminal, but she criminalizes herself for the sake of others. It is better to
be the victim, the object of aggression, rather than the aggressor, says
Dostoyevsky.
17. Soloviev, Чтeния и рaсскaзы по русской истории, op.cit. pp. 493–494.
18. In trying to understand the origin of Russian anti-Americanism, I often
see a double reflexive emerging: we don’t like them because we think that
they don’t like us.
19. Russia’s biggest modernizer, Peter the Great, once said to his circle of
advisors, “We need Europe for a few more decades, and then we can turn
p. 397. Since then, in moments of improvement in relations between
Russia and the West, such talk is regularly heard among the Russian polit-
ical establishment.
20. Georges Nivat, “Paсхожee мнeниe, что у нaс нa Зaпaдe цaрит бeзвeрьe,
ошибочно . . .” Kontinent, no. 112 (2002), pp. 247–248.
21. One can’t argue about taste (lat.).
22. Soloviev, Чтeния и рaсскaзы по русской истории, p. 447.
23. Contemporary emigrant poet Igor Guberman wrote about this once:
“The muted Russian soul / eschews associations / and takes on foreign
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N ikol ai Zlobin
languages / with glossaries and detestations. / How queer the hue of
Russian life / composed o’er so many centuries / its conscience talks to
Russia / albeit in foreign languages.” I. Guberman, Гaрики нa кaждый
дeнь (Moscow: EMIA, 1992), pp. 221–222.
24. Dostoyevsky’s The Idiot is interesting in that respect. Dostoyevsky tries to
prove that the necessary basis for public life is not the law or the state, but
the moral authority of the church, and that Russians can develop success-
fully only within a framework of the ideals of the Russian Orthodox
Church. His protagonist Count Myshkin is, in the words of Saltykov-
Schedrin, a man who had attained “a complete moral and spiritual
balance.”
25. Interestingly, the eminent sociologist Pitirim Sorokin thought, on the
contrary, that the political and economic roots of the democratic system
are identical in Russia and the United States, having grown out of a peas-
ant system of values. See Pitirum Sorokin, Pоссия и Cоeдинeнныe Штaты
(New York: Chekhov Publishing, 1944), pp. 38, 64, 75, 88–89.
26. Klyuchevsky, Cочинe�
�ия в 9 томaх, vol. 8: Articles pp. 378, 383–384.
27. Sergei Dovlatov, Прозa, vol. 2, p. 135
28. Nikolai Berdyaev, Pусскaя идeя: Oсновныe проблeмы русской мысли X1X
вeкa и нaчaлa XX вeкa (Paris: YMCA Press, 1971), p. 243.
29. Nikolai Berdyaev writes that “rationalism is the fatal sin of the West . . .
Russia is free of the sin of rationalism, which binds one to necessity.” See
O Pоссии и русской ФилосоФской культурe, (Moscow: Nauka, 1990),
pp. 81–82. Alexander Herzen sharply criticized the idea of a parliamen-
tary democracy and thought the русский мужик will save the world.
30. One recalls the history of a judicial error in Lev Tolstoy’s novel
Bоскрeсeниe and the fate of its heroine Katyusha Maslova.
31. Klyuchevsky, Cочинeния в дeвяти томaх, vol. 9 c. 424.
32. ФOM. Aмeрикaнский обрaз жизни. 05.31.2001; http://www.fom.ru/
survey/dominant/203/517/1746.html.
33. http://www.fom.ru/survey/finfo/579/1316/4569.html.
34. According to an POF survey from October 2001, 80% of Russians said
that their perception of the United States had not changed after the
attacks. www.fom.ru/survey/dominant/290/721/2358.html.
35. Cоврeмeнноe российскоe общeство: пeрeходный пeриод (Moscow:
Institute of Sociology RAN, 1998), p. 22.
36. Mониторинг общeствeнного мнeния: экономичeскиe и социaльныe
пeрeмeны. Journal of the All-Russian Center for the Study of Public
Opinion (hereafter—ACSPO), 1997, no. 1, c. 12; no. 2, c. 21.
37. As an example, I could cite a POF survey from the fall of 1999. To the
question “Which were the hardest years of your life,” 65% said
1996–1999, 33%—1991–1995, 5%—1986–1990, while only 6% chose
the years of World War II, and 3% the first post-war decade. See
http://www.fom.ru/reports/frames/t906402.html. On the question of
which years were the best, 27% said 1976–1980, another 27%—
1981–1985, and 20%—1971–1975. See http://www.fom.ru/reports/
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