Party), Collected Works (Tehran: Enteshar Publishing House, 1357
[1978]), vol. 7, pp. 95–97.
* * *
Anti-Americanism in Iran
205
33. Ali Shariati, Jahatguiri-ye Tabaghati-ye Eslam (The Class Orientation of
Islam), Collected Works (Tehran: Enteshar Publishing House, 1358
[1979]), vol. 13, p. 113.
34. Ali Shariati, Ba Mokhtabha-ye Ashena (With Familiar Listeners), Collected
Works (Tehran: Hosseyniye Ershad), vol. 1, pp. 7–8.
35. For the full account, see Ervand Abrahamian, Radical Islam: The Iranian
Mojahedin (London: I.B. Tauris, 1989).
36. Suroosh Irfani, Revolutionary Islam in Iran. Popular Liberation or
Religious Dictatorship? (London: Zed Books Ltd, 1983), p. 95.
37. Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, Sahife-ye Nur (Letters from Light),
Introduction by Ayatollah Seyyed Ali Khamenei, 16 vols. (Tehran: Markaz-e
Madarek-e Farhanghi-ye Enghelab-e Eslami, 1363 [1982]), vol. 1,
pp. 109–113.
38. See all the Ayatullah Khomeini’s discourse befor the anticapitulation in
1964. Sahif-ye Nur, op. cit., pp. 8–102.
39. Ayatollah Khomeini, Sahife-ye Nur, vol. 1, p. 120.
40. Ibid., p. 186.
41. Ibid., p. 207.
42. Ibid., p. 208.
43. Ibid.
44. Philippe Roger, L’Ennemi americain. Généalogie de l’antiamericanisme
francais (Paris: Le Seuil, 2002).
* * *
1 1
U ncle Sam to the Rescue?
T he Political Impact of
A merican Involvement in
A S E A N S ecurity and Political
I ssues in the Wake of 9⁄11
Farish A. Noor
Introduction: The “Great Game”
Comes to Southeast Asia
Never have the armies of the North brought peace, prosperity, or
democracy to the peoples of Asia, Africa, or Latin America. In the
future, as in the past five centuries, they can only bring to these peoples
further servitude, the exploitation of their labour, the expropriation of
their riches, and the denial of their rights. It is of the utmost importance
that the progressive forces of the world understand this.
Samir Amin,
Arab Political Scientist,
writing in al-Ahram, May 2003
Political realities are just as much the result of discursive activity as
they are rooted in concrete facts and figures. This fact was demon-
strated most explicitly in the discursive and ideological acrobatics
performed by the leaders of Western and Southeast Asian countries in
the immediate aftermath of the terrorist attacks on the United States
of America on September 11, 2001. To bring home the reality of the
events that took place thousands of miles away, the Kuala Lumpur
Commercial Centre (KLCC) twin towers in Malaysia were evacuated
the following day, after a bomb scare that came just as Malaysians were
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208
F arish A. Noor
coming to terms with the loss of Malaysian workers who were lost or
killed in the New York attacks. The form and content of Malaysian
political discourse was subsequently altered on the basis of a simple
rumor.
As the events following the aftermath of the attack were broadcast
all over the world by American media channels like CNN, emotions
ran high. The paranoia and xenophobia stoked by the media was soon
echoed by the establishment itself. The American government responded
with calls for revenge and retribution, and, in the days that followed,
the president of the United States, George W. Bush, vowed that those
responsible for the attacks would be made to pay and that America
will lead the new global “crusade” against terrorism—an unfortunate
choice of words that only added to the confusion and anxiety of the
time, and which also shifted the focus of U.S. political rhetoric to a
radically different register.
As a result of this discursive shift, the political game-board of Asia
was reconfigured, with old allies suddenly being designated as “rogue
states,” while erstwhile adversaries suddenly being bestowed the title
(by Washington, no less) of “moderate, progressive” Muslim states that
were allied in the global “war against terror.”
The discourse of the war against terror soon developed into a
sophistic discursive economy of its own, replete with both positive sig-
nifiers (“defenders of peace, freedom and democracy”; the “allied forces
of good”; the “crusade against terror,” etc.) and negative signifiers
(“Muslim extremists/fanatics”; the “Axis of Evil,” etc.). Mellifluously
driving this rhetoric was an internal idea that was—though based
mainly on unfounded and empirically un-verifiable essentialist notions—
coherent and logical in its own way. Two neat chains of equivalences
were drawn: on the one side stood the “forces of good” led by an
increasingly unilateralist and bellicose United States and its allies, and
on the other stood the “Axis of Evil” made up of those countries and
movements that were said to be supportive of the use of terrorism
against the West.
In time, the discourse of war against terror was globalized and
hegemonized—mainly thanks to the dominance of the omnipresent
American media in Asia—and the logic of the war against terror was
normalized in both national and international politics in the region.
The governments of ASEAN, some of which were already engaged in
internal conflicts against numerous separatist movements in their own
countries, were the first to put to service the discourse of war against
terror to further intensify their efforts to eliminate internal dissidents
and critics. The governments of Malaysia and Indonesia, in turn,
* * *
Uncle Sam to the Rescue?
209
found the best pretext to up the stakes in their own contestation
against local Islamists from the opposition.
The war against terror has allowed some of the governments of
Asia to backtrack on their earlier policies, most notably the govern-
ment of the Philippines, that had earlier attempted to chart its own
course by distancing itself from the long arm of Big Brother United
States and forcing the United States to withdraw its troops and weapons
facilities from naval and air bases on Filipino soil. A cursory overview
of recent Asian history will show how the governments of Asia have
tried to reposition themselves vis-à-vis the United States and their own
domestic political constituencies in the wake of 9/11.
Pakistan’s government under General-turned-President Parvez
Musharraf was brought into the American-led coalition as its most
problematic and reluctant partner with the use of a somewhat over-
sized carrot and an overly endowed stick. Promises of economic aid
and a cancellation of outstanding loans were coupled with threats
of even more comprehensive sanctions and international isolation
should the Pakistani government fail to comply with the demands of
Washington. In time, Islamabad agreed—but not without paying a
hea
vy price in the form of massive demonstrations and violent protests
in all the major cities of the country, courtesy of Islamist parties
like the Jama’at-e Islami (JI) and Jamiat’ul Ulama-e Islam (JUI). To
compound matters further, Pakistan’s entry into the American-led
coalition, reluctant though it was, infuriated many senior leaders of
the armed forces and intelligence services who had been working with
the Taliban and the numerous Jihadi and Mujahideen groupings in the
country all along.
In Indonesia, groups like the Front Pembela Islam and Lashkar
Jihad were immediately mobilized and took to the streets as soon as
America announced its unilateral move to confront its foes abroad.
But like Pakistan, Indonesia was also caught in dire straits of its own.
The country’s president, Megawati Sukarnoputri flew to Washington
to discuss the implications of Indonesia’s involvement in the interna-
tional campaign against Osama bin Laden and the Taliban—though
it was soon clear that the sensitive matter of Indonesia’s spiraling
debt problem was also put on the agenda. Realpolitik considerations
aside, the Islamist parties and movements in Indonesia were less prag-
matic in their approach to the problem. The Indonesian president
was warned by the country’s Islamist groups (and members of her
own government like Hamzah Haz) that any attempt to appease the
Americans would lead to a backlash at home with heavy political costs
involved.
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210
F arish A. Noor
The Philippines was likewise forced to deal with a backlash from
Islamist groups and movements in the troubled Island province
of Mindanao in the south. Soon after the American response was
made known to the international community, the Abu Sayyaf group
renewed its attacks on Filipino government installations and outposts
all over the province, and a new wave of hostage-taking was soon on
the way.
Malaysia was unwittingly dragged into the global campaign that
followed in the wake of the 9/11 attack. First came the news that
letters containing anthrax spores that was sent to an address in the
United States originated from Malaysia. It was later discovered that
the letters were not, after all, contaminated and that nobody in
Malaysia was involved. But the FBI’s reports also pointed the finger at
Malaysia when it was later revealed that Khalid al-Midhar, one of the
close associates of Osama bin Laden, had met with other associates in
Malaysia previously in January 2000. Later, a former member of bin
Laden’s Al Qaeda movement, Jamal Ahmed Al-Fadhl, also told a U.S.
court that some money was deposited in Malaysia, which Malaysian
authorities denied.
Developments in Malaysia—like that in Indonesia and the
Philippines—soon took their course at an accelerated pace. During
the U.S.-led attack on Afghanistan in October 2001, the country’s
biggest Islamist opposition party (the Pan-Malaysian Islamic party,
PAS) declared its own jihad against the United States and its allies,
Israel and Britain.1 Loud (though nonviolent) demonstrations outside
the U.S. and British embassies sent shockwaves across the country,
and the foreign business community as well as Malaysia’s large non-
Malay, non-Muslim minority groups were taken aback by PAS’s call
for jihad against the infidels.
The situation was exploited to the full by the Mahathir administra-
tion, which saw it as the best justification for its own policies vis-à-vis
the local Islamist opposition. Henceforth, the Malaysian government’s
crackdown on Islamist cells and networks—both real and imagined—
would receive less criticism from foreign and local observers. By
presenting itself as the face of “moderate” and “progressive” Islam at
work, the Mahathir government had managed to outflank the Islamist
opposition and reposition itself successfully.
This fact was made all the more clearer when the American trade
representative, Robert B. Zoellick (who was on a visit to Malaysia and
the other countries in the region) publicly stated that President Bush
“was pleased with the support given by Malaysia.”2 The United States
then extended its thanks to the Mahathir administration for the
* * *
Uncle Sam to the Rescue?
211
support it had shown despite the difficulties it had to face from the
local opposition (meaning PAS). By then, it was clear that an entente
cordiale had been struck: neither Malaysia nor the United States was
prepared to let political differences get in the way of economic neces-
sity. Trade between the two countries amounted to US$38 billion
(RM144 billion) a year and America was, after all, Malaysia’s biggest
trading partner abroad. The American trade representative was also
careful to mention all the key words that were necessary for the upward
shift in bilateral relations to register: Zoellick stated that Washington
as a role model for leadership and economic development,” not only
for the region but for the rest of the Muslim world as well. As an Islamic
country, Malaysia was described as “modern,” “progressive,” “liberal,”
and “tolerant”—precisely the terms that were required to form a pos-
itive chain of equivalences, which the Mahathir administration was
looking for.
The newly improved relationship between Kuala Lumpur and
Washington was also reflected in the new understanding between the
two governments. The American trade representative spoke not only
about economic matters but also raised a number of concerns related
to security issues. In his meeting with the Malaysian minister for for-
eign affairs, Syed Hamid Albar, the two men discussed the various
strategies and tactics that could be used to combat the phenomenon
of international “Islamic terrorism.” Later, the American Pacific Fleet
commander in chief, Adm. Dennis Cutler Blair (who was on a tour of
ASEAN) praised the Malaysian government for its help in the global
campaign against international terrorism and vowed that Malaysian
and American armed forces and security services would cooperate
even more in the future against the threat of terrorist networks and
that militant cells posed a security threat to both countries.3
This new understanding would later be cemented when the leaders
of Malaysia and the United States finally met for the first time (on
October 20) at the APEC conference held in Shanghai a few weeks
later. After the meeting between Dr. Mahathir and George W. Bush,
both men agreed to seek ways and means to combat the threat of inter-
national terrorism and to increase the level of cooperation in both trade
and security matters. Needless to say, these moves were strongly con-
demned by the members of the Islamist opposition in Malaysia, who
argued that the Mahathir administration had caved in to Washington’s
demands and was trying to exploit the situation to the full.
The 9/11 attacks, thus, had many long-term and far-flung conse-
quences for Muslim and non-Muslim relations. For the countries in
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212
F arish A. Noor
Asia with sizeable Muslim minorities, it opened up old wounds after
decades of internal civil conflict, and served as a justification for clamping
down on local Muslim resistance movements. Worse still, the fear of
Islamic militancy was exploited by some as a convenient way to whip
up anti-Muslim sentiment, disguised as part of the now-global “War
on Terror.” In Southeast Asia, the worst affected countries were the
Philippines—where fears of renewed militancy on the part of Islamist
movements in the south were intensified—and Indonesia, which expe-
rienced its own national tragedy with the bombing of tourist spots in
Bali that only contributed to the weakening of its tattered economy.
In an effort to seize the initiative on the issue, Malaysia had played
host to the leaders of Indonesia, Thailand, and the Philippines—
Presidents Megawati Sukarnoputri, Thaksin Shinawatra, and Gloria
Arroyo—who had visited the country to discuss matters of bilateral
concern, one of which was the problem of Islamist militant networks
operating in the region. Soon after, the governments of Malaysia,
Indonesia, and Philippines issued a series of statements to the effect
that they would, henceforth, be increasing the level of cooperation
among their intelligence and security services to deal with the problem
of religious militancy in Southeast Asia.
In time, however, it became clear to all that behind the scenes was
the ever-present United States. With ASEAN countries caught in a
desperate race to attract foreign direct investment (FDI), the govern-
ments of ASEAN were caught in a race to out-bid each other’s claim
to be a reliable ally to the United States, and to ensure that their coun-
tries remained in the good books of Washington and Wall Street. First
to jump the gun were Singapore, Philippines, and Thailand, with each
country’s respective leaders categorically stating that they would offer
whatever help necessary to the United States in its bid to win the war