the most anti-American. This was done through the occupation of
the U.S. embassy in Tehran. By doing so, the Islamic students put a
victorious end to the rivalry between Iran’s political entities, which
was more than two decades old—a rivalry constructed around
anti-monarchism and anti-Americanism.
From Anti-Israelism to Anti-Americanism
Interestingly enough, Ayatollah Khomeini never referred to the 1953
coup and the role of the Americans in fomenting it in his pamphlets
and discourses pronounced from 1962 (date of his first political inter-
vention) till the closing months of 1979. Even when on October 27,
1964 he made one of his most furious speeches against the diplomatic
immunity given to Americans working in Iran, he did not say a word
about the coup.37 He was expelled from Iran, spent 11 months in
Turkey, and then went to Iraq for a long period of exile (13 years).
Even there, and while the pro-Soviet and anti-Iranian Iraqi govern-
ment would, probably, not prevent him from doing so, he avoided to
refer to the U.S. role in 1953. While he certainly adopted an anti-
American discourse, he avoided referring to an event that could give
legitimacy to the nationalist movement. Instead, he enriched his anti-
American discourse by using elements directly related to Islam and the
Muslim people of Iran, the Middle East, and other parts of the world.
The missing link was Israel.
Israel, its agents, and its conspiracies against Islamic countries had a
continuous presence in Ayatollah Khomeini’s discourse; but before
being identified as an American agent and a source of anti-Americanism
in Iran, Israel had different and very diverse roles. First, Israel was hated
because of Baha’ism (a new sect developed in Iran and claiming that
Bahaullah was the Prophet of God—contrary to the teachings of the
Koran that Prophet Mohammad was the last prophet). Bahai’s have
their most important temple in Israel. For a while in Ayatollah
Khomeini’s discourse, one cannot distinguish between Israelism and
Baha’ism.38 Furthermore, Israel was the symbol of the Islamic commu-
nity’s incapability to unite against a foreign power that weakened and
exploited divisions within that community. In this position, Israel was
not worse than the Kashmir issue. Khomeini wanted Muslims to be
united against the conspiracy of Jews and Christians, which had
emerged in the creation of the state of Israel. He argued that “had only
four hundred39 million of the total seven hundred million Muslims
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M orad Saghafi
been united” the Jews would not have been able to establish their
state in Palestine or the Indians to dominate Kashmir. Israel was not
just the product of an American conspiracy but of the common con-
spiracy of both the United States and the Soviet Union, the work of
“the West” and “the East” to annihilate Islam and the Muslims.40
Considering the above, the question is when exactly did Khomeini’s
anti-Israelism turn to anti-Americanism? It seems that this is the
precise moment when the Shah decided to offer to the American
army the support they needed to help the Israelis during the 1973
Egyptian–Syrian attack. The Khomeini declaration following that
event is undoubtedly the most radical of his declarations ever made.
After fiercely condemning the Shah’s support for Israel, he urged the
Iranian masses to “oppose the interests of the United States and Israel
in Iran, and attack them even to the point of destruction.”41 From
that time on, there is no distinction for Khomeini between Israeli and
American interests.
This same declaration is also the occasion for Ayatollah Khomeini
to declare publicly, for the first time, his deep desire to see the Pahlavi
Monarchy overthrown in Iran.
I had already warned several times about the danger of Israel and its
elements that are led by the Shah of Iran. Muslims will not see happy
days if they do not get rid of this corrupt element, and Iran will not be
free as long as it is a prisoner of this family.42
It is true that, since his first political appearance in 1963, Khomeini
always used very direct language to talk to the Shah as if the monarch
He gave advice to the Shah in a tone similar to the one used by a
school supervisor talking to his undisciplined and bad students. He
never asked the Shah to do anything in particular; he always warned
him to respect the constitution, to pay allegiance to Islam, to spend
his money for the poor, to be aware about the infiltration of Israeli
and American agents in Iran, and so on. But it is also true that he never
openly asked for the departure of the Shah and certainly not the
dynasty. The question then is why did he suddenly decide to change
his tone and approach? What was so special about the 1973 experience
that Khomeini decided to declare that enough is enough? The text of
his declaration contains the answer:
Now that a large majority of the Muslim countries and several non-
Muslim countries are in war against Israel, the Iranian state and its
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201
undignified Shah, due to his servitude to America and to show his sub-
ordination are apparently quiet but in reality they are supporting Israel.
And the conclusion follows:
I feel danger from this servant of America for the world of Islam, and it
is now the duty of the Iranian people to prevent this dictator’s crimes
and it is the duty of the Iranian army and its officials not to accept
this humiliation and to find a solution for the independence of their
homeland.43
From Israel to the Shah, and from the Shah to America, this is the
path that brought Ayatollah Khomeini and the mass of his followers
from anti-Israelism to anti-Americanism.
CONCLUSION
Iranian anti-Americanism, compared, for example, to French anti-
Americanism that includes strong cultural and anthropological aspects,44
is almost only political. However, one should admit that it was a
special political relationship.
During the course of half a century, every Iranian political force
thought that by enjoying American support, it could run the country
and oblige other forces to be subdued or risk being ejected or com-
pletely marginalized from the country’s political scene. The victory
of the Islamic Revolution showed that between 1953 and 1979, every-
thing had been changed in this regard: now, each political force thought
that all it needed to succeed was to carry the anti-American flag
and be its champion. When, in 1953, Iran’s ever-sought ally, namely
America, turned out to be an untrue friend, its image was definitively
stained for Iranians. However, America’s power and authority were
not affected. America became even more than before, in the Iranian
vision of politics, the powerful force that could play a decisive role in
Iran’s internal
politics. It could foment a coup d’état against a popular
prime minister and bring the Shah back to his throne; it could force
the same Shah to organize free elections and to step back in front of
an unpopular prime minister who had the so-called American green
light for organizing an agrarian reform; it could give back his confi-
dence to his majesty and let him rule an authoritarian regime for
15 years before finally letting him down when the revolution emerged.
The American presence was supposed to free the Iranians from for-
eign interventions, which threatened Iran’s independence. However,
it turned out to be the reverse. At the dawn of the revolution, all
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M orad Saghafi
anti-monarchic forces believed that Iran could choose freely its own
destiny, only if the country could get rid of the U.S. intervention. By
not realizing the Iranian dream, America became Iran’s nightmare.
Instead of becoming their savior, their Messiah, the United States
became their troublemaker, their Satan.
While both points of view contain some truth regarding Iranian
politics, it seems that they could not take account of its most decisive
aspects. Like in every country, socioeconomic conditions, as well as
decision of the country’s leading political actors, are the essential
determinants of political destiny. Of course, if most political actors
continue to think that Americans (by their presence or their absence)
play the decisive role in the political future of the country, then, in
fact, Americans could have this messianic or satanic power. In other
words, the most basic source of anti-Americanism in Iran resides
exactly where its most basic source of pro-Americanism lies, namely, in
the refusal of Iranians to take a serious look at their own problems and
to find indigenous solutions, preferring to give the job to outside
powers, and hope and pray for these to be the messianic ones.
Notes
1. For the history of this organization see Maziar Behrooz, Rebels Without
Cause. The Failure of the Left in Iran (London: I.B. Tauris, 1999).
2. Sazeman-e Fadayian-e Khalgh-e Iran, “Communique about the task of
the provisional government,” Keyhan Newspaper, February 14, 1979.
3. “Khaterat-e Abbas Abdi, Yeki as Daneshjouyan-e Khatt-e Emam. Barressi-
ye Nahve-ye Sheklgiri-ye Harekatha-ye Daneshjouyi az aghaz” (Memories
of Abbas Abdi, one of the students of Imam’s line. Study about the
formation of student movement from the beginning), Keyan-e Sal
(Annual Keyhan), New series, Year 2, vol. 2, Iran during 1365/66
(1986/87), p. 9.
4. Ibid.
5. Ibid.
6. “Etelai-ye efshagari shomare-ye 20” (The denounciation communiqué no.
20), Asnade Lane-ye Jassoussi (Documents of the Spy Nest) (Tehran:
Markaze Nashr-e Assnad-e Lane-ye Jassoussi [Center for publishing the
Document of the Spy Nest]), vol. 1–6, p. 105.
7. “Etelai-ye efshagari shomare-ye 23” (The denounciation communiqué
no. 23), Asnade Lane-ye Jassoussi (Documents of the Spy Nest), op. cit.,
p. 125.
8. Ibid., p. 126.
9. For an account of the mobilization caabilities of these leftist group and
their rivalry with the Khomeini’s followers, see Assef Bayat, Street Politics.
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Anti-Americanism in Iran
203
Poor People’s Movements in Iran (New York: Columbia University Press,
1997).
10. For an academic account of the presence of Britain and Russia in Iran, see
Firooz Kazemzadeh, Russia and Britain in Persia, 1864–1914 (New
Haven: Yale University Press, 1968). For the search of the third power,
see R.K. Ramzani, The Foreign Policy of Iran: A Developing Nation in
World Affairs (Charlotteville: University of Virginia Press, 1966).
11. Kaveh Bayat, “Amrika va Bitarafi-ye Iran” (America and the iranian non-
alignment policy), Goftogu Quarterly, no. 27 (spring 1379 [2000]),
73–85.
12. Fereydoun Zandfard, Iran va Jame’-ye Melal (Iran and the Society of
Nations) (Tehran: Shirazeh, 1377 [1998]).
13. Touraj Atabaki, Azarbaijan Ethnicity and the Struggle for Power in Iran
(London: I.B. Tauris, 2000).
14. For the American help to Iran through the “Point 4” program, see
William E. Warne, Mission For Peace. Point 4 in Iran (Bethesda, Maryland:
Ibex Publishers, 1999). For the less state-oriented American effort to
help Iran’s development, see Linda Wills Qaimmaqami, “The catalyst of
nationalization: Max Thornburg and the failure of private developmental-
ism in Iran, 1947–1957,” Diplomatic History, vol. 19 (winter 1995), 1–31.
15. There are a significant number of books and papers that analyzes the
Iranian–American relation through the logic of Cold War. See James A.
Bill, The Eagle and the Lion: The Tragedy of American Iranian Relation
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989). Richard W. Cottam, Iran
and the United State: A Cold War Case Study (Pittsburgh: University of
Pittsburgh Press, 1988). Habib Lajevardi, “The origins of the U.S. sup-
port for an autocratic Iran,” International Journal of Middle East Studies,
no. 15 (1983), 225–239.
16. For this point of view, which does not see the Cold War logic as the
dominant logic of American–Iranian relations, see Robert MacFarland,
“A peripheral view of the Cold War,” Diplomatic History, vol. 4 (fall
1984), 335–351. Barry Rubin, Paved with Good Intentions: The American
Experience and Iran (New York: Oxford University Press, 1980).
17. H.E. Chehabi, Iranian Politics and Religious Modernism. The Liberation
Movement of Iran under the Shah and Khomeini (London: I.B. Tauris,
1990), pp. 140–186.
18. For a critical account of the February 1961 student protest and the sav-
age intervention of military forces under Amini’s premiership, see Kaveh
Bayat, “Daneshgah-e Tehran, Avval-e Bahman-e 1340” (Tehran University,
January 20, 1961), Goftogu Quarterly, no. 5 (fall 1373 [1994]), 45–57.
19. For an accurate and political history of the land reform, see Eric J.
Hooglund, Land and Revolution in Iran, 1960–1980 (Austin: University
of Texas Press, 1982).
20. See, e.g., Hamid Dabashi, Theology of Discontent. The Ideological
Foundation of The Islamic Revolution in Iran (New York and London:
New York University Press, 1993). For a more sociological analysis, see
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M orad Saghafi
Said Amir Arjomand, The Turban for the Crown. The Islamic Revolution
in Iran (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988). For a
research presenting these changes with a background of history of the
shi’ism, see Yann Richard, Si’ite Islam. Polity, Ideology and Creed (Oxford
and Cambridge: Blackwell, 1995); Shahrough Akhavi, Religion and
Politics in Contemporary Iran. Clergy–State Relations in the Pahlavi Period
(Albany: State University of New York Press, 1980).
21. Cosroe Chaqueri, The Soviet Socialist Republic of Iran, 1920–1921. Birth of
the Trauma (Pittsburgh and London: University of Pitts
burgh Press, 1994).
22. About Kashani and the way he is rehabilitated, see Yann Richard,
“Ayatollah Kashani: precursor of the Islamic Republic?” in Religion and
Politics in Iran. Sh’ism from Quietism to Revolution, edited by Nikki R.
Keddie (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1983).
23. To evaluate how much these withdrawals were important for the decision
of American intelligence service to program the coup, see Kermit Roosevelt,
Counter Coup. The Struggle for the Control of Iran (New York: Mc Graw
Hill, 1981 [1979]).
24. Hojatol-eslam Falsafi, Khaterat va Mobarezat (Memories and Struggles)
(Tehran: Entesharat Markaz Assnad Enghelab Eslami, 1376 [1997]),
p. 112.
25. For a documentary history of the state–clergy relationship during the
Pahlavi era until 1960, see Seyyed Mohammad Hossein Manzoor ol
Ajdad, Marja’iat dar Arse-ye Jame’e va Siassat (The Sources of Imitation
in the Realm of Society and Politics) (Tehran: Shirazeh, 1380 [2001]).
26. Chehabi, op. cit., pp. 180–181.
27. As an example of religious mobilization against the Tudeh Party in
Shiraz, see Ali Shariatmadari, “Nokat Tarikhi, Faaliyat Hezb-e Tudeh,
Melliha va Guerayesh-e Eslami” (Historical notes: Tudeh Party activities,
the nationalists and the Islamist currents), Tarikh Va Farhangue Moasser
Quarterly, no. 8 (winter 1372 [1993]), 114–127.
28. For more details, see Morad Saghafi, “Olguha-ye Noavari-ye Siassi dar
Iran: Negahi be Tajrobe-ye Nehzat-e Khodaparastan-e Socialist” (Patterns
of political innovation in Iran: the experience of the movement of socialist
God-worshippers), Goftogu Quarterly (fall 1376 [1997]), 9–26.
29. Mohammad Nakhshab, Bashar-e Maddi be Zamime-ye Chahar resale-ye
Digar (The Materialist Man and Four Other Essays), Nashr-e Karvan,
Ghom, 1398 Lunar year (1982). The date of the first edition of the five
essays is between 1950 to 1952.
30. Ali Shariati, Tashayyo’e alavi va Tashayyo’e Safavi (Alavi Shi’ism and
Safavid Shi’ism), Collected Works (Tehran: Enteshar Publishing House,
1359 [1980]), vol. 10.
31. Ali Shariati, Eslam Shenassi (Islamology), Collected Works (Tehran:
Enteshar Publishing House, 1357 [1978]), vol. 16, p. 63.
32. Ali Shariati, Shi’e Yek Hezbe Tamam (Sh’ism, a Complete Political