appointed as their captain Pagolo Vitelli, a most prudent man, who
from a private position had risen to the greatest renown. If this man
had taken Pisa, nobody can deny that it would have been proper for the
Florentines to keep in with him, for if he became the soldier of their
enemies they had no means of resisting, and if they held to him they
must obey him. The Venetians, if their achievements are considered,
will be seen to have acted safely and gloriously so long as they sent
to war their own men, when with armed gentlemen and plebians they did
valiantly. This was before they turned to enterprises on land, but
when they began to fight on land they forsook this virtue and followed
the custom of Italy. And in the beginning of their expansion on land,
through not having much territory, and because of their great
reputation, they had not much to fear from their captains; but when
they expanded, as under Carmignuola,[#] they had a taste of this
mistake; for, having found him a most valiant man (they beat the Duke
of Milan under his leadership), and, on the other hand, knowing how
lukewarm he was in the war, they feared they would no longer conquer
under him, and for this reason they were not willing, nor were they
able, to let him go; and so, not to lose again that which they had
acquired, they were compelled, in order to secure themselves, to
murder him. They had afterwards for their captains Bartolomeo da
Bergamo, Roberto da San Severino, the count of Pitigliano,[&] and the
like, under whom they had to dread loss and not gain, as happened
afterwards at Vaila,[$] where in one battle they lost that which in
eight hundred years they had acquired with so much trouble. Because
from such arms conquests come but slowly, long delayed and
inconsiderable, but the losses sudden and portentous.
[*] Battle of Caravaggio, 15th September 1448.
[+] Johanna II of Naples, the widow of Ladislao, King of Naples.
[%] Giovanni Acuto. An English knight whose name was Sir John
Hawkwood. He fought in the English wars in France, and was
knighted by Edward III; afterwards he collected a body of troops
and went into Italy. These became the famous "White Company." He
took part in many wars, and died in Florence in 1394. He was born
about 1320 at Sible Hedingham, a village in Essex. He married
Domnia, a daughter of Bernabo Visconti.
[#] Carmignuola. Francesco Bussone, born at Carmagnola about 1390,
executed at Venice, 5th May 1432.
[&] Bartolomeo Colleoni of Bergamo; died 1457. Roberto of San
Severino; died fighting for Venice against Sigismund, Duke of
Austria, in 1487. "Primo capitano in Italia."--Machiavelli. Count
of Pitigliano; Nicolo Orsini, born 1442, died 1510.
[$] Battle of Vaila in 1509.
And as with these examples I have reached Italy, which has been ruled
for many years by mercenaries, I wish to discuss them more seriously,
in order that, having seen their rise and progress, one may be better
prepared to counteract them. You must understand that the empire has
recently come to be repudiated in Italy, that the Pope has acquired
more temporal power, and that Italy has been divided up into more
states, for the reason that many of the great cities took up arms
against their nobles, who, formerly favoured by the emperor, were
oppressing them, whilst the Church was favouring them so as to gain
authority in temporal power: in many others their citizens became
princes. From this it came to pass that Italy fell partly into the
hands of the Church and of republics, and, the Church consisting of
priests and the republic of citizens unaccustomed to arms, both
commenced to enlist foreigners.
The first who gave renown to this soldiery was Alberigo da Conio,[*]
the Romagnian. From the school of this man sprang, among others,
Braccio and Sforza, who in their time were the arbiters of Italy.
After these came all the other captains who till now have directed the
arms of Italy; and the end of all their valour has been, that she has
been overrun by Charles, robbed by Louis, ravaged by Ferdinand, and
insulted by the Switzers. The principle that has guided them has been,
first, to lower the credit of infantry so that they might increase
their own. They did this because, subsisting on their pay and without
territory, they were unable to support many soldiers, and a few
infantry did not give them any authority; so they were led to employ
cavalry, with a moderate force of which they were maintained and
honoured; and affairs were brought to such a pass that, in an army of
twenty thousand soldiers, there were not to be found two thousand foot
soldiers. They had, besides this, used every art to lessen fatigue and
danger to themselves and their soldiers, not killing in the fray, but
taking prisoners and liberating without ransom. They did not attack
towns at night, nor did the garrisons of the towns attack encampments
at night; they did not surround the camp either with stockade or
ditch, nor did they campaign in the winter. All these things were
permitted by their military rules, and devised by them to avoid, as I
have said, both fatigue and dangers; thus they have brought Italy to
slavery and contempt.
[*] Alberigo da Conio. Alberico da Barbiano, Count of Cunio in
Romagna. He was the leader of the famous "Company of St George,"
composed entirely of Italian soldiers. He died in 1409.
CHAPTER XIII
CONCERNING AUXILIARIES, MIXED SOLDIERY, AND ONE'S OWN
Auxiliaries, which are the other useless arm, are employed when a
prince is called in with his forces to aid and defend, as was done by
Pope Julius in the most recent times; for he, having, in the
enterprise against Ferrara, had poor proof of his mercenaries, turned
to auxiliaries, and stipulated with Ferdinand, King of Spain,[*] for
his assistance with men and arms. These arms may be useful and good in
themselves, but for him who calls them in they are always
disadvantageous; for losing, one is undone, and winning, one is their
captive.
[*] Ferdinand V (F. II of Aragon and Sicily, F. III of Naples),
surnamed "The Catholic," born 1542, died 1516.
And although ancient histories may be full of examples, I do not wish
to leave this recent one of Pope Julius the Second, the peril of which
cannot fail to be perceived; for he, wishing to get Ferrara, threw
himself entirely into the hands of the foreigner. But his good fortune
brought about a third event, so that he did not reap the fruit of his
rash choice; because, having his auxiliaries routed at Ravenna, and
the Switzers having risen and driven out the conquerors (against all
expectation, both his and others), it so came to pass that he did not
become prisoner to his enemies, they having fled, nor to his
auxiliaries, he having conquered by other arms than theirs.
The Florentines, being entirely without arms, sent ten thousand
Frenchmen to take Pisa, whereby they ran more danger than at any other
time of their troubles
.
The Emperor of Constantinople,[*] to oppose his neighbours, sent ten
thousand Turks into Greece, who, on the war being finished, were not
willing to quit; this was the beginning of the servitude of Greece to
the infidels.
[*] Joannes Cantacuzenus, born 1300, died 1383.
Therefore, let him who has no desire to conquer make use of these
arms, for they are much more hazardous than mercenaries, because with
them the ruin is ready made; they are all united, all yield obedience
to others; but with mercenaries, when they have conquered, more time
and better opportunities are needed to injure you; they are not all of
one community, they are found and paid by you, and a third party,
which you have made their head, is not able all at once to assume
enough authority to injure you. In conclusion, in mercenaries dastardy
is most dangerous; in auxiliaries, valour. The wise prince, therefore,
has always avoided these arms and turned to his own; and has been
willing rather to lose with them than to conquer with the others, not
deeming that a real victory which is gained with the arms of others.
I shall never hesitate to cite Cesare Borgia and his actions. This
duke entered the Romagna with auxiliaries, taking there only French
soldiers, and with them he captured Imola and Forli; but afterwards,
such forces not appearing to him reliable, he turned to mercenaries,
discerning less danger in them, and enlisted the Orsini and Vitelli;
whom presently, on handling and finding them doubtful, unfaithful, and
dangerous, he destroyed and turned to his own men. And the difference
between one and the other of these forces can easily be seen when one
considers the difference there was in the reputation of the duke, when
he had the French, when he had the Orsini and Vitelli, and when he
relied on his own soldiers, on whose fidelity he could always count
and found it ever increasing; he was never esteemed more highly than
I was not intending to go beyond Italian and recent examples, but I am
unwilling to leave out Hiero, the Syracusan, he being one of those I
have named above. This man, as I have said, made head of the army by
the Syracusans, soon found out that a mercenary soldiery, constituted
like our Italian condottieri, was of no use; and it appearing to him
that he could neither keep them not let them go, he had them all cut
to pieces, and afterwards made war with his own forces and not with
aliens.
I wish also to recall to memory an instance from the Old Testament
applicable to this subject. David offered himself to Saul to fight
with Goliath, the Philistine champion, and, to give him courage, Saul
armed him with his own weapons; which David rejected as soon as he had
them on his back, saying he could make no use of them, and that he
wished to meet the enemy with his sling and his knife. In conclusion,
the arms of others either fall from your back, or they weigh you down,
or they bind you fast.
Charles the Seventh,[*] the father of King Louis the Eleventh,[+]
having by good fortune and valour liberated France from the English,
recognized the necessity of being armed with forces of his own, and he
established in his kingdom ordinances concerning men-at-arms and
infantry. Afterwards his son, King Louis, abolished the infantry and
began to enlist the Switzers, which mistake, followed by others, is,
as is now seen, a source of peril to that kingdom; because, having
raised the reputation of the Switzers, he has entirely diminished the
value of his own arms, for he has destroyed the infantry altogether;
and his men-at-arms he has subordinated to others, for, being as they
are so accustomed to fight along with Switzers, it does not appear
that they can now conquer without them. Hence it arises that the
French cannot stand against the Switzers, and without the Switzers
they do not come off well against others. The armies of the French
have thus become mixed, partly mercenary and partly national, both of
which arms together are much better than mercenaries alone or
auxiliaries alone, but much inferior to one's own forces. And this
example proves it, for the kingdom of France would be unconquerable if
the ordinance of Charles had been enlarged or maintained.
[*] Charles VII of France, surnamed "The Victorious," born 1403, died
1461.
[+] Louis XI, son of the above, born 1423, died 1483.
But the scanty wisdom of man, on entering into an affair which looks
well at first, cannot discern the poison that is hidden in it, as I
have said above of hectic fevers. Therefore, if he who rules a
principality cannot recognize evils until they are upon him, he is not
truly wise; and this insight is given to few. And if the first
disaster to the Roman Empire[*] should be examined, it will be found
to have commenced only with the enlisting of the Goths; because from
that time the vigour of the Roman Empire began to decline, and all
that valour which had raised it passed away to others.
[*] "Many speakers to the House the other night in the debate on the
reduction of armaments seemed to show a most lamentable ignorance
of the conditions under which the British Empire maintains its
existence. When Mr Balfour replied to the allegations that the
Roman Empire sank under the weight of its military obligations, he
said that this was 'wholly unhistorical.' He might well have added
that the Roman power was at its zenith when every citizen
acknowledged his liability to fight for the State, but that it
began to decline as soon as this obligation was no longer
recognized."--Pall Mall Gazette, 15th May 1906.
I conclude, therefore, that no principality is secure without having
its own forces; on the contrary, it is entirely dependent on good
fortune, not having the valour which in adversity would defend it. And
it has always been the opinion and judgment of wise men that nothing
can be so uncertain or unstable as fame or power not founded on its
own strength. And one's own forces are those which are composed either
of subjects, citizens, or dependents; all others are mercenaries or
auxiliaries. And the way to make ready one's own forces will be easily
found if the rules suggested by me shall be reflected upon, and if one
will consider how Philip, the father of Alexander the Great, and many
republics and princes have armed and organized themselves, to which
CHAPTER XIV
THAT WHICH CONCERNS A PRINCE ON THE SUBJECT OF THE ART OF WAR
A prince ought to have no other aim or thought, nor select anything
else for his study, than war and its rules and discipline; for this is
the sole art that belongs to him who rules, and it is of such force
that it not only upholds those who are born princes, but it often
enables men to rise from a private station to that rank. And, on the
contrary, it is seen that when princes have thought more of ease than
of arms they
have lost their states. And the first cause of your
losing it is to neglect this art; and what enables you to acquire a
state is to be master of the art. Francesco Sforza, through being
martial, from a private person became Duke of Milan; and the sons,
through avoiding the hardships and troubles of arms, from dukes became
private persons. For among other evils which being unarmed brings you,
it causes you to be despised, and this is one of those ignominies
against which a prince ought to guard himself, as is shown later on.
Because there is nothing proportionate between the armed and the
unarmed; and it is not reasonable that he who is armed should yield
obedience willingly to him who is unarmed, or that the unarmed man
should be secure among armed servants. Because, there being in the one
disdain and in the other suspicion, it is not possible for them to
work well together. And therefore a prince who does not understand the
art of war, over and above the other misfortunes already mentioned,
cannot be respected by his soldiers, nor can he rely on them. He ought
never, therefore, to have out of his thoughts this subject of war, and
in peace he should addict himself more to its exercise than in war;
this he can do in two ways, the one by action, the other by study.
As regards action, he ought above all things to keep his men well
organized and drilled, to follow incessantly the chase, by which he
accustoms his body to hardships, and learns something of the nature of
localities, and gets to find out how the mountains rise, how the
valleys open out, how the plains lie, and to understand the nature of
rivers and marshes, and in all this to take the greatest care. Which
knowledge is useful in two ways. Firstly, he learns to know his
country, and is better able to undertake its defence; afterwards, by
means of the knowledge and observation of that locality, he
understands with ease any other which it may be necessary for him to
study hereafter; because the hills, valleys, and plains, and rivers
and marshes that are, for instance, in Tuscany, have a certain
resemblance to those of other countries, so that with a knowledge of
the aspect of one country one can easily arrive at a knowledge of
others. And the prince that lacks this skill lacks the essential which
it is desirable that a captain should possess, for it teaches him to
surprise his enemy, to select quarters, to lead armies, to array the
battle, to besiege towns to advantage.
Philopoemen,[*] Prince of the Achaeans, among other praises which
writers have bestowed on him, is commended because in time of peace he
never had anything in his mind but the rules of war; and when he was
in the country with friends, he often stopped and reasoned with them:
"If the enemy should be upon that hill, and we should find ourselves
here with our army, with whom would be the advantage? How should one
best advance to meet him, keeping the ranks? If we should wish to
retreat, how ought we to pursue?" And he would set forth to them, as
he went, all the chances that could befall an army; he would listen to
their opinion and state his, confirming it with reasons, so that by
these continual discussions there could never arise, in time of war,
any unexpected circumstances that he could not deal with.
[*] Philopoemen, "the last of the Greeks," born 252 B.C., died 183
B.C.
But to exercise the intellect the prince should read histories, and
study there the actions of illustrious men, to see how they have borne
themselves in war, to examine the causes of their victories and
defeat, so as to avoid the latter and imitate the former; and above
all do as an illustrious man did, who took as an exemplar one who had
been praised and famous before him, and whose achievements and deeds
he always kept in his mind, as it is said Alexander the Great imitated