Voice recognition pattern is a combination of physical and behavioral
characteristics that are related to the voice signal patterns. The physical pattern of a voice includes characteristics of the vocal tracts, nasal cavity, mouth, and lips. The behavioral pattern of a voice involves characteristics of the speaker’s physical and emotional state. The authentication of a voice is divided into two groups: text-dependent and text-independent methods.
Text-dependent methods analyze a predetermined phrase.
Facial recognition technology (FRT) uses a digital photograph of an indi-
vidual’s face to take measurements between nodal points, which are locations on every humans face. While there are about 80 different nodal points, an FRT software algorithm requires only 14–22 of these points for comparison.
Postoperational Actions and Debrief
All information should be documented and, if necessary, concealed or kept secret. Once all the personnel are in a safe zone, a debriefing should take place to ensure the objectives were met, no mistakes were made that were not resolved, and the information is disseminated to the recipient(s) or collection is continued (e.g., monitoring).
Make sure no evidence is left behind. This includes equipment, finger-
prints, DNA evidence, disturbed items, and security detection (such as video,
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Advanced Criminal Investigations and Intelligence Operations
alarm activations, biometric evidence of intrusion, etc.). The operation will fail if any such evidence is found by the target subject. The information may become useless or obsolete if the target subject becomes aware of it. Once the information has been obtained, it should be analyzed and disseminated among those involved in the operation. These may be someone else’s responsibility.
Order of Battle
Order of Battle (OB) is the identification, command structure, strength, and disposition of personnel, equipment, and units of an opposing force participating in field operations. A basic understanding of the units of land, air, and sea forces is useful to understanding the OB of intelligence.
Understanding the identification, command structure, strength, and
disposition of personnel, equipment, and units of an opposing force can help determine the tactical and strategic intentions of a force, as well as the composition and capabilities of the force. Special Operations combat support and combat service support may have a different structure. Special operations, for example, usually operate much smaller, but highly specialized, units.
The basic composition of most military forces (army, navy, air force) is
illustrated in Figures 1.2 through 1.5.
Army
Theater commander or
General of the army O-11
chief of staff
(only used in WWII)
Army
Army
Army
Army
100,000
100,000
100,000
100,000
General O-10
or more
or more
or more
or more
Corps
Corps
Corps
Corps
LTG O-9
Corps
Corps
Corps
Corps
Corps
Corps
Corps
Corps
(2–4 divisions)
(2–4 divisions)
(2–4 divisions)
(2–4 divisions)
50,000–75,000
50,000–75,000
50,000–75,000
50,000–75,000
BGN O-7 (usually deputy commander of a division or commander of a command, e.g., Division
MGN O–8
Division
USACIDC—US Army criminal investigations command)
Brigade or
Division
COL O-6
LTC O-5
Brigade or
Brigade or
Battalion
(3–4 brigades)
Battalion
MAJ O-4
13,748–15,000
battle group
Battalion
(usually
(3–4 battalions)
Battalion
executive
Company
CPT O-3
1,356–3,000
(3–5 companies)
officer of a
Company
Company
445–1,000
battalion;
Company
may be
Company
Platoons
2LT O-2
Platoons
commander
(4–6 platoons)
Platoons
of a special
185–200
Platoons
forces
1LT O-2 (usually executive officer of a company or a
(3–5 squads)
B-team, i.e.,
senior platoon leader)
35–40
B-4A-Teams or
a USACIDC
detachment)
Figure 1.2 Order of battle: table of organization (army).
Black Bag Operational Planning
11
Order of battle: Army organization
Command
Unit
Strength
∙ SSG (E-6)
∙ Squad (2 teams)
11
∙ 2LT/1LT (O-2/O-1)
∙ Platoon (3–4 squads)
35
∙ CPT (O-3)
∙ Company (4–6 platoons)
184–200
∙ Maj (O-4)
∙ (Usually executive officer of a battalion;
• May be commander of a Special Forces B-Team, i.e.,
3–4 A-Teams or a USACIDC detachment)
∙ LTC (O-5)
∙ Battalion (3–5 companies)
445–1,000
∙ COL (O-6)
∙ Brigade or battle group (3–4)
1,356–3,000
∙ Maj general (O-8)
∙ Division (3–4 Brigades)
13,748–15,000
∙ Lt general (O-9)
∙ Corps (2–4 Divisions)
50,000–75,000
∙ General (O-10)
∙ Army
100,000 or more
∙ General of the
∙ Theater or chief of staff
(only used in WWII)
army (O-11)
Figure 1.3 Order of battle: command structure (army).
Order of battle: Navy
Command
Unit
O-3/LIUET
Patrol or escort
O-4/LTCMD
Destroyer escort, submarine, or small auxiliary
O-5/CMDR
Destroyer, auxiliary ship or
Division of destroyers or submarines
O-6/CAPT
Heavy ship, squadron of destroyers or
Naval station
O-7/Commodore
Usually commissioned only in time of war
Division of heavy ships, Flotilla of lesser ships,
Naval district of task force
O-9/VADM
Major division of a fleet or naval district
O-10/ADM
The principal fleet or separate fleets
O-11/Fleet admiral
Theater commander or chief of naval
operations (CNO) (only used in WWII)
Figure 1.4 Order of battle: table of organization (navy).
Communications in Unconventional Environments
U.S. Army Field Manual 30-20 Special Forces Operational Techniques says,
“The communications system and techniques employed by Special Forces are
applicable to both unconventional warfare and counterinsurgency opera-
tions.” There
are times, when conducting black bag or clandestine operations, that field-expedient means of covert communications must be relied upon.
One such method is the use of field telephones, which, of course,
on not a part of the local telephone system. Field phones are connected
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Advanced Criminal Investigations and Intelligence Operations
Order of battle: Air force
Command
Unit of establishment
2LT O-1 or 1LT O-2
Flight or detachment (unit)
1LT O-2 or CPT O-3
Flight (4 aircraft or a support detachment) (unit)
CPT O-3 or MAJ O-4
Squadron (2–4 flights) (unit)
MAJ O-4 or LTC O-5
Group (several squadrons) (establishment)
BGN O-7
Wing (up to 4 groups; 30–75 aircraft)
(establishment)
MGN O-8
Air division (2 or more wings or several groups)
LTG O-9
Air force (numbered air force, e.g., 9th air
force of the tactical command)
GEN O-10
Major command (e.g., space command,
Military Airlift Command [MAC],
Formerely Strategic Air Command [SAC],
Tactical Air Command [TAC])
General of the
Chief of air operations or chief of staff
air force O-11
(only used in WWII).
Figure 1.5 Order of battle: table of organization (Air Force).
Figure 1.6 Field-expedient telephone: Ground return circuits using two strands of a fence line. (Adapted from U.S. Army, FM 31-20 Special Forces Operational Techniques, 1971.)
phone-to-phone (or filed switchboard) by filed wire(s). In an unsecured environment where field wire cannot be run or might be detected, operators have borrowed fence lines made of wire to use as filed phone-wire lines. Phones are connected to fences, which become the phone lines and go unnoticed,
requiring no retrieval upon exfiltration (see Figure 1.6).
Field radios (transmitters, receivers, and transceivers) can also be
connected to field expedient antennas using field-expedient (improvised)
Black Bag Operational Planning
13
insulators (see Figure 1.7). Antennas can also be improvised from lengths of wire at appropriate lengths for the band being used (see Figures 1.8
through 1.10).
When encrypted communications are unavailable, an old technique
may still be practical. In the old days, communications that were subject to unwanted interception were recorded in Morse code, usually in ciphered
form (i.e., code other than Morse code, which is merely an International
alphabet of dots and dashes). The recorded message was then transmitted
at a much higher speed for reception on predesignated frequencies by the
C-ration spoon
Plastic bag
Wood
Button
Bottle neck
Nylon rope
Rubber or cloth strip
Figure 1.7 Field-expedient insulators. (Adapted from U.S. Army, FM 31-20
Special Forces Operational Techniques, 1971.)
1/2 λ
14% offcenter fed
1/2 λ
14%
1/4 λ
Figure 1.8 Field-expedient half-wave antenna off-center-feed. (Adapted from U.S. Army, FM 31-20 Special Forces Operational Techniques.)
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Advanced Criminal Investigations and Intelligence Operations
Inverted “L” antenna
Insulators
1/4 λ
Counterpoise
Figure 1.9 Inverted L field expedient antenna. (Adapted from U.S. Army, FM 31-20 Special Forces Operational Techniques, 1971.)
10 feet
Fasten wire to wall with tape
Locate transmitter
at center
of loop
10 feet
Relative directivity at
right angles to loop
Antenna length: Full wave
Antenna length : 984 = 40 feet
Frequency shown: 25 megacycles
25
Normal range for
300
frequency shown: Day, 750 miles or greater;
= 12 m
Night, frequency too high.
25
Note: Tune output carefully by indicator lamp. Bulb will not glow brightly.
Figure 1.10 Indoors, full-wave square-loop antenna. (Adapted from U.S. Army, FM 3-20 Special Forces Operational Techniques.)
Black Bag Operational Planning
15
intended recipients. These burst transmission were sent at, say, 10 times the original speed, received, rerecorded, then played at 1/10 the received speed to play the message at normal speed. Any unwanted monitoring could easily miss the 20 seconds message sent in 2 seconds because the monitors did not know what they were hearing (in 2 seconds), if they hear it at all while scanning thousands of frequencies.
Communications and communications security are important, yet it
is limited only by one’s imagination, even in the absence of state-of-the-art technology. In fact, with advanced technology, often it is the old and outdated technology that goes unnoticed (more on communications technology
in Chapter 8).
Human Intelligence
2
Human Intelligence Operations
Human Intelligence ( HUMINT) is intelligence gathering by means of inter-personal contact, rather than technical intelligence such as signals intelligence (SIGINT), imagery intelligence (IMINT), and measurement and
signature intelligence (MASINT). NATO defines HUMINT as “a category
of intelligence derived from information collected and provided by human
sources.” Clandestine HUMINT ( HUMan INTelligence) involves obtaining information (using human intelligence methods) that is considered secret or confidential without the permission of the holder of the information.
HUMINT includes a wide range of espionage operations, including the use
of spy-professional assets or agents who collect intelligence, couriers who handle secure communications, access agents who arrange contacts between potential spies, and case officers who recruit them.
Sometimes, the recruiter continues to supervise the recruited agent, but
sometimes, the asset may be handed off to a different handler or case officer.
Espionage networks may consist of multiple levels of spies, support personnel, and supervisors and are usually organized on a cell system. An operator usually knows the people in his or her own cell, the external case officer, and an emergency method to use to contact higher levels if the case officer or cell leader is apprehended or discovered. They usually have no knowledge of people in other cells.
“I’m with the CIA, but I tell people I’m with the CIC, so they think I’m
with the CID”—Colonel Sam Flagg (from M*A*S*H). Typical HUMINT
operations consist of interrogations and conversations with persons having access to information. HUMINT is sometimes related to counterintelligence (CI) and sometimes in direct opposition to CI. In one episode of the television show M*A*S*H, intelligence officer Colonel Sam Flagg tells Dr. Hawkeye Pierce, “I’m with the CID. Although I told your boss I was with the CIA.
It throws people off who think I’m with the CIC.” In another episode, he has a dialog with Major Frank Burns:
Colonel Flagg: I’m in the CIC. (Counter Intelligence Corps)
Major Burns: I thought you were in the CIA. (Central Intelligence Agency) Colonel Flagg: No I just tell people that so they think I’m in the CID.
(U.S. Army Criminal Investigations Division Command)
17
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Advanced Criminal Investigations and Intelligence O
perations
(Footnote for M*A*S*H fans: Colonel Flagg was in seven episodes of the
popular TV show:
1. Deal Me Out (December 8, 1973)—alias Captain Halloran
2. A Smattering of Intelligence (March 2, 1974)—Colonel Samuel Flagg
3. Officer of the Day (September 24, 1974)—Colonel Samuel Flagg
4. White Gold (March 11, 1975)—Colonel Samuel Flagg
5. Quo Vadis, Captain Chandler (November 7, 1975)—Colonel Samuel
Flagg
6. The Abduction of Margaret Houlihan (October 26, 1976)—Colonel
Samuel Flagg
7. Rally ‘Round the Flagg, Boys (February 14, 1979)—Colonel Samuel
Flagg)
The relationship between HUMINT and CI becomes at odds when one side
is trying to turn agents of the other side, while the other side seeks to detect those turned. Recruiters can run false flag operations in which a source of one side believes they are providing intelligence to the other side, when they are actually providing intelligence to a third-party side. For example, a member of the Federation may be recruited to provide information to the Romulans—a
culture friendly with the Federation—when in fact they are providing
intelligence to the Klingons, which are not friendly with the Federation.
(Presumably these examples will not offend anyone in the foreseeable future, regardless of the changing geopolitical environment and relationships.)
Often, the source believes there is no harm in sharing secrets with an
ally or neutral state. Sometimes that false assumption comes to reveal that the source is sleeping with the enemy—that is, the true identity of the other half of the transactions are a known enemy. That scenario may be further
extrapolated when the member of the Federation refuses to continue to provide information and is informed that his or her activities of selling secrets to the opposing Klingons will be revealed if cooperation is not continued.
Documentation in the form of financial deposits and audio–video can make
a source regretfully fear prosecution for espionage, rather than reveal that he or she has been unwittingly trading in secrets with a known enemy.
Intelligence management begins with a determination of what needs to
be known—a needs assessment or determination of the essential elements
of intelligence (EEI). Espionage activities often involve accessing places where the information sought is stored or accessing people who know the
information. Covert operations may include reconnaissance, sabotage,