materialism of the totalitarians.” Quoted by Jean-François Revel in
L’Obsession anti-américaine (Paris: Plon, 2002), p. 98.
15. Emmanuel Todd, Après l’empire: Essai sur la décomposition du système
américain (Paris: Gallimard, 2002).
16. Charles Kupchan, The End of the American Era (New York: Knopf,
2002). See my discussion of Kupchan in The New York Review, April 10,
2003.
17. Emmanuel Todd, La troisième planète: Structures familiales et systèmes
idéologiques (Paris: Seuil, 1983). “Communism’s success is principally
explained by the existence . . . of egalitarian and authoritarian family
structures predisposing people to see Communist ideology as natural and
good”: See Après l’empire, p. 178.
18. Revel, L’Obsession anti-américaine, op. cit.
19. See www.pollingreport.com/religion.htm, and www.pollingreport.com/
religion2.htm
20. “A tale of two Legacies,” The Economist, December 21, 2002; Financial
Times, January 25–26, 2003.
21. See Financial Times, February 20, 2002.
22. For a relentlessly negative account of the deficiencies of the American
model, see Will Hutton, The World We’re In (Boston: Little Brown,
2002), to which I am indebted for some of the figures cited above.
23. Michael J. Mazarr, “Saved from ourselves?” in What Does the World Want
from America? edited by Alexander T.J. Lennon (from MIT Press,
Boston, November 2002), p. 167; first published in The Washington
Quarterly, vol. 25, no. 2 (spring 2002).
* * *
2
A nti-Americanism and
A mericanophobia: A French
P erspective
Denis Lacorne
French anti-Americanism has never been as much the focus of debate
as it is today. This is true both in France, where a crop of books has
appeared on the subject, and in the United States, for reasons linked
to the French refusal to support the American invasion of Iraq. Some
authors have underlined the unchanging nature of the phenomenon,
defining anti-Americanism as a historical “constant” since the eighteenth
century, or again as an endlessly repetitive “semantic block” to use
Philippe Roger’s expression. Others, like Jean-François Revel, have
tried to show what lies hidden behind such a fashionable ideology: a
deep-rooted critique of economic liberalism and American democracy.
Yet others, while rejecting the anti-American label, like Emmanuel
Todd, have attempted to lift the veil and lay bare the weaknesses of
American democracy and the extreme economic fragility of an American
empire “in decline,” despite appearances.1
Contradictions and Swings
in Public Opinion
What I propose to do here—rather than pick out historical con-
stants, defend the virtues of the liberal model, or pontificate upon
the inevitable decline of great empires—is to take a closer look at
the contradictions of what I view as a changing and ambiguous
phenomenon, a subject of frequent swings in public opinion. In
The Rise and Fall of Anti-Americanism, Jacques Rupnik and I
* * *
36
D enis Lacorne
pointed out that:
France is a heterogeneous country made up of countless different
groups, every one of which has its “own” image of America, which
frequently changes in the light of circumstances or political events.
However, it sometimes happens that this multitude of contradictory
perceptions coalesces into a major trend of opinion and for a while the
attitudes of the country as a whole are either exaggeratedly favourable
or excessively unfavourable to American realities.2
Such contrasting swings of opinion have indeed occurred over the past
three years, first due to France’s reaction to the tragic events of 9/11,
and later to France’s opposition to the second Gulf War.
To properly bring out the complexity of French opinion, its ambi-
guities and frequent contradictions, I propose going back to the year
2000, before the upheavals of the 2001–2003 period. This was a peace-
ful time in Franco-American relations. According to a 2000 SOFRES
poll, sympathy for the United States (41 percent of French respondents)
was stronger than animosity (10 percent), and at first sight, French
respondents seemed to be more Americanophile than anything else.
However, the very proportion of those who refused to commit them-
selves one way or another (48 percent) was disquieting—suggesting a
kind of discomfort before the American big brother.3 To get a clearer
picture, SOFRES, in the same poll, included an open-ended question,
leaving a wide margin to respondents: “When you think of the United
States, what words and images come to your mind?”
As table 2.1 clearly shows, most spontaneous images of America
(56 percent) turned out to be negative. When the French thought
of the United States, the first thing that came to mind was violence
(mentioned by 21 percent of the respondents) in every form (physical
violence, drugs, the death penalty, uncontrolled gun sales), or again
the weird or excessive aspects of the American character (14 percent),
including the “obesity of Americans” and the “junk” they eat (3 percent).
The complaints so common in the 1960s and 1970s against “American
imperialism” or “capitalism” were now barely mentioned (3 and
2 percent of responses, respectively). As for spontaneously mentioned
positive aspects, what is striking is that none of them had anything
opinion of the United States, they cite, in order of importance, American
grandeur or gigantism (14 percent), American power (12 percent), or
superior technology . . . It is clear that for the French, America is not a
political model. An insignificant number of the respondents specifically
* * *
37
Table 2.1
French responses to the question: “When you think of the United States,
what words and images come to your mind?” (all values in %)
Positive Aspects
43*
The economy
7
(% respondents who mention)
“American imperialism”
3
Grandeur/gigantism
14
Economic hegemony
2
Power of the United States
12
Capitalism/profit-seeking
2
Wealth
4
Food
3
Freedom
4
Poor food
2
Superior technology
4
The obesity of Americans
1
Modernism
3
“I like this country”
1
Other negative aspects
2
Dynamism
1
Neutral Aspects
43*
The economy
6
Money
4
Economic strength/
4
Economic liberalis
m
3
a strong economy
A multiracial society
3
A strong currency/
1
Weapons
3
a strong dollar
Capitalism
2
A federation of states
2
Politics
4
The dollar
2
“Gives military support
The “American Dream”
1
to other countries”
3
Other positive aspects
3
Geography
8
The Statue of Liberty
2
Negative Aspects
56*
Wide open spaces
2
“I don’t like the United States”
2
Hollywood
2
Violence
21
Skyscrapers
2
Violence (unspecified)
14
Other geographical features
2
Crime, delinquency, drugs
7
Food
6
The death penalty, executions
2
McDonald’s
3
Free sale of arms
2
Fast food restaurants
3
Negative psychological traits
14
Coca-Cola
2
“They’re excessive in everything”
3
American personalities
6
Vanity, arrogance
2
Among them, Bill Clinton
4
Individualism
2
Extremism
1
Politics
5
Puritanism
1
Power
3
Craziness/“a crazy people”
1
A world power
2
Selfishness
1
A military power
1
Intolerance
1
Other neutral aspects
2
Brings nothing to mind
2
Criticism of American influence
11
They control other countries
9
No answer
5
“They think they’re the
world’s policemen”
2
“They want to impose their
way of life”
2
* Multiple responses account for totals greater than 100.
Source: “France-Etats-Unis: regards croisés,” SOFRES/French American Foundation poll, May 2000.
* * *
38
D enis Lacorne
referred to key elements of economic or political liberalism, such as
“individualism” (2 percent), “freedom” (4 percent), “liberalism,” or
capitalism, without elaborating (3 percent). One even comes away with
the impression—and this goes to prove the ignorance of the average
Frenchman about America—that recent immigrants are more easily
assimilated in France than in the United States.4
These few data suggest that the French didn’t turn anti-American
all of a sudden in 2003, at the time of the American invasion of
Iraq. They were so before the Gulf War; or rather, they were already
of two minds, their empathy mingled with indifference, their admi-
ration with doubt and distrust of the abnormalities of the American
society.
Who shapes opinion? The SOFRES study does not give a clear
answer. But we could suggest a few explanations, particularly for the
frequent criticism in France against the violence and racism of American
society. The media may be partly to blame: films, news, and current
affairs programs, and all the French debates about the injustice and
barbarity of the death penalty in the United States. There seem to be
good reasons for the United States to become unpopular with the
French, even if, as I hope to show, some of our belles âmes have over-
done it to the extent of losing all credibility.5
Let us now consider the three quick swings of public opinion that
have occurred since September 2001.
First Phase. Extreme sympathy. Most of the French shared in the suf-
fering of Americans, in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks. One of the
most well-known newspaper editors marked the occasion with a slogan
somewhat unusual in the post-war daily press: “We are all Americans!”6
French compassion expressed itself in a hundred different ways: from
the ecumenical service performed at the American Church of Paris to
the three mandatory minutes of silence imposed by the government
on every school and public agency, the hundreds of drawings elemen-
tary school students in Normandy sent to the U.S. embassy in Paris,
and other more modest but symbolically significant gestures like the
planting of a tree of liberty next to Bartholdi’s small bronze replica of
the Statue of Liberty in the Luxemburg gardens in Paris. During the
Bastille Day festivities of July 14, 2002, the new compassionate love
for America reached its climax with a red New York Fire Department
truck leading the parade. It was followed by an entire class of West
Point cadets that came to Paris to celebrate the bicentennial of their
school—founded in the same year as the French military academy—
their Saint Cyr comrades marching alongside.
* * *
Anti-Americanism and Americanophobia
39
Second Phase. Emergence of differences of opinion between France
and the United States with the UN resolutions on Iraq. What came as
a surprise in France, was the near-unanimous public support for
Chirac’s critical stance, a situation where the political left, right, and
far right seemed to have joined the same chorus. Stranger still, French
opinion coincided perfectly with widespread European popular oppo-
sition to the war, making it possible to say that there is such a thing as
a common, unified European public opinion.7 On March 28, when
the war began, French public opinion confirmed its massive support
for Chirac’s foreign policy: 78 percent of a polled sample opposed the
American intervention. More surprisingly, a quarter of the French
(and nearly two-thirds of French Muslims) felt themselves “on the
Iraqi side” and, according to the same survey, “deep down,” 33 percent
of the respondents “did not wish the United States to win” (among
them, 72 percent of French Muslims).8 In a most unprecedented dec-
laration, the Prime Minister felt obliged to say, in Clermont-Ferrand
on March 31, 2003: “Be careful not to pick the wrong enemy. . . .
Opposing the war doesn’t mean that we’re hoping for dictatorship to
win over democracy.”9
A note of discord did emerge within the French elite. Influential intel-
lectuals such as Pierre Hassner (otherwise extremely critical of the
methods used by the Bush administration) spoke out in support of
good sense and realism, against French diplomatic activism and the
ephemeral alliance it forged with Russia, Germany, and Chi
na, a com-
bination intended to counterbalance the power of the United States:
“Even if we refuse to take orders from Bush, we can’t have the butcher
of Chechnya or Tibet commanding us instead.”10
Third Phase. Appeasement and reconciliation. Preparations for the
G8 summit at Evian (June 2003) became an opportunity to resume
friendly French-U.S. relations. Indeed, Bush concluded his Le Figaro
interview with an unexpected “Vive la France!,” preceded by the admis-
sion that “between allies, we might have our differences, but what brings
the United States closer to France, to Europe, is far more important.”11
At the same time, an officer of the American forces posted at Kabul
stressed the eminently positive role of the French forces helping the
Americans rebuild an Afghan army. “Out here,” he pointed out to
a visiting American senator, “we’ve still got French fries.”12 French
Defense Minister Alliot-Marie’s visit to the Pentagon, on January 22,
2004, was a major step in the restoration of frayed ties between France
and the United States. It was designed to prepare a visit to Normandy
by President Bush in June 2004 to participate in the commemoration
* * *
40
D enis Lacorne
of the sixtieth anniversary of D-Day—the planned highlight of a genuine
Franco-American reconciliation.13
Still, whatever the ups and downs of the transatlantic relationship, we
would be well advised not to ignore the vigor and tenacity of anti-
American feelings in France. This is proven by the sales figures of a
whole new literary genre of books about the “murky side of America.”
These publications indiscriminately denounce the more monstrous
aspects of American civilization. For example: Noël Mamère and Patrick
Farbiaz, Dangereuse Amérique [Dangerous America] (Ramsay, 2002);
Peter Scowen, Le Livre noir des États-Unis [The Black Book of the
United States] (Mango, 2002); Ziauddin Sardar and Merryl Davies,
Pourquoi le monde déteste-t-il l’Amérique? [Why Does the World Hate
America?] (Fayard, 2002); Thierry Meyssan, L’Effroyable imposture
[The Appalling Imposture] (Carnot, 2002); Gilbert Achcar, Le choc des
barbaries [The Clash of Barbarians] (Complexe, 2002); Eric Laurent,
La guerre des Bush: les secrets inavouables [Bush’s War: The Unspeakable
Secrets] (Plon, 2003).
All these books tell a similar tale of misdeeds, horrors, and threats—
the American colonization of the world compounded with an even