These antithetical worldviews are one of the major sources of Russian
anti-Americanism. That is precisely why, at the end of the Cold War,
many Russians had become more anti-American despite the elim-
ination of the threat of military conflict with the United States. In
democratization, they saw a danger to their system of values, their way
of life, and spiritual uniqueness. For many, defending their country’s
borders consisted of defending those intellectual and spiritual riches,
in the narrow sense of the word.
Throughout the course of Russian political culture, there is a great
pull toward isolation, inside the fortress keep, into the “outer shell.”11
Nikolai Gogol thought that Russia should be a monastery. In The
Brothers Karamazov, Fyodor Dostoyevsky sets up the conflict between
Zosim and Alyosha as Russia’s conflict between the doctrine of the
monastery and the doctrine of the world that surrounds it, and, con-
sequently, between two different value systems.12 Integration with the
West is today seen by many in Russia as the rejection of isolation, a
rejection of Russian uniqueness and the acceptance of foreign—that
is, American—norms and values. Lev Gumilev once worried about the
fact that an inescapable consequence of integration will be “a com-
plete rejection of homeland traditions followed by assimilation.”13
The United States cannot change this outlook, because it is rooted in
the Russian mind.
Accepting their country’s uniqueness as fact, Russians also accept
the uniqueness of their main historical opponent—the United States.
This raises themselves in their own eyes. Over a hundred years
before the Cold War, Russian philosopher V. Pecherin prophesized that
Russia and the United States would begin a new era of world history.14
But American uniqueness has a pejorative connotation for Russia.
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If Russia is unique in its depth and complexity, culture and spirituality,
then the United States is unique in its simplicity, lack of spirituality,
primitivism, and dogmatism. Everything good in the United States
originates from the outside. There is even a Russian joke that asks why
American presidents aren’t known for their intellect. It is because to
be president, one has to be born in America.
Russians are constantly comparing themselves to Americans. If
there is something in which Russia is better, faster, stronger, be it
ice-skating or spaceflight, the Russian’s heart fills with pride and
satisfaction. They do not take other countries into account. Many are
convinced that Americans are also constantly comparing themselves to
Russians, that there is some sort of a historical contest between the
two societies. And, therefore, an exceptionally strong stereotype
dwells in the mass consciousness—what’s good for Russia is bad for
America, and vice versa. The possibility of mutual interests is
perceived by the masses with great difficulty. It is difficult to overesti-
mate the political consequences of such a perception.
Russians are deeply convinced that the United States never does
anything to damage itself, or to altruistically help others. “American
Messianism” consists of spreading its own values and ideals to other
societies. For this reason, America will not do anything good for
Russia unless it receives something better in return. In contrast,
“Russian Messianism” is always done for the benefit of others. It is
believed, for example, that the Russian Army’s involvements over the
past few centuries, including the Italian and Swiss missions of
Alexander Suvorov, the anti-Napoleonic wars, the First and Second
World Wars, conflicts in Africa and Asia, wars in Spain and Afganistan,
etc., were always done for the benefit of outside interests rather than
its own—in order to help others who were deprived of rights, oppressed,
and treated unjustly. Paraphrasing the words of Sergey Soloviev’s
famous poem: “What sort of country, Russia, do you choose to be—
the land of Xerxes or the land of Christ?”; it could be said that Russia
assumes it has always chosen Christ.15
Supporting the international communist movement was perceived
where the center lived worse than the periphery, and where sacrifices
were always made to improve life in the provinces—the Soviet
republics and the countries of Eastern Europe. In other words, in the
Russian consciousness, their country is a beacon unto other nations,
which saves them by preserving their culture, language, customs, and
sovereignty, while the United States “enlightens” by Americanizing
other countries’s native culture and politics, forcing the English
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language upon them, and subordinating them to her economic
interests.16 The United States, in other words, is the land of Xerxes.
Conspiracy theories against Russia have always been widespread,
and it is from this angle that American actions are frequently
assessed. This is why, for example, American efforts to assist the
establishment of Russian democracy and private markets are seen by
a significant part of the population as an “American conspiracy” to
enslave Russia. Sergey Soloviev, describing Peter the Great’s efforts
to Westernize Russian society, noted that the masses who protested
against the replacement of the Russian style of dress with a foreign
one “do not pay attention to the fact that the change taking place is
a replacement of the old-style dress not with a dress of some foreign
nation, but the dress of all Europe. . . .”17 Similarly, the fact that,
today, not only America but the entire civilized world lives with
democracy and free markets does not prevent Russians from focus-
ing all their suspicions upon the United States. The average Russian
does not believe in the purity and honesty of American intentions,
but sees only a clandestine goal to attain political or economic
profit.
There is a duality in Russian mass political culture. On the one
hand, it is believed that Russia is at the center of world events, that
everything is in some way connected with it. America, meanwhile, is
trying to push Russia into the periphery. It follows, then, that America
cannot be believed or relied upon, because it will use Russia, then
betray, and discard her. The good intentions of Washington cannot be
believed, because they are pure hypocrisy. On the other hand, there is
sincere surprise expressed at the fact that America doesn’t trust
Russia.18 The juxtaposition of profound suspicion toward America
and the no less profound resentment for not being trusted by America
is a traditional trait of the Russian mentality. Russians are so worried
the United States may be trying to deceive them that they attempt to
deceive them first.19
French Slavist Georges Nivat noted that he was constantly urged to
be baptiz
ed while in Russia. His objection that he was already a bap-
tized Protestant was waved off.20 Even today, a Western Christian
(Catholic or Protestant) is, in the eyes of the Russian Orthodox
Church, “improperly baptized,” an inferior Christian, even worse
than representatives of other religions. Religious pluralism is therefore
another serious source of divergence with the United States.
Russia did not have in its history a period of state secularization,
involving the separation of church and state, and school from church.
Until 1917, the tsar was the head of the Orthodox Church. The “holy
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123
law” was a mandatory part of primary education, and Russian nationality
was determined solely by belonging to the Orthodox religion. For
centuries, administrative power and ideology stemmed from the same
source—the upper echelons of the political system. Both sides prof-
ited tremendously from such a union—the church always had a
government-like character, while the state, through the church, con-
trolled and formed public sentiment. There would be no gustibus non
est disputandum.21 The administrative–ideological union of the
church and the state meant that any sign of dissent was punished by
both sides. Someone protesting the Orthodox Church immediately
became a state criminal, while an opponent of the government was
also considered a heretic. The Decembrists were declared to be
heretics, for example, while Lev Tolstoy and Alexander Pushkin were
saved only by their fame. In other words, unlike the United States,
which was based on the ideas of the Reformation, Russia never even
underwent such a reformation in the first place.
This led to an undeveloped tradition of free thought in Russia.
Society became uncompromising and intolerant. The slogan of the
Socialist Revolutionaries at the beginning of the twentieth century,
“Those not with us are against us,” reflected this perfectly. Soon after-
ward, the communists followed through on that principle by elimi-
nating not only the Socialist Revolutionaries but all other parties as
well. “The floor is yours, Mr. Pistol,” wrote Vladimir Mayakovsky at
the time. The large majority of intellectuals emigrated first to Europe,
and later to the United States. The emigration began long before
the communists. Sergey Soloviev wrote that not one (!) person sent
abroad to study by Peter the Great ever returned home,22 while great
Russian patriots Alexander Herzen and Piotr Chaadaev spent their
lives abroad.23 Russian society learned and grew accustomed to living
in conditions where ideology, spiritual values, faith, and ethics all
“trickled down” from the top through the administrative organs. The
central administration, the state, Russian federal agencies were always
“masters of the mind” and this proved to be an important trait of the
political culture.
Even the arrival of the communists in 1917 changed only the content
of the system. Karl Marx replaced God, The Communist Manifesto
replaced the Bible, and the party meeting replaced the sermon. Faith
remained, except the state became communist instead of Christian
Orthodox, and Marxism–Leninism began to be taught fastidiously in
schools. The Siamese twins—no longer church and state, but state
and party—continued to coexist in a mutually beneficial union.
Mayakovsky has a poem about a Petersburg tram that was moving
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under capitalism, but on October 25, 1917 suddenly found itself
under socialism. The tram didn’t change, nor did the conductor, the
rails and the passengers remained the same, but the tram now simply
moved in a different political system.
Russian society was never able to develop its own system of norms
and values, one that was independent from the state.24 It was always
an object of ideological manipulation by the central powers.25 Vasily
Klyuchevsky called it “the national education aspect of power” in
Russia, with its main “pedagogical tool”—the infamous “tsar’s cudgel”
of Peter the Great.26 Unlike in America, in Russia the state always told
people how to think, specifying, in the words of Mayakovsky, “what is
good and what is bad.”
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, many Russians complained
about the lack of an ideological compass, a system of values brought
down from above without which they felt lost, and society began to
crumble. Mikhail Gorbachev is seen by many in Russia not only as a
man who destroyed the ideology of communism, but as a state criminal.
That tram of Mayakovksy was suddenly riding in a democracy. That is
why the search for a system of values and a new national idea is so
important for Vladimir Putin—a search that wins him high levels of
personal popularity.
Ideological dependence on the state results not only in great chal-
lenges toward creating a civil society, but also toward the average
Russian’s difficulty in comprehending the separation between state
and society, and between the public and the private, that exists in
the United States. America is viewed through the actions of the White
House, and American society is seen as an object of direct manipulation
by the federal government. Coming from their political culture, the
Russian cannot comprehend, for instance, how the president of
the United States may be limited in his powers. The story of the
rejection of the infamous “Jackson-Vanick” trade agreement, when
three consecutive presidents called for its annulment and were all
rejected by Congress, makes no sense to him.
Russian writer Sergei Dovlatov, who immigrated to America in
the 1970s, recalled that only there did he realize the “impotence of
Mr. Reagan. You cannot force. You cannot command. The most
inconsequential issues are put to a vote. And most importantly, every-
one gives advice. And you must listen, or be branded as authoritarian.”27
The Russian, on the other hand, knows that all one must do is get to
Putin, and the problem will be solved. Russian politicians who visit
Washington spare no effort to get into the White House, assuming
that it is the “American Kremlin.” As they leave, they spread their
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125
hands in wonder, saying, “Why couldn’t I do it? The president himself
said that he agrees.”
In his famous book The Russian Idea, Nikolai Berdyaev wrote that
“the Russian moral consciousness is very different from the moral con-
sciousness of Westerners; it is more Christian in form. Russian moral
judgments are determined in relation to the person, not abstract law of
property or government or the vague greater good. They search less
for an organized society and more for a community, and have few ped-
agogical features.”28 Not laws and rules but trust should form the basis
of a contract. Relationships between people are more important than
what is written on paper, more important than procedure.29 “God is
not in strength but in truth”—words of Alexander Nevsky that are
known to every Russian, meaning that not strength, law, or norms—
America’s strong points—should determine the order of things and
relations between people, but something spiritual, subjectively
personal.30 “Russian life does not acknowledge any laws,” concluded
Vasily Klyuchevsky.31 Not the rule of law, but the rule of something
that is just and proper. It is no accident that in answering the question,
“What does the American lifestyle mean to you?” Russians put wealth,
drive to succeed, and high quality of life at the top of the list, and
justice, compassion, and humanity at the bottom.32
The restructuring of relations between the government and society,
between the public and the personal is seen by Russians as destructive
to the state, a betrayal of “what generations of Russians fought for,”
an abandonment of the Motherland. Russian history teaches that as
soon as the institution of government is weakened, Russia is faced
with issues of national independence and sovereignty. Gorbachev and
Yeltsin destroyed that institution and in doing so put Russia on her
knees in front of America. In 1999, only 7 percent thought that
Gorbachev played a positive role in the country’s history, while
34 percent considered it negative. Yeltsin was judged positively by
2 percent of the respondents, and negatively by 30 percent. The leaders
judged as contributing the most positive things to Russian history
were Leonid Brezhnev and Joseph Stalin, at 19 and 15 percent,
respectively.33 An independent Russia means a strong, powerful, well-
armed state. Many think that its restoration should be the primary
goal today, not human rights, elections, or freedom of the press. A
strong society can only be a result of actions by a strong government.
The American way—a strong government arising out of a strong
society—is incompatible with the Russian situation, and its insistence
by the United States upon Russia, in the form of democracy, is destroy-
ing the Russian state.
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I could mention a whole number of other objective factors that