(Paris: Rieder, 1931), pp. 107–108.
46. Ibid., pp. 115–116. Continuing this tradition, Régis Debray describes the
attitude of a true graeculus of modern times in his pamphlet, L’édit de
Caracalla ou plaidoyer pour les Etats-Unis d’Occident par Xavier de C***
(Paris: Fayard, 2002).
47. A. Dandieu and R. Aron, ibid., p. 243 and 57.
48. The expression is borrowed from François Furet, Le passé d’une illusion
(Paris: Livre de Poche, 1998), p. 504.
49. Le cancer américain, p. 80, quoted in Loubet del Bayle, op. cit., p. 259.
50. Mounier, Revue de culture générale, October 1930, pp. 14–21, quoted in
Jean-Louis Loubet del Bayle, Les non-conformistes des années trente (Paris:
Seuil, 1969), p. 258. On Mounier and America, see especially Seth Armus,
“The eternal enemy: Emmanuel Mounier’s Esprit and French anti-
Americanism,” French Historical Studies, no. 2 (spring 2001), pp. 271–303.
51. Folder announcing the founding of Esprit, February 1932, reproduced in
J-L Loubet del Bayle, op. cit., pp. 448–449.
52. The influence of Heidegger on the editors of Ordre nouveau is well doc-
umented by J-L Loubet del Bayle, ibid., p. 90. Another probable source
of inspiration is the essay by Gina Lombroso, La rançon du machinisme
(Fr. trans.) (Paris: Payot, 1931).
* * *
58
D enis Lacorne
53. Martin Heidegger, An Introduction to Metaphysics [1935] (New Haven:
Yale University Press, 1974), p. 45. (Based on a lecture delivered in 1935
at the University of Freiburg. “I have made no change in the content,”
explained Heidegger in his Preface to the 1953 German edition.)
54. Ibid., pp. 46, 47, 50, respectively.
55. Alain de Benoist, quoted in D. Lacorne et al., L’Amérique dans les têtes,
op. cit., p. 33. Curiously, the same argument was defended by more mod-
erate politicians, strongly inspired by the Gaullist political tradition, such
as Michel Jobert, Jacques Thibau, or Jean-Marie Benoist. Other major
intellectuals like Maurice Merleau Ponty, Jean-Paul Sartre, or Etienne
Gilson defended comparable viewpoints at the end of the 1940s. See
Tony Judt, Past Imperfect: French Intellectuals, 1944–1956 (Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1994).
56. See D. Lacorne, “E Pluribus Unum, a motto for Europe?” Le Débat,
January 2003, pp. 88–97 and a special issue of Critique Internationale
on U.S. and European constitution-making (Critique Internationale,
October 2003, pp. 118–187).
* * *
3
A nti-Americanism in French and
E uropean Public Opinion
Gérard Grunberg
The British–American intervention in Iraq served to reveal the
depth of European anti-Americanism. The intervention did not create
anti-Americanism, but it increased it and gave it form. The frequent
opinion surveys conducted recently can be used to analyze present-
day anti-Americanism and to explore its varying contours. American
intervention in Iraq was, for the most part, seen through the prism of
a previous, already largely negative image of America, which provided
a framework for interpretation. In a sense, the war in Iraq served to
confirm in the eyes of many Europeans the manifold reasons they had
to distrust the United States. This chapter, largely devoted to the
French case but which will include other European countries as well,
sets out to analyze the varying contours of anti-Americanism and to
measure its significance.
Hostility to the War in Iraq
On the eve of military intervention in Iraq, at a time when war
appeared practically certain, hostility to intervention was widespread
in European public opinion. Roughly, four-fifths of the French were
against it and remained so to the end of the war, even when coalition
victory appeared imminent. Four-fifths of the Germans condemned
the intervention and considered it unjustified. Ninety percent of the
Spanish—despite the fact that their government had unequivocally
sided with the United States—declared that they were opposed to the
war, and this percentage remained high throughout the conflict.
Three-quarters of Italians considered recourse to war unjustified even
though in this country, as in Spain, the government backed the
* * *
60
G érard Grunberg
United States. In Poland, where once again the government favored
intervention, two-thirds of those polled were against their country
taking part in the war. The same held true for 90 percent of the Swiss
and 80 percent of the Danish. Ninety percent of the Russians consid-
ered that the Americans were wrong to intervene without a UN man-
date. In Great Britain, on the eve of hostilities, 62 percent as against
was “handling the situation in Iraq”; in February, 29 percent as against
52 percent were in favor of military intervention. Great Britain is the
sole European country in which, once the intervention was launched,
a sense of patriotism and the concern to support the troops in the field
brought about a shift in public opinion toward increasing support for
government policy. Tony Blair’s approval rating, which was down to
31 percent in February, rose to 47 percent in April. In mid-April,
63 percent of the British as against 23 percent said they approved of
the military intervention. Everywhere else, public opinion remained
hostile to the Iraq war up to the end.
This opposition to the war in Iraq was marked by a serious deteri-
oration of the image of the United States in European public opinion.
Thus, between 2002 and 2003, according to a survey conducted by
the Pew Research Center for the People and the Press, the percentage
of people who had a positive image collapsed in all European coun-
tries: a drop of 36 percentage points in Germany, Italy, and Spain,
33 in Russia, 32 in France, 29 in Poland, and 27 in Great Britain.
Beyond doubt, the Iraq war produced a strong upsurge of anti-
Americanism in Europe. But, as can be seen from table 3.1, even if it
was in the years 2002 and 2003 that the image of the United States
Table 3.1
Global attitudes toward the United
States (% favorable)
1999–2000
2002
2003
Britain
83
75
48
France
62
63
31
Germany
78
61
25
Italy
76
70
34
Spain
50
—
14
Poland
86
79
50
Russia
37
61
28
Turkey
52
30
12
Source: March 10/17, 2003, Pew Research Center for
the People and the Press.
* * *
French and Eu
ropean Public Opinion
61
deteriorated significantly, the decline had already set in before the Iraq
issue emerged. Despite 9/11, which produced a real, if short-lived,
sense of compassion and solidarity for the United States, the changed
international context and the new orientation of American policy after
the terrorist attacks in the United States worked against the image of
America in European eyes. With the exception of Germany and Russia,
the deterioration of America’s image is the general rule in Europe
during this period, even if this deterioration was to accelerate during
the period that followed (table 3.1).We must then try to understand
what has modified the image of the United States in the course of the
last few years so as to understand why American policy with regard to
Iraq has been considered in such negative terms by European public
opinion.
The Contours of Anti-Americanism
The Sole Superpower
The period between the collapse of the Soviet Union and 9/11 was a
time of gestation in international affairs when the old world was
on the way out while the new world had not yet taken shape. But during
this period, the image of the United States underwent a gradual change.
The United States appeared undeniably as the sole superpower. In the
words of Madeleine Albright, the Pew Center chairperson and secre-
tary of state under Clinton, when commenting on the results of a
survey conducted between July and October 2002, anti-American
attitudes, “simply go with the territory of being the world’s only super-
power, with unmatched economic and cultural influence. In many
ways, we are viewed as the rich guy living on the hill. . . . We have seen
this coming since the end of the Cold War.”
The extensive survey conducted by the German Marshall Fund of
the United States and the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations in
June/July 2002 revealed that the Europeans were not content for the
United States to remain the sole superpower (see table 3.2). The survey
report stated, “Europeans appear ready to take on a stronger world
role. When asked if the United States should remain the only super-
power or the EU should become a military and economic superpower
like the United States, 65 percent of European respondents opt for
the latter. The French (91%) and Italians (76%) are the most supportive
of this notion, with the Germans (48%) the most cautious. Of those
desiring the European Union to become a superpower, 9 out of 10
indicate they support this as a way for Europe to better cooperate with
* * *
62
G érard Grunberg
Table 3.2
The United States as superpower
Roles of the U.S. and Europe as superpowers (all responses in %)
GB
FR
GER
NL
IT
PL
EUROPE
U.S.
U.S. should
20
3
22
11
7
12
14
52
remain the only
superpower
E.U. should
56
91
48
59
76
63
65
33
become a
superpower
like the U.S.
Source: The German Marshall Fund of the U.S. and The Chicago Council on Foreign Relations.
the United States, not compete with it. A majority of these would
support increased defense spending if necessary to attain this status.”
During the period of the first Gulf War, 65 percent of the French con-
sidered that it was a good thing for the United States to play a dominant
role; in January 2003, only 17 percent thought so.
The Use of Force
Mistrust of America as a superpower feeds largely on U.S. readiness to
use force in international relations, on the increasing preference for
Hard Power rather than Soft Power, and the open espousal of this
new approach. The issue of the systematic use of force by the United
States is increasingly the key element in determining European public
opinion concerning American policy. More than the specifics of American
policy, it is the overall tendency to have recourse to force that prompts
European distrust, not to say hostility. In this regard, the first Gulf
War appears an isolated exception. From the late 1990s on, a majority
of the French (57 percent) were against the bombing of Iraq by the
United States (February 1998). This majority reached 63 percent in
December of the same year. In March 1999, 46 percent of the French
condemned NATO bombing of Serbia as against 40 percent who
approved, even though France was an active partner in the campaign.
With few exceptions, the Europeans do not apprehend with as
great an intensity as the Americans the dangers that threaten their
society, nor do they give them the same degree of importance, and
they are less inclined to consider that force is the best solution.
According to the German Marshall Fund survey, 91 percent of
Americans but only 65 percent of the French considered that interna-
tional terrorism was a danger that threatened the vital interests of their
* * *
French and European Public Opinion
63
country. Almost as many Europeans consider that global warming is
as great a threat as Iraq’s development of weapons of mass destruction
(50 and 58 percent), while on the American side the figures are
46 and 86 percent, respectively.
In combatting international terrorism, more Europeans than
Americans think that “helping poor countries develop their economies”
is the best course (91 percent as against 78 percent); on the other
hand, more Americans than Europeans favor “air strikes against
terrorist training camps and other facilities” (87 percent as against
68 percent).
The use of troops is considered as legitimate or effective by Europeans
above all when it is a question of helping people suffering from famine
or of imposing international law—for the Americans, when the issue is
the destruction of terrorist training camps. Nevertheless, these differ-
ences in public opinion were not strongly marked until the question
of armed intervention in Iraq became a pressing issue. Thus, in June/
July 2002, a majority of both Europeans and Americans were in favor
of the invasion of Iraq if the campaign was approved by the UN
and backed by the allies. When it became evident that America
would act unilaterally, U.S. and European public opinions increasingly
diverged.
The Legitimacy of American Policy
European opposition to American foreign policy grew as doubts as to
the legitimacy of the policy intensified. American foreign policy was
considered as too egotistic, exclusively concerned with the interests of
the United States. Even though the 9/11 attacks clearly marked the
United States as target and victim, a majority of Europeans considered
&
nbsp; that American foreign policy had been a contributing factor (GMF
survey). Sixty-three percent of the French were of this opinion, but
57 percent of the British as well. In June of 2003, only 59 percent of
Europeans thought that “in its conduct since the 9/11 attacks, the
U.S. aims to protect itself from future terrorist attacks rather than
enforce its will around the globe.” As the Pew Center presentation of
the March 2002 survey put it: “More generally, criticisms of U.S. for-
eign policy are almost universal. Overwhelming majorities disapprove
of President Bush’s foreign policy and the small boost he received in
the wake of Sept. 11 has disappeared. As a consequence, publics in
seven of the eight nations surveyed believe that American policies
have a negative effect on their country. Only the British are divided on
the impact of American foreign policy on their country.” As for the
* * *
64
G érard Grunberg
survey conducted by the same organization in June/October 2002,
the accompanying commentary gives a clear picture of the findings:
“A majority of people in three of those friendly countries—France,
Russia and Germany—believe the United States is pushing for war to
win control of Iraqi oil. Majorities totalling 75 percent in France,
76 percent in Russia, and 54 percent in Germany say that is why
Washington wants war. Many people around the world believe the
U.S. does not take into account the interests of their country when
making international policies. Majorities in most countries also see
U.S. policies as contributing to the growing gap between rich and
poor nations and believe the United States does not spend the right
amount to solve global problems.”
This perception of America as egotistic explains, in part why
European reactions to military intervention in Iraq are seen as unjus-
tified and illegitimate. Figures taken from surveys conducted in
France demonstrate this clearly. Even if 83 percent of young people
interviewed by the SOFRES in April agreed that Saddam Hussein was
a dictator, the party responsible for the conflict was, in their eyes, the
one that started it, namely the United States. According to IPSOS
(March 2003), it is the United States (65 percent) and not Iraq
(12 percent) which is responsible for the outbreak of the conflict.