These enhanced capabilities were on display in March 2010, when Pakistani
troops finally managed to flush Pakistani Taliban (TTP) forces from the area
around the town of Khar, in Bajaur agency. That offensive was part of a broader
campaign in Pakistan’s tribal areas bordering the Afghan province of Kunar.
A couple of months later, it was still very easy to see how well-fortified the
militant stronghold along the brush-covered ridges overlooking the town had
been. Back in 2006, rumors swirled that al-Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri
took shelter there.36
The complex included fortress-like buildings as well as a warren of tunnels
dug deep into the hills. The dark and dusty passageways had obviously offered
refuge to militants for many years. Some of the tunnels were spacious, littered
with whatever the occupants had left in their haste, from colorful bed linens to
sandals. Just outside one entryway an old clock sat in the dirt, forever stopped
at three thirty-five.
33 Kamran Yousaf, “Kayani Initiates USAID Project in S Waziristan,” Express Tribune, June 19, 2012, http://tribune.com.pk/story/395817/kayani-initiates-usaid-project-in-s-waziristan/.
34 “The FC-1/JF-17 ‘Thunder’ – The History and Design Philosophy,” Defencetalk.com, June 20, 2004, http://www.defencetalk.com/the-fc-1jf-17-thunder-the-history-and-design-philosophy-part-1-2725/#ixzz21lQ9eUPF.
35 Jane Mayer, “The Predator War,” The New Yorker, October 26, 2009.
36 Carlotta Gall, “Airstrike by U.S. Draws Protests from Pakistanis,” New York Times, January 15, 2006, http://www.nytimes.com/2006/01/15/international/asia/15pakistan.html?
pagewanted=all.
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No Exit from Pakistan
A Pakistani colonel proudly described how his forces had hammered the
militants and how, as part of their wider counterinsurgency campaign, they had
convinced the local tribesmen to fight on the army’s side. Although U.S. military
assistance did not factor into the colonel’s briefing that day, a subsequent
conversation back in Peshawar clarified that American training, funds, and
equipment had improved the paramilitary Frontier Corps that waged those
battles.37 These were changes that Pakistan’s top army officers favored, but
without U.S. insistence and resources they might never have been implemented.
The results served both U.S. and Pakistani interests.
If U.S. officials again aim to build trust with Pakistan’s military, they could
attempt to implement a policy process similar to that of the Bush administration
during its early years, when Secretary of State Colin Powell could, as he put
it, speak “general to general” with Musharraf.38 At that time, Powell and his
team set much of U.S. policy and also managed the diplomatic relationship.
This gave Musharraf confidence that when he spoke to Powell, he understood
where the Bush administration stood.
In addition to discussions at the very top of the military hierarchy, Wash-
ington could seek to maintain and expand exchanges and educational oppor-
tunities for rising Pakistani officers so as to encourage comfortable working
relationships in the future. In the past, these programs have at least fostered
familiarity with the United States, if not necessarily sympathy. Considering
the other anti-Western influences that buffet Pakistani society and the fact that
some groups like Hizb ut-Tahrir (HuT) are specifically targeting the military for
infiltration and indoctrination (as described in Chapter 2), Washington could
at least attempt to cultivate a greater appreciation for the potential benefits of
U.S. partnership among a core of elite officers.
A military-first relationship with Pakistan could also serve Washington’s
broader regional interests. An improvement in Indo-Pakistani relations is unre-
alistic without the consent of Pakistan’s generals, but at least some of them
have managed to put aside their hostility with India long enough to recognize
that a cold peace would be better than another hot war. Accepting this logic,
Musharraf’s military regime pursued a backchannel dialogue with New Delhi
that made unprecedented progress, at least according to Pakistani sources close
to the talks. If not for Musharraf’s downfall, it seemed as if a breakthrough
deal on Kashmir might have been achieved.39 Part of the reason that President
Musharraf was willing to engage in a serious dialogue with India was the
simultaneous pressure he felt from the United States and China. U.S. influence
in Pakistan may never again be as strong as it was during Musharraf’s tenure,
37 Eric Schmitt and Jane Perlez, “U.S. Unit Secretly in Pakistan Lends Ally Support,” New York Times, February 22, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/23/world/asia/23terror.html.
38 On the Powell-Musharraf relationship, see Chapter 4.
39 Steve Coll, “The Back Channel,” The New Yorker, March 2, 2009, http://www.newyorker
.com/reporting/2009/03/02/090302fa_fact_coll.
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America’s Options
219
but a close military-to-military relationship would offer U.S. officials access
to their Pakistani counterparts and the opportunity to argue the benefits of
normalized relations with India.
A good working relationship with Pakistan’s generals has also proven invalu-
able in times of crisis.40 The Indo-Pakistani relationship will have its ups and
downs, but another military standoff remains a distinct possibility. Only the
United States has had sufficient power or influence to calm the two sides. Even
an increasingly powerful China will not likely enjoy enough of India’s trust to
play a similar role.
Retaining and expanding ties with the Pakistani military would also help
Washington keep a close eye on Chinese military and economic activities
inside Pakistan. Questions will persist about China’s long-term intentions in
the region, but it is beyond doubt that Beijing is extending its influence in
Pakistan and throughout Central Asia by way of diplomacy, trade, and invest-
ment. Chinese support to Pakistan’s nuclear, missile, and conventional military
programs will be more apparent to Washington if U.S. officials retain work-
ing relationships with their Pakistani counterparts, even if the information is
gleaned indirectly.
Finally, close ties with Pakistani generals would come in handy if China
decides to pursue a more aggressive regional strategy in the future. Pakistan’s
generals would at least have the option to demur if China seeks to “Finlandize”
their country. No matter how much they tend to profess their affection for
China, Pakistanis actually have no greater interest in suffering under Beijing’s
yoke than Washington’s. As one astute Pakistani officer explained in a moment
of candor, Islamabad would much prefer to squeeze benefits from both China
and the United States than to pick one over the other.41 Recognizing this, U.S.
officials have less to fear from Pakistan playing the “China card,” and more to
gain by offering an alternative to Beijing’s dominance in the region.
Dangerous Side Effects
A military-first approach toward Pakistan suffers, however, from the crucial
fact that the army has never run the country very effectively. The generals have
never even managed to set Pakistan on the path to better governance, unlike
celebrated strongmen in other countries such as Turkey or Singapore.
Instead, each bout of military dictatorship has eaten away at the other
administrative sinews of the state, from the parliament to the police. Authority
undermined, resources deprived, it is no wonder that Pakistan’s civilian admin-
istration is a hollow, often corrupt, shell. Faced with the stresses of popula-
tion growth, environmental degradation, and urbanization, Pakistan’s civilian
40 Daniel Markey, “Terrorism and Indo-Pakistani Escalation,” Council on Foreign Relations Press, January 2010, http://www.cfr.org/india/terrorism-indo-pakistani-escalation/p21042.
41 Author conversation, Washington, DC, April 2010.
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No Exit from Pakistan
authorities face a near-impossible task. Even under the best of circumstances,
they would struggle to contain widespread criminality, extremism, and terrorist
violence.
The weakness of Pakistan’s civilian leaders is largely the consequence of an
overweening military that has too often failed to accept the limits of its power
or authority. Yet, the weakness is now a reality. It cannot be wished away. It
explains, as described in Chapter 4, why many in Washington believed that
working with Musharraf and treading lightly on the issue of democracy was
their only option.
It is also the reason that the Obama administration never lived up to the
hopes of Pakistan’s most idealistic supporters of democracy in the early days
after Musharraf was toppled. At the time, these advocates suggested that all
dealings with Islamabad – starting with U.S. assistance – should be routed
through elected leaders. In effect, they championed a “civilian-first” approach
to Pakistan. They believed that U.S. pressure combined with the popular mood
in Pakistan would force the generals to see that the tide had truly turned and
accept a subordinate role to their civilian masters.42
This noble defense of democratic principles struck out against Pakistan’s
civil-military realities. First, Pakistan’s generals were not about to let the civil-
ians have their way. Second, Washington considered its security agenda in
Pakistan too urgent to jeopardize with a risky bet on a new crop of politicians.
Third, Pakistan’s new leaders did nothing to win confidence in the United
States.
The third strike was perhaps the most disappointing. When Prime Minister
Gilani made his first official visit to Washington in July 2008, he managed a
string of gaffes that left American audiences stunned. His performance at a
Council on Foreign Relations session in front of several hundred influential
journalists, officials, and analysts was literally laughable. Jeers erupted from
the audience when Gilani observed without nuance or qualification that the ISI
reported to the prime minister, and “Therefore they will do only what I want
them to do.”43
Until Pakistan’s civilian leaders demonstrate greater capacity for statesman-
ship and governance, Washington will be forced to deal with the military. To
be clear, this does not make the military any more effective or legitimate in run-
ning the state of Pakistan. If the military ever retakes power, it would almost
certainly be bad for the country. It would also be bad for the United States.
42 For example, the authors of a prominent Asia Society Task Force released in April 2009 urged Washington to “Reform the way in which the United States deals with the Pakistan military so as to help establish civilian control, and ensure that all U.S. military aid to Pakistan is fully transparent to the civilian authorities and subject to monitoring by both them and the United States.” See “Back from the Brink? A Strategy for Stabilizing Afghanistan-Pakistan,” April 2009, p. 28, http://asiasociety.org/files/pdf/Afghanistan-PakistanTaskForce.pdf.
43 “A Conversation with Yousaf Raza Gilani: Transcript,” Council on Foreign Relations, July 29, 2008, http://www.cfr.org/pakistan/conversation-yousaf-raza-gilani/p16877.
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America’s Options
221
Yet Washington’s ability to control political developments inside Pakistan
is limited. If a new army chief decides to seize the reins of power, American
protests are likely to fall on deaf ears, just as they did when the Bush admin-
istration counseled Musharraf against imposing a state of emergency, when
the Clinton administration criticized Musharraf’s coup against Nawaz Sharif,
when the Carter administration warned Zia against hanging Bhutto, or when
down an undemocratic path.44
The next military dictator need not be any more benign or effective than
Musharraf. He could be far less so. By pushing the politicians to the exits and
subordinating civilian administrators, another generation of Pakistanis would
fail to gain experience in self-rule. The messy – and often corrupt – process
of democratic rule is rarely improved without practice. Although a military
regime might offer immediate improvements in terms of security or economic
growth, without a functioning political system, deeper uncertainty about the
future would linger. Pakistan’s military regimes have routinely implemented
solid plans for seizing power, but never for managing an orderly retreat and
transition.
Another military coup would also hurt the military itself. Officers who
served under Musharraf, including his successor, General Kayani, learned this
lesson the hard way. Distracted from its professional duties over nearly a
decade, the army lost strength, unity, and the respect of the public. All of
these trends would be at least as likely the next time around. And the more
political a military becomes, the more prone it is to faction and breakdown.
Returning to the discussion in Chapter 2, a failure of Pakistan’s military would
be tantamount to the failure of the state.
In a country traumatized by violence and riven by social, political, and
ideological cleavages, any new Pakistani military regime is more likely to be
followed by dangerous revolutionary change than by constructive reform or a
bright new democratic order. Even a deeply flawed, corrupt, and compromised
civilian order actually poses less of a threat to the stability of the Pakistani state than the return of direct military
rule.
In spite of these grave risks, Washington could still opt to work with
Pakistan’s military to achieve what it considers urgent and important short-
term security goals. In that case, U.S. policymakers should always remember
that another bout of military rule is in no one’s best interest. Behind closed
doors, American diplomats would need to remind Pakistan’s military leader-
ship early and often about the many risks they run by playing politics. Beyond
44 For the Bush administration’s struggles, see Condoleezza Rice, No Higher Honor (New York: Crown, 2011), pp. 606–7. See Dennis Kux, Disenchanted Allies: The United States and Pakistan 1947–2000 (Washington: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2001), for a look into the efforts by the Eisenhower (pp. 84–5, 97–101), Carter (pp. 236–8), and Clinton (pp. 356–8) administrations.
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No Exit from Pakistan
that, Washington would want to monitor the Pakistani military for signs of
eroding unity and politicization, the precursors to institutional breakdown.
In public, U.S. officials would want to keep their dealings with a military
regime under the radar, avoiding the example set by President Bush’s tight
embrace of Musharraf that hurt the White House’s credibility as a supporter
of democracy and did little to save Musharraf from his fate. Maintaining
cooperation would be a difficult trick for any White House to pull off. Mem-
bers of Congress and critics of the administration would pounce, especially if
Pakistan’s new military regime imposed draconian or violent measures against
its opponents.
In sum, military-first cooperation may offer the best way to address short-
and medium-term security concerns, but it should not be mistaken for a long-
term solution. Its side effects read like a warning label on a prescription drug:
American discomfort and hypocrisy, Pakistani civil-military dysfunction, and
the potential for severe instability caused by the politicization of the military.
For all of these reasons, it should not be Washington’s preferred approach to its