evidence of ISI support to a range of other Pakistani militant groups, some
of which were also quite sympathetic to al-Qaeda. At the very least, Pakistan
hardly looked like a satisfactory partner worthy of billions of dollars in Amer-
ican assistance. Pakistan’s subsequent arrest and trial of Dr. Shakil Afridi, the
doctor who ran a fake polio vaccination campaign in an effort to help the
United States ascertain bin Laden’s identity, only added insult to injury.
There should be no mistaking that Pakistan’s failure to meet U.S. expecta-
tions in the fight against terrorism represented the core stumbling block in the
relationship. To explain the remainder of the yawning chasm between aspira-
tions of a transformed U.S.-Pakistan relationship in 2008 and the sad reality of
2011, however, the comic strip Pogo’s famous line, “We have met the enemy,
and he is us,” captures an important part of the story. Recent episodes, includ-
ing the Raymond Davis affair, suggest that the sole remaining superpower
is better at hunting and killing terrorists than winning friends or influencing
people.
A Tumultuous Transition
Stepping back to 2007–8, the final years of the Bush administration, both Pak-
istan itself and relations between Washington and Islamabad were in turmoil.
Violence inside Pakistan spiked in the aftermath of the July 2007 Red Mosque
raid. Not only did more of Pakistan’s militants turn against the state in the
tribal areas but they also extended their reach into nearby settled parts of
the country and unleashed suicide bombers on its cities. In September 2008,
when a massive truck bomb turned the Islamabad Marriott into a smolder-
ing crater and killed more than fifty people, regular international visitors to
Pakistan shuddered. “That could have been me,” was the collective refrain.
In November, when Lashkar-e-Taiba terrorists from Pakistan killed Indians,
Americans, Israelis, and other international visitors in their commando-style
raid on Mumbai, similar fears resurfaced.
Pakistanis, of course, routinely experienced violence beyond the oases of
five-star hotels. Attacks escalated in the tribal areas as well as in the nation’s
urban centers. From January 2007 through December 2009, the number of
Pakistanis killed or wounded by terrorism exceeded 2,300 in Peshawar, 1,300
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No Exit from Pakistan
in Lahore, and 800 in Karachi. In the previous three years, total violence
was far lower; terrorists killed or wounded 90 Pakistanis in Peshawar and
Lahore and about 500 Pakistanis in Karachi.7 Major cities imposed draconian
security measures in their effort to clamp down on the violence, but ending
the threat posed by suicide bombers and gunmen was an impossibly difficult
task.
In 2009, the army finally launched a major offensive in the Swat Valley of
Pakistan’s northwestern Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province, where the Pakistani
Taliban had seized territory and reneged on a peace deal with the provincial
government. Army operations that year forced 2 million people to flee their
homes. Despite its huge human costs, the Pakistani public backed the campaign.
A video clip circulated on the Internet and broadcast on Pakistani television of
the Taliban mercilessly flogging a seventeen-year-old girl fueled public outrage
against them.8 Over a similar period, the army also expanded and intensified
its fight in the tribal agencies of South Waziristan and Bajaur along the Afghan
border, where anti-state militants were uprooted only at great cost, and then
A Bright New Democratic Future?
Yet in the midst of this bloodshed, there was also an undeniable euphoria in
Pakistan about the political change that had forced Musharraf to step down
and returned civilian leaders to power. Hopes ran high, as the famous veteran
diplomat Richard Holbrooke reported from Pakistan during a March 2008 trip.
He argued that Washington should send a “clear and consistent” message to
Pakistan: “democracy, reconciliation, the military out of politics, a new policy
for the tribal areas – and more democracy.”10 That was nine months before
president-elect Obama and his new secretary of state, Hillary Clinton, offered
him the job of special representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan.
Once in office, Holbrooke set about putting his money where his mouth was.
Washington’s primary policy tool for helping Pakistan’s civilian government
was to be a vast infusion of cash. Such a plan had already been kicking around
for a couple of years on Capitol Hill and inside the State Department. When
7 Worldwide Incidents Tracking System, National Counterterrorism Center, http://www.wits
.nctc.gov on February 1, 2012.
8 Abubaker Siddique, “Pakistani Flogging Video Leads to Outrage against Increasing Taliban Influence,” Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty, April 7, 2009, http://www.rferl.org/content/
Pakistani Flogging Video Leads to Outrage Against Taliban/1604077.html.
9 For a great deal more detail on the Pakistani military campaigns against the Pakistani Taliban (TTP) during this period, see Jerry Meyerle, Unconventional Warfare and Counterinsurgency in Pakistan, CNA Strategic Studies, November 2012, http://www.cna.org/sites/default/files/
research/Pakistan.pdf.
10 Richard Holbrooke, “Hope in Pakistan,” Washington Post, March 21, 2008, http://www
.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/03/20/AR2008032003016.html.
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Great Expectations to Greater Frustrations
141
one of its early sponsors, Senator Joe Biden, became vice president, the idea
was nearly ready for prime time.
The legislative effort was driven by three U.S. politicians: the co-chairs
of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, John Kerry and Richard Lugar,
and Representative Howard Berman, chair of the House Committee on For-
eign Affairs. Together, they sponsored the authorizing legislation colloquially
known as “Kerry-Lugar-Berman,” “Kerry-Lugar,” or “KLB” for short.11 KLB
tripled U.S. assistance for nonmilitary projects, raising it to roughly $1.5 bil-
lion per year for a five-year period. It also had provisions that in order for
military aid to be sent to Pakistan, the secretary of state was required to certify
that the Pakistani government was “continuing to cooperate” with the United
States in dismantling nuclear supply networks, that it had “demonstrated a
sustained commitment to and [was] making significant efforts towards com-
bating terrorist groups,” and that the Pakistani military was “not materially
and substantially subverting the political and judicial processes of Pakistan.”
In addition to these certifications, the law required the secretary of state to
submit repor
ts to Congress on, among many other issues, the degree to which
Pakistan’s civilian leaders exercised effective control of the military.
The Obama South Asia team, with Holbrooke leading the charge, cham-
pioned the bill as a means to trumpet America’s sympathy for Pakistan’s
democrats. The bill was notable in comparison to the Bush administration’s
aid package, which had offered equal parts civilian and military assistance and
later sent billions of dollars more to the Pakistani military. With this new pack-
age, Obama officials sought to signal to ordinary Pakistanis that the United
States was committed to a long-term relationship with their people and not just
their military.
Unfortunately, KLB stumbled right out of the gate. Over a year later, it still
had not managed to find its footing. KLB became a tragic symbol of American
diplomatic missteps in Pakistan and the yawning gap between Washington’s
rhetoric and its capacity for follow-through.
The political storm over KLB broke over Pakistan as soon as Congress passed
it in early October 2009. For several drama-filled days, Pakistan’s opposition
politicians took to the floor of the National Assembly in Islamabad to decry
KLB’s “insulting” language that violated Pakistan’s sovereignty and imposed
unreasonable “conditions” on the aid.12 They asked why the U.S. Congress
had used the public language in an assistance authorization bill to raise ques-
tions about sensitive issues like Pakistan’s nuclear program and counterterror
policies.
11 For the full text of the Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act, see http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/
pkg/BILLS-111s1707enr/pdf/BILLS-111s1707enr.pdf.
12 Jane Perlez and Ismail Khan, “Aid Package from U.S. Jolts Army in Pakistan,” New York Times, October 7, 2009, www.nytimes.com/2009/10/08/world/asia/08pstan.html?scp=7&sq=kerry%
20lugar%20pakistan&st=cse.
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142
No Exit from Pakistan
The army and its civilian mouthpieces were especially upset over the KLB
requirement that the state department report on civilian control over the
military’s “chain of command” and “the process of promotion for senior mili-
tary leaders.”13 Given the history of tussles between the army and civilian lead-
ers, this language was considered especially intrusive. During Pakistan’s par-
liamentary debate, one prominent politician called the bill a historic defeat.14
Another called it a “triumph for India.”15
Instead of energizing a new relationship between Pakistan and the United
States, skeptics of that relationship saw it as proof-positive of Washington’s
malign intent. Pakistan’s ruling party was forced to defend its dealings with
Washington in the face of angry statements from the army and indignation
from across the political spectrum.16
The idea that American aid could be greeted with such hostility shocked
many American policymakers and legislators in Washington. KLB was not a
reincarnation of the infamous Pressler amendment.17 Its “conditions” did not
apply to civilian aid, and the certifications that were required from the secretary
of state were carefully worded so as to provide flexibility on military aid as
well. Contrary to the suspicions Pakistanis harbored, the American champions
of the bill were genuinely interested in fostering a long-term, broad-based
relationship between the United States and the people of Pakistan in ways that
reflected Pakistan’s own priorities.18
If that was the case, why did KLB use language that was certain to ruffle
Pakistani feathers? Pakistani conspiracy theorists – including some national
political leaders – saw the “evil hand” of Indian lobbyists at work on Capitol
Hill.19 The truth was more mundane.
A side-by-side comparison of the Kerry-Lugar (Senate) bill and the Berman
(House) bill shows that the most inflammatory language in the final version
of KLB came from the House.20 Why the difference? Like Kerry and Lugar,
Berman supported aid to Pakistan’s civilian government and wanted to see
13 The language on civilian control over the military is found in Section 302(a) (15) of the Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act.
14 “Hashmi Terms Govt’s Stance on KLB as a Historic Defeat,” Daily Regional Times, October 17, 2009; “Kerry Lugar Bill Worth ‘Peanuts’: PML-N,” Asian News International, September 29, 2009, http://www.newstrackindia.com/newsdetails/125375.
15 “Kerry-Lugar Bill a ‘Triumph for India’: Shujaat Hussain,” Asian News International, October 8, 2009, http://newstrackindia.com/newsdetails/127056.
16 Iftikhar A. Khan, “Corps Commanders Express Concern over Kerry-Lugar,” Dawn, October 8, 2009, http://archives.dawn.com/archives/41612.
17 The 1985 Pressler amendment, which forced the cutoff in U.S. assistance to Pakistan, is discussed in Chapter 3.
18 “Chairman Kerry and Chairman Berman Release Joint Explanatory Statement to Accompany Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act of 2009,” Office of Senator John Kerry, October 14, 2009, http://kerry.senate.gov/press/release/?id=34cf9b3a-2791-4dec-bc23-8611417466ed.
19 Author conversations with Pakistani officials and commentators, Islamabad, Pakistan, October 2009.
20 For the text of H.R. 1886, the final bill passed by the House on June 11, 2009, see http://www
.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS-111hr1886rh/pdf/BILLS-111hr1886rh.pdf. For the text of S. 962, Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. University of Sussex Library, on 05 Mar 2019 at 17:35:49, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781107053755.005
Great Expectations to Greater Frustrations
143
relations with Pakistan improve. However, he also believed that his legislation
was a smarter, more comprehensive reflection of U.S. interests in Pakistan than
the Senate version.21 It covered more territory, authorizing military as well as
civilian aid. It touched upon nearly all facets of the relationship.
Berman also faced more acute political pressures than his colleagues in the
Senate. He needed to win over skeptical House members and explain why
sending billions of dollars to Islamabad would make a direct, material contri-
bution to American interests. He needed to show that the Pakistanis would be
held accountable for the money they received. He was determined not to give
Islamabad the sort of “blank check” President Bush had offered Musharraf.
He was also determined not to give the Obama administration the latitude
that he thought had been abused by the Bush administration.22 By requir-
ing the State Department to submit routine reports on its programs and on
developments inside Pakistan, he and his staff believed his bill imposed greater
accountability without creating inflexible conditions.
Finally, Berman also felt that the House Foreign Affairs Committee needed
to demonstrate its relevance to the foreign policy-making process. If it did not,
the administration, congressional appropriators, and other committees would
violate its turf. That had been the story for years before Berman assu
med
the committee chairmanship, particularly with respect to military assistance.23
The idea that these sorts of congressional turf battles might set the tone for
a major piece of foreign policy legislation would not surprise anyone familiar
with Capitol Hill. Yet these “inside the Beltway” explanations received little
notice in Pakistan. In this respect, the episode reveals both the extent to which
Congress “matters” in the U.S. policy process and, at the same time, the limited
appreciation of this fact outside Washington.
The legislative process that yielded KLB was an unusually messy one, reflect-
ing clear differences between Berman’s vision and that of the bill’s Senate spon-
sors. In June 2009, Kerry publicly criticized the House version of the bill for
sending the wrong message to the Pakistani public. He said it threatened to
paint Pakistan’s government as “an American puppet,” and suggested this ran
“counter to some of the things that we’re trying to do.”24 Senate staffers and
the final bill passed by the Senate on June 24, 2009, see: http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/
cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=111 cong bills&docid=f:s962es.txt.pdf.
21 Author conversations with House and Senate staffers, January 19–20, 2012.
22 Many congressional observers perceived the Bush administration’s use of Coalition Support Funds as a particularly cynical “blank check” exercise. See, for instance, the exchange between Senator Robert Menendez and Assistant Secretary of State Richard Boucher in “U.S. Foreign Assistance to Pakistan,” Hearing before the Subcommittee on International Development and Foreign Assistance, Economic Affairs, and International Environmental Protection of the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, 110th Congress, First Session (Washington, DC: U.S. GPO), December 6, 2007, pp. 20–22, http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/
CHRG-110shrg45127/pdf/CHRG-110shrg45127.pdf.
23 Author conversations with House and Senate staffers, January 19–20, 2012.
24 Adam Graham-Silverman, “House to Consider Revised Pakistan Aid Measure,” Congressional Quarterly Today, June 10, 2009.
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