and water and have the best survival rates under stress.
The evolution of an elephant’s memory rests heavily upon spatial recall
(Byrne et al., 2009). The location of food and water, the times of year when
these are plentiful or scarce, and the likely presence of predators are all placed
within the framework of a spatial map. The critical nature and the location of
this knowledge make it memorable and thus consolidated within the brain. This
ability to recognize critical facts and place these facts within a spatial context
is programmed into elephants’ and other animals’ brains, including that of hu-
mans. Human memory contestants have clearly recognized this ability of the
brain, developing the “Memory Palace” as a foundation for a system of remem-
bering (Foer, 2011). Foer (2011) illustrates this capability by asking one to re-
call the house one was born and spent our time in as a child. If one has done so,
recall of an amazing level of detail is possible. It is easy to visualize, after many
decades with no intervening attempt to do so, minute detail of the entrance gate,
the path to the front door, the steps and cracks in the steps up to the door, the
screen door and handle, the entrance hall, and so on throughout the entire house.
To remember things, in sequence, one can place what needs to be remembered,
like a shopping list, at various locations in the house. The more memorable we
Memory Chapter | 5 25
make these placements, like imagining bananas sticking out of the mailbox,
the more likely the item will be remembered. Images and not numbers or let-
ters are what we are programmed to remember. The capacity to create a spatial
neural framework has been burned over evolutionary time into the elephant’s
brain. Convergent evolution has apparently led to remarkably similar capabili-
ties within the human brain, reflecting in that brain the same elements of storage
and retrieval. The possibility that the elephant’s brain is better equipped than
the human brain to both store information and to retrieve it under these circum-
stances becomes entirely plausible.
To the author’s knowledge, neurologists have not raised the question as to
whether elephants or any other animal, other than humans, are known to suf-
fer from memory loss similar to that observed in humans. If this is indeed so,
it may be possible that insight into the workings of the brain may be furthered
by inquiring whether and why such changes are not observed in a species such
as elephants that depend as critically as we do upon their memory. And if not,
why not.
In the chapters that follow we explore how the elephant uses its memory.
Can it interpret the mental or social state of others? Can we detect the origins of
morality in an elephant and has this morality evolved into feelings of empathy,
emotion, and, ultimately, the emergence of intelligent behavior?
Chapter 6
Morality
Dawkins believes that animals at the very least exhibit “selfishness” and at the
very best both “selfishness and altruism.” He holds, however, that the primary
manifestation is “selfishness” and that the origin of this behavior is the gene
(Dawkins, 1989).
A significant conclusion that can be drawn from Dawkins’s position and one
that is central to this chapter is that he has no difficulty in ascribing an emotion,
selfishness, to animals. He further accepts that animals may have other emo-
tions that can include altruism and even morality.
It is more difficult to conclude what role, if any, Dawkins assigns to nur-
ture and, in particular, to the role played by society in determining behavior
in animals compared to humans. He is, however, careful to say in the Selfish
Gene (pp. 3 and 4) that he is not entering the debate on nature versus nurture or providing a description of human and other species behavior. We will, on the
other hand, deal explicitly with the role played by society in elephant behavior.
Dawkins seems to reject the notion that morality is based on evolution, argu-
ing that while humans may be able to change the “ruthless selfishness” of the
genes, other animals cannot. Holding that man as opposed to other animals is
“uniquely defined by culture,” he sees genetically inherited traits as being modi-
fied only by humans ( Selfish Gene, p. 2).
In Unweaving the Rainbow (Dawkins, 2000, p. 212), Dawkins goes even
further to say “much of animal nature is indeed altruistic, cooperative and even
attended by benevolent subjective emotions, but this follows from, rather than
contradicts, selfishness at the genetic level.” Similarly (pp. 232–233), he accepts
that co-evolution and co-adaptation between and within species can be posi-
tive and constructive while remaining fundamentally selfish but pragmatically
cooperative.
While conceding the uniqueness of human culture, we explore the special
nature of elephant society and the interplay between society and behavior.
In his book Good Natured: The Origins of Right and Wrong in Humans
and Other Animals, de Waal (1996) concludes that evolutionary behavior crafted
rules of survival that we and other animals have adopted and built upon. But he
points out that only we still argue about the validity and purpose of these rules,
failing to acknowledge that we did not formulate the basic concepts—nature
did. And that “many of the sentiments and cognitive abilities underlying human
Elephant Sense and Sensibility. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/B978-0-12-802217-7.00006-5
Copyright © 2015 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
27
28 Elephant Sense and Sensibility
morality antedate the appearance of our species on this planet.” Human moral-
ity derives from sympathy, attachments, succorance, emotional contagion, and
cognitive empathy. He further points out that the human brain (as are all other
brains) is a product of evolution and is fundamentally the same as the nervous
system of other higher animals.
In The Bonobo and the Atheist, de Waal (2013, p. 162) defines morality “as
a system of rules helping not hurting others where the community is placed
before the individual. This does not deny self-interest but curbs its pursuit and
promotes cooperation.” Morality is a product of the species in which it evolves.
It is grounded in emotional values that stem from social pressure and the role
of authority. As we will see in the next chapter, the extended dependence of
the young upon the mother and the group generates tolerance and a hierarchical
structure. In the case of elephants, the ejection of the young male at puberty not
only solves problems of disruption in the herd but allows females to remain as a
cohesive group while simultaneously maintaining genetic diversity and survival
characteristics. A single individual, the matriarch, with clear mental attributes,
is elevated to a position of leadership extended over time, with no evidence of
conflict or injury within the herd (Figure 6.1).
FIGURE 6.1 Bodily contact is continued into adulthood.
Morality Chapter | 6 29
The morality of elephants is then grounded in this unique social system,
which ha
s generated over time not rationally constructed rules but behavior that
has promoted survival of their species. It is these behaviors in which humans
found irresistible challenges to elaborate upon and codify. As Philip Kitchers
(de Waal, 2013, Bonobo, p. 171) aptly states, “Philosophers have cast them-
selves as enlightened replacements for religious teachers who previously pre-
tended to insight.” Morality is no longer solely the domain of philosophers.
Nevertheless, philosophers have a substantive and distinguished claim on
the understanding and elucidation of morality. It is both essential and instruc-
tive to summarize the salient features of how modern-day philosophers view
morality and in particular how they view the question of morality in nonhuman
animals. In summarizing the current view of morality in humans and nonhu-
mans, I draw mainly upon the recent book by B.A. Dixon, Animals, Emotions
and Morality: Marking the Boundary (2008).
In any attempt to show that humans and animals are moral kin, expressed
in the moral kinship hypothesis, Dixon places considerable emphasis upon the
need to define clearly the concepts involved. If emotions form the basis for
morality then it is essential that we understand what is meant by emotions. She
recognizes four conditions that define emotions. Emotions, she says, must
●
be directed at objects, persons, or the state of affairs;
●
be interpreted by the agent recognizing that each agent may have a different
experience or a different interpretation;
●
involve beliefs, judgments, and appraisals; and
●
involve a value judgment made by each individual.
Furthermore, morally laden emotions must be connected to moral virtues,
which means that they must have cognitive, evaluative, intentional content.
They must reflect good moral characteristics such as dignity and unwavering
love. Compassion is cited as a morally laden virtue, which Dixon elaborates
as reflecting empathy in action, is commendable, shows a sense of right and
wrong, and is sensitive to context.
To illustrate the need to clearly define how emotions are coupled with
morality, consider the following situation. A mother is watching her son climb
a ladder to reach a high window. He slips and falls and seems to be injured.
What are his mother’s emotions and how does she react? Slightly alter the situ-
ation where instead of her son the mother observes what she interprets to be
a suspicious-looking character climbing the same ladder to the same window.
He also slips, falls, and seems to be injured. The mother’s moral response in
the two situations will likely be quite different. Each of the four above criteria
that define the emotions needs to be considered before interpreting the moral
response of the mother.
The logic of the conclusions drawn from Dixon’s definition of emotions
and connection between emotions and morality is that emotions are derived
from conscious thought; morality in turn stems from emotions and thus from
30 Elephant Sense and Sensibility
conscious thought. Since nonhuman animals are not believed by Dixon to be
capable of conscious thought, nonhuman animals are not moral nor morally
culpable.
Dixon rejects the concept that if closely related species act the same then
the underlying mental processes are probably the same. Known as evolutionary
parsimony, Dixon rejects this theory on the grounds that:
●
it depends on how we define closeness between species and thus conclude
that they exhibit similar moral behavior;
●
if some animals exhibit moral emotions, then humans are not unique with
respect to morality; and
●
unless emotions are strictly defined, we cannot conclude anything from per-
ceived similarities.
Dixon also rejects the concept of moral continuity and gradualism where the
former is a continuum in cognitive complexity from a simple emphatic response
to a complex mental comprehension of another’s state, and the latter is where
there is a gradual evolution from the simple to the complex. Likewise, Dixon
does not accept de Waal’s building blocks of morality thesis where morality can
evolve from some primitive to some advanced level. In each case, Dixon’s pri-
mary objection seems to be that the proponents of these theories fail to specify
what is morally significant. Here Dixon insists that a response must be shown
that is morally significant and that the subject has the capacity for empathy and
is motivated to alleviate the object’s distress.
Dixon has considerable difficulty in presenting a consistent argument that
defines a boundary between children who should not be considered moral sub-
jects and those who are. In particular, her rejection of gradualism and the build-
ing block thesis of evolving morality is seen to be violated by such statements.
She then claims that because they are children “we aught to employ more lib-
eral principles of responsibility” (p. 172). It is not clear how Dixon proposes to
determine the threshold or boundary between children that are moral subjects
qualifies children to be viewed as moral subjects. Is it based on a single act
that is judged to be moral? More than one act? How many? If a child does not
suddenly cross a boundary from being judged not to be moral to being moral,
does the child do this gradually and, if so, is this not gradualism that Dixon
has rejected?
Only occasionally and only in the latter half of her book does Dixon concede
that humans are animals. Elsewhere she makes the distinction between humans
and animals. Her stance on whether animals have emotions or exhibit morality
is not as rigid as a number of other current philosophers, such as Philip Kitcher
who holds that animals cannot be considered moral subjects because they do
not possess an “inner intellectual state,” which they must exhibit if they are to
be considered capable of morality. Or Richard Joyce because animals “do not
have language” or Marc Hauser because he considers that animals “do not have
Morality Chapter | 6 31
self-awareness” (Dixon, 2008, p. 126). Dixon, nevertheless, does not agree with
de Waal (2013), Bekoff (2002), Bekoff and Pierce (2009), Rowlands (2012),
or Regan (2004), among others, who hold that animals exhibit morality and
that morality predates the emergence of Homo sapiens. Once emotions and the
emergence of morality is seen as ancient and evolutionary, much of the super-
imposed complexity disappears and the relative role played by emotions and
morality within and across species is clarified.
Work with very young preverbal human infants (6–10 months old and some
younger) at the Yale Infant Cognition Laboratory by Wynn (2008) and her col-
leagues challenges the boundaries described above and supports the view that
morality is rooted in long-term adaptive behavior evolving over immense time
scales favoring the survival of social species.
Responses of 3- to 6
-month-old infants were shown on the CBS program 60
Minutes on 28 July 2013, to puppet behavior that was both “nice” and “mean.”
Seventy-five percent of the infants tested chose the “nice” puppets over the
“bad” puppets, suggesting a recognition of right and wrong and a sense of jus-
tice. When the puppets behaved badly, 85% of the infants opted to punish the
“bad guys.” Positive and negative feelings on the part of the babies were evident,
with the analysis showing that 87% of the subjects showed bias. Conclusions
drawn by the researchers suggest that infants prefer those who are kind and who
are like themselves. This results in a bias and response to punish others, creating
a “them” and “us” situation that predisposes the infant to choose those who are
more likely to help them survive. In published work (Hamlin et al., 2007; Wynn,
2008), the Yale researchers show that infants prefer individuals who help ver-
sus those who hinder others, indicating that they can assess individuals on the
basis of their behavior toward others. This capacity, they conclude, “may serve
as the foundation for moral thought and action.” Wynn also shows that infants
can detect intentional actions on the part of individuals and understand these
as “good” or “bad” within their social context. Experiments with these infants
suggest that it is unnecessary to establish any artificial boundary between those
who cannot and those who can be perceived as moral subjects. Infants as early
as 3 months old demonstrate an understanding of social entities and react to the
mental state of others.
A clear evolution in judging and responding to social interactions is dem-
onstrated as tests are applied to children of increasing age. By 9 or 10 years
old, Wynn found learned behavior replacing the early inherent response. By
the teenage years, education and learned culture displace the previous behavior,
although elements of the instinctual response remained. These findings support
the concept that morality evolves and accepts both the precepts of gradualism
and of the building blocks of morality suggested by de Waal.
Before returning to consider morality within elephants, we must acknowl-
edge the views of those who have considered whether and how humans should