thousand people, caused tens of billions of dollars in economic losses, and
sparked an open-ended U.s.-led War on Terror. The ruthlessness of the
coordinated assaults, combined with the sheer terror that they evoked,
led many lawmakers and journalists to refer to 9/11 as a “turning point”
in the history of political violence.28 paul Bremer, former head of the U.s.
national Commission on Terrorism, declared that 9/11 “is a different order of
magnitude. . . . This is not only the worst terrorist attack in American history,
it is the worst terrorist attack in history, period.”29
in the third place, the pre-9/11 social and political context was characterized
by excessive levels of hostility, prejudice, and mistrust directed toward
muslims and islam. several factors fueled these feelings of antipathy,
including, but probably not limited to, the following: (1) an actual global
increase in terrorist violence perpetrated in the name of islam, (2) persistently
negative Western media representations of the islamic faith and its followers,
(3) a general lack of familiarity with muslims and islamic beliefs among the
American populace, and (4) the heightened visibility of the growing muslim
population in the United states.
political scientist Kerem Ozan Kalkan and his colleagues have con-
vincingly argued that negative attitudes toward muslims emerged from a
much larger syndrome that predated the 9/11 attacks.30 muslims’ religious
beliefs, cultural orientations, and ethnicities have long made them stand out
in crucial ways from the dominant white, Judeo-Christian majority in the
United states. The sense of “difference” associated with the islamic faith
made many Americans wary of islam years before 9/11.31 As such, the attacks
on new york and Washington, D.C., served as a match that allowed these
preexisting prejudices to flare.
During the latter half of the twentieth century, Christians, Jews, Hindus,
sikhs, Buddhists, muslims, and members of many other religious sects
carried out an alarming number of violent acts against government and
civilian targets in countries around the world.32 These acts sadly and
repeatedly demonstrated that all religions have the potential to be used to
Conclusion / 169
provoke destruction. yet in the American public imagination, the words
“Arab,” “muslim,” and “terrorist” have become virtually synonymous.
As edward said acknowledges in Covering Islam, a great many violent
offenses, organized or not, have indeed been committed against Western and
israeli targets in the name of islam. yet, as said maintains, “islam” defines
a relatively small proportion of what actually takes place in the islamic
world. nevertheless, references to “muslim terrorists” appear so regularly in
the Western media that the relationship between the religion of islam and
violence is often accepted without question. said’s writing on the subject is
worth quoting at length:
instead of scholarship [on islam and muslims], we often find only
journalists making extravagant statements, which are instantly
picked up and further dramatized by the media. looming over their
work is the slippery concept, to which they constantly allude, of “fun-
damentalism,” a word that has come to be associated almost auto-
matically with islam, although it has a flourishing, usually elided,
relationship with Christianity, Judaism, and Hinduism. The deliber-
ately created associations between islam and fundamentalism ensure
that the average reader comes to see islam and fundamentalism as
essentially the same thing. Given the tendency to reduce islam to a
handful of rules, stereotypes, and generalizations about the faith, its
founder, and all of its people, then the reinforcement of every nega-
tive fact associated with islam—its violence, primitiveness, atavism,
threatening qualities—is perpetuated.33
in the fourth place, the 9/11 attacks solidified the preexisting image of
muslims as dangerous and threatening outsiders. The coordinated hijackings
and the assaults on the World Trade Center and the pentagon dramatically
escalated Americans’ sense of threat from a foreign “enemy” arising from the
against these groups, inciting discrimination and hate crimes across the
United states.
The media had so thoroughly maligned muslims and their faith that
when the post-9/11 backlash began, many Americans were unsure whether
they should be sympathetic toward or suspicious of the muslims who were
being harassed and discriminated against. What’s more, most Americans
lack direct contact with muslims, and even fewer hold a deep understanding
of the islamic faith.34 These interrelated issues have undoubtedly made it
more difficult to challenge the monolithic view of muslims as terrorists.
To be certain, some people in positions of power condemned the
backlash violence. president George W. Bush, on several occasions, used
170 / Chapter 7
his speeches to emphasize that America’s quarrel was not with islam. in an
address to the nation on september 20, 2001, Bush said, “i also want to speak
tonight directly to muslims throughout the world. We respect your faith.
it’s practiced freely by many millions of Americans and by millions more in
countries that America counts as friends. its teachings are good and peaceful,
and those who commit evil in the name of Allah blaspheme the name of
Allah.” After a period of applause from Congress, he continued: “The enemy
of America is not our many muslim friends; it is not our many Arab friends.
Our enemy is a radical network of terrorists, and every government that
supports them.”35
Jeffrey Kaplan, a religious studies scholar, maintains that the leadership
president Bush showed was one of the most important factors in turning
the tide of anger away from individual muslims after 9/11.36 Although it
is true that the most egregious acts of backlash violence largely subsided
in the first three months after the terrorist attacks, reports of anti-muslim
bias and discrimination have continued to rise in the years since 9/11.
This disturbing trend is in part a result of actions of the U.s. government,
which continues to implement policies that target muslims, Arabs, and
south Asians (this is an argument that michael Welch meticulously details
in his book Scapegoats of September 11th).37 in the minds of some bigoted
individuals, these official government actions—the profiling, interrogations,
raids, detentions, and deportations—appear to justify, and perhaps even
sanction, acts of intolerance.
Although reported levels of prejudice toward minority groups in the
United states have declined in recent decades, attitudes toward muslims
are an exception: Americans view muslims less favorably than they do most
other religious and racial minorities.38 A 2006 national survey found that
more than one-fourth (26.3 percent) of Americans said that muslims “do not
at all agree with my vision of American society.”39 much lower p
ercentages of
respondents agreed with the same statement when asked about Hispanics (7.6
percent), Jews (7.4 percent), Asian Americans (7 percent), African Americans
(4.6 percent), and whites (2.2 percent).40
yet, contrary to this perspective, research has unequivocally demonstrated
that muslim Americans are “mostly mainstream” in terms of their attitudes
and values. muslims express positive views of American society: They see
their communities as good places to live, they believe in the American dream,
and, as a group, their income and education levels mirror those of the general
public.41 nevertheless, muslims are perceived as strange and potentially
threatening religious and cultural “Others.” in the aftermath of 9/11, these
perceptions, and associated levels of fear and anger, played a central role in
mobilizing considerable hostility toward muslim Americans.
in the fifth place, the visibility and identifiability of the muslim population
Conclusion / 171
also influenced their selection as scapegoats. identifiability matters, because,
for a group to be targeted for discrimination, its members must be detectable
in some way.42 (it is worth pausing for a moment to note that when
stigmatized people are not easily recognized, hostile governments or regimes
may take steps to ensure that the out-group is made visible. The Jews in nazi
Germany who were forced to sew colored patches on their garments to mark
themselves as Jews in public serve as a tragic case in point.)
emigration from muslim-majority countries to the United states has
increased dramatically since the passage of the 1965 immigration Act.
subsequently, the number of mosques and islamic schools and businesses
in communities across the nation has grown steadily over the past several
decades. most muslim Americans choose not to wear traditional islamic dress.
However, the practice is rapidly increasing in popularity, especially among
second-generation muslim youth and young adults, and it is now common to
see muslim women wearing headscarves in college classrooms and the work-
place.
These and many other visible signifiers of the growth of the muslim
population have led some commentators to lament the loss of “American
values” and to warn Americans of the “threat” of an islamic takeover from
within. in 2006, republican Congressional representative virgil Goode
issued a letter to his constituents in which he declares, “i fear that in the
next century we will have many more muslims in the United states. . . . To
preserve the values and beliefs traditional to the United states of America [we
must] adopt strict immigration policies.” like Goode, many other right-wing
politicians used 9/11 as a window of opportunity to advance an anti-muslim
and anti-immigrant agenda.43
The muslim American community is composed of a dizzying array of
people from across the globe. But since 9/11, the considerable racial and ethnic
diversity of the population has been largely obscured as muslim Americans
have been lumped together and racialized “brown.”44 Consequently, dark-
skinned and dark-haired muslims, as well as other dark-complexioned
people mistakenly identified as muslims, have been subject to violent threats,
physical attack, and profiling. Again, although most muslims choose not
to wear traditional islamic dress, those who do—such as muslim women
with headscarves or muslim men who don the kufi—have been especially at
risk for discrimination. in addition, other minorities who wear distinctive
religious or ethnic clothing, including indian women who dress in saris and
turbaned sikhs, have been confused for muslims and consequently harmed.
immigrants from muslim countries, those with islamic-sounding names,
persons with foreign accents, and community leaders associated with islamic
organizations have been excluded and mistreated as well.45
After 9/11, these various markers of difference led to heightened levels
172 / Chapter 7
of vulnerability within the muslim community. in 2003, the new york City
Commission on Human rights issued a report revealing that muslims, as
well as Arabs and south Asians, were regularly singled out and harassed after
the attacks on the World Trade Center.46 The study found that 69 percent of
the 956 respondents were discriminated against in the disaster aftermath.
Almost 80 percent of those surveyed indicated that the fallout from 9/11 had
negatively affected their lives, regardless of whether they had been directly
mistreated. national polls of muslims yielded similar results. For example,
Georgetown University’s muslims in the American public square project
conducted a survey in 2001 that found that 52 percent of muslims knew of
individuals, businesses, or religious organizations in their community that
had been targeted for attack after 9/11.47
interestingly, most non-muslim Americans also see muslims living in
the United states as facing more discrimination than other religious groups.
The pew research Center conducted a survey in 2009 that found that nearly
six in ten American adults (58 percent) believed that muslims are subject to
“a lot” of discrimination, far more than say the same about Jews (35 percent),
evangelical Christians (27 percent), atheists (26 percent), or mormons (24
percent).48
in the sixth place, the relative powerlessness of muslims, especially
when compared to other more enfranchised minority groups, contributed
to their post-9/11 victimization. This final point is not meant to imply that
muslim Americans are entirely powerless as a people, nor is it intended
to suggest that muslims have not tried to respond to the issues affecting
their community since 9/11. To the contrary, muslim Americans have been
quite active in working to correct misperceptions about their faith. They
have engaged in extensive outreach efforts, formally and informally, aimed
at educating non-muslim Americans about islamic beliefs and practices.
national islamic organizations have lobbied elected leaders to protect
civil rights and have demanded an end to religious and ethnic profiling
among law enforcement officials. nevertheless, muslims have confronted
significant barriers in responding to the enormous challenges that they face
in the post-9/11 era.
For one thing, muslims represent just a fraction of the overall American
population. Although estimates vary widely, most observers agree that
muslims make up only about 0.6 percent to 2 percent of the total population.
With that said, and as mentioned above, the muslim American community is
growing rapidly (according to one study, the number of muslims in the United
states doubled between 1990 and 2001).49 nonetheless, for the immediate
future, their numbers will remain comparatively small, and, therefore,
muslims will likely continue to struggle to have their voices heard.
muslims are also vastly underrepresented in influential social institutions:
Conclusion / 173
most notably, in the mass media and the political system. Because muslims
lack access to channels of power within t
hese institutions, they have
had an exceedingly difficult time in their quest to challenge derogatory
representations and discriminatory policies that have seriously disadvantaged
their community.
malevolent stereotypes equating islam with violence have endured for
more than a century.50 Following the 9/11 attacks, which spawned intense
public fear of future terrorist strikes and two wars against two predominantly
islamic countries, an unending barrage of vicious and hateful slurs have been
directed at muslims. in the post-9/11 era, evangelical Christians label islam
“evil” and “wicked” on prime-time television without triggering widespread
condemnation. syndicated talk radio hosts openly advocate for the global
“eradication” of muslims. newspaper columnists inform their readers that
muslims “breed like rats.” military generals proclaim that Americans should
battle islam “in the name of Jesus” and assert that Allah is “not a real God.”
And without raising much opposition, conservative politicians threaten to
“take out” islam’s holiest cities, medina and mecca, through preemptive
nuclear warfare.
These statements are so startling not just because of their maliciousness
but also because we live in a time when racial or religious misrepresentations
of every other cultural group are no longer circulated with such impunity.51
imagine if political leaders, pastors, or media pundits had said the same
thing about African Americans, Jews, or Catholics. These sorts of sweeping
mischaracterizations and violent intonations would be publicly decried,
and the person responsible for the hate speech would likely be summarily
dismissed.52
Why has the mass media basically gone unchecked in its transmission
of this post-9/11 discourse of fear and hatred? First, it is well established
that during times of armed conflict and national crisis, stereotyping
meets the least resistance.53 From this perspective, as long as the United
states remains at war with iraq and Afghanistan, the muslim community
will in all likelihood continue to be the subject of bigoted and slanderous
representations in the media. second, non-muslims write and report much
of the Western news that is produced about “islam” and “muslims.” The
virtual absence of a “muslim voice” in American newsrooms contributes