testimony.
With regard to overseers, Miss Grimké's testimony is further
borne out by the universal acknowledgment of Southern owners.
A description of this class of beings is furnished by Mr. Wirt,
in his life of Patrick Henry, page 34. “Last and lowest,” he
says [of different classes of society], “a feculum of beings called
overseers--a most abject, degraded, unprincipled race.” Now,
suppose, while the master is in Charleston, enjoying literary
leisure, the slaves on some Bellemont or other plantation, getting
tired of being hungry and cold, form themselves into a committee
of the whole, to see what is to be done. A broad-shouldered,
courageous fellow, whom we will call Tom, declares it is too bad,
and he won't stand it any longer; and having by some means
become acquainted with this benevolent protective Act, resolves
to make an appeal to the horns of this legislative altar. Tom
talks stoutly, having just been bought on to the place, and been
used to better quarters elsewhere. The women and children
perhaps admire, but the venerable elders of the plantation--
Sambo, Cudge, Pomp, and old Aunt Dinah--tell him, “he
better mind himself, and keep clar o' dat ar.” Tom, being
young and progressive, does not regard these conservative
maxims; he is determined that, if there be such a thing as
justice to be got, he will have it. After considerable research,
he finds some white man in the neighbourhood verdant enough
to enter the complaint for him. Master Legree finds himself,
one sun-shiny, pleasant morning, walked off to some Justice
Dogberry's, to answer to the charge of not giving his niggers
enough to eat and wear. We will call the infatuated white man
who has undertaken this fool's errand Master Shallow. Let us
imagine a scene: Legree standing carelessly with his hands in
his pockets, rolling a quid of tobacco in his mouth; Justice
Dogberry, seated, in all the majesty of law, reinforced by a
decanter of whiskey and some tumblers, intended to assist in
illuminating the intellect in such obscure cases.
Justice Dogberry. Come, gentlemen, take a little something,
to begin with. Mr. Legree, sit down; sit down, Mr.--a
what's-your-name?--Mr. Shallow.
Mr. Legree and Mr. Shallow each sit down, and take their
tumbler of whiskey and water. After some little conversation,
the justice introduces the business as follows:--
“Now, about this nigger business. Gentlemen, you know
the Act of --um--um--where the deuce is that Act?
[Fumbling an old law-book.] How plagued did you ever hear
of that Act, Shallow? I'm sure I'm forgot all about it; Oh!
here 'tis. Well, Mr. Shallow, the Act says you must make
proof, you observe.
Mr. Shallow. [Stuttering and hesitating.] Good laud!
why, don't everybody see that them ar niggers are most
starved? Only see how ragged they are!
Justice. I can't say as I've observed it particular. Seem to
be very well contented.
Shallow. [Eagerly.] But just ask Pomp, or Sambo, or
Dinah, or Tom!
Justice Dogberry. [With dignity.] I'm astonished at you,
Mr. Shallow! You think of producing negro testimony? I
hope I know the law better than that! We must have direct
proof, you know.
Shallow is posed; Legree significantly takes another tumbler
of whiskey and water, and Justice Dogberry gives a long
ahe-a-um. After a few moments the justice speaks:--
“Well, after all, I suppose, Mr. Legree, you wouldn't have
any objections to swarin' off; that settles it all, you know.”
As swearing is what Mr. Legree is rather more accustomed
priate termination of the affair could not be suggested; and he
swears, accordingly, to any extent, and with any fulness and
variety of oath that could be desired; and thus the little affair
terminates. But it does not terminate thus for Tom or Sambo,
Dinah, or any others who have been alluded to for authority.
What will happen to them, when Mr. Legree comes home, had
better be left to conjecture.
It is claimed, by the author of certain paragraphs quoted at
the commencement of Part II., that there exist in Louisiana
ample protective Acts to prevent the separation of young chil-
dren from their mothers. This writer appears to be in the en-
joyment of an amiable ignorance and unsophisticated innocence
with regard to the workings of human society generally, which
is, on the whole, rather refreshing. For, on a certain incident
in “Uncle Tom's Cabin,” which represented Cassy's little
daughter as having been sold from her, he makes the following
naïve remark:--
Now, the reader will perhaps be surprised to know that such an incident as the
sale of Cassy apart from Eliza, upon which the whole interest of the foregoing
narrative hinges, never could have taken place in Louisiana, and that the bill of
sale for Eliza would not have been worth the paper it was written on. Observe,
George Shelby states that Eliza was eight or nine years old at the time his father
purchased her in New Orleans. Let us again look at the statute-book of
Louisiana.
In the Code Noir we find it set down that--
“Every person is expressly prohibited from selling separately from their
mothers the children who shall not have attained the full age of ten years.”
And this humane provision is strengthened by a statute, one clause of which
runs as follows:--
“Be it further enacted, that if any person or persons shall sell the mother of
any slave child or children under the age of ten years, separate from said child or
children, or shall, the mother living, sell any slave child or children of ten years
of age or under, separate from said mother, such person or persons shall incur the
penalty of the sixth section of this Act.”
This penalty is a fine of not less than one thousand nor more than two thou-
sand dollars, and imprisonment in the public jail for a period of not less than six
months nor more than one year.
-- What a charming freshness of nature is suggested by this
assertion! A thing could not have happened in a certain State,
because there is a law against it!
Has there not been for two years a law forbidding to succour
fugitives, or to hinder their arrest? and has not this thing been
done thousands of times in all the Northern States, and is not it
more and more likely to be done every year? What is a law
against the whole public sentiment of society? and will anybody
venture to say that the public sentiment of Louisiana practically goes against separation of families?
But let us examine a case more minutely, remembering the
bearing on it of two great foundation principles of slave juris-
prudence: namely, that a slave cannot bring a suit in any case,
except in a suit for personal freedom, and this in some States
must be brought by a guardian; and that a slave cannot bear
testimony in any case in whi
ch whites are implicated.
Suppose Butler wants to sell Cassy's child of nine years. There
is a statute forbidding to sell under ten years; what is Cassy to
do? She cannot bring suit. Will the State prosecute? Sup-
pose it does; what then? Butler says the child is ten years
old; if he pleases, he will say she is ten and a half, or eleven.
What is Cassy to do? She cannot testify; besides, she is
utterly in Butler's power. He may tell her that if she offers to
stir in the affair, he will whip the child within an inch of its life;
and she knows he can do it, and that there is no help for it; he
may lock her up in a dungeon, sell her on to a distant plantation,
or do any other despotic thing he chooses, and there is nobody to
say--Nay.
How much does the protective statute amount to for Cassy?
It may be very well as a piece of advice to the public, or as a
decorous expression of opinion; but one might as well try to
stop the current of the Mississippi with a bulrush as the tide of
trade in human beings with such a regulation.
We think that, by this time, the reader will agree with us that
the less the defenders of slavery say about protective statutes
the better.
* Slavery as It is; Testimony of a Thousand Witnesses. New York, 1839. Pp. 52, 53.
CHAPTER VII.
THE EXECUTION OF JUSTICE.
State v. Eliza Rowand.--The “Ægis of Protection” to the Slave's Life.
“We cannot but regard the fact of this trial as a salutary occurrence.”
-- Having given some account of what sort of statutes are to be
found on the law-books of slavery, the reader will hardly be
satisfied without knowing what sort of trials are held under them.
We will quote one specimen of a trial, reported in the Charleston
Courier of May 6th, 1847. The Charleston Courier is one of the
leading papers of South Carolina, and the case is reported with
the utmost apparent innocence that there was anything about the
trial that could reflect in the least on the character of the State
for the utmost legal impartiality. In fact, the Charleston Courier ushers it into public view with the following flourish of trumpets,
as something which is for ever to confound those who say that
South Carolina does not protect the life of the slave:--
Our community was deeply interested and excited yesterday, by a case of great
importance and also of entire novelty in our jurisprudence. It was the trial of a
lady of respectable family and the mother of a large family, charged with the
murder of her own or her husband's slave. The court-house was thronged with
spectators of the exciting drama, who remained, with unabated interest and un-
diminished numbers, until the verdict was rendered acquitting the prisoner. We
cannot but regard the fact of this trial as a salutary, although in itself lamentable
occurrence, as it will show to the world that, however panoplied in station and
wealth, and although challenging those sympathies which are the right and in-
heritance of the female sex, no one will be suffered, in this community, to escape
the most sifting scrutiny, at the risk of even an ignominious death, who stands
charged with the suspicion of murdering a slave--to whose life our law now
extends the ægis of protection, in the same manner as it does to that of the white
man, save only in the character of the evidence necessary for conviction or defence.
While evil-disposed persons at home are thus taught that they may expect rigorous
trial and condign punishment, when, actuated by malignant passions, they invade
the life of the humble slave, the enemies of our domestic institution abroad will
find, their calumnies to the contrary notwithstanding, that we are resolved in this
particular to do the full measure of our duty to the laws of humanity. We subjoin
a report of the case.
The proceedings of the trial are thus given:--
The prisoner was brought to the bar and arraigned, attended by her husband
and mother, and humanely supported, during the trying scene, by the sheriff,
J. B. Irving, Esq. On her arraignment she pleaded “Not Guilty,” and for her
trial, placed herself upon “God and her country.” After challenging John M.
Deas, James Bancroft, H. F. Harbers, C. J. Beckman, E. R. Cowperthwaite,
Parker J. Holland, Moses D. Hyams, Thomas Glaze, John Lawrence, B. Archer,
J. S. Addison, B. P. Colburn, B. M. Jenkins, Carl Houseman, George Jackson,
and Joseph Coppenberg, the prisoner accepted the subjoined panel, who were duly
sworn, and charged with the case: 1. John L. Nowell, foreman; 2. Elias Whil-
den; 3. Jesse Coward; 4. Effington Wagner; 5. William Whaley; 6. James
Culbert; 7. R. L. Baker; 8. S. Wiley; 9. W. S. Chisholm; 10. T. M. Howard;
11. John Bickley; 12. John Y. Stock.
The following is the indictment on which the prisoner was arraigned for
trial:--
The State v. Eliza Rowand.--Indictment for Murder of a Slave.
State of South Carolina, Charleston District,
to wit:
At a Court of General Sessions, begun and holden in and for the district of
Charleston, in the State of South Carolina, at Charleston, in the district and State
aforesaid, on Monday, the third day of May, in the year of our Lord one thousand
eight hundred and forty-seven:
The jurors of and for the district of Charleston aforesaid, in the State of South
Carolina aforesaid, upon their oath present, that Eliza Rowand, the wife of Robert
Rowand Esq., not having the fear of God before her eyes, but being moved and
seduced by the instigation of the devil, on the sixth day of January, in the year
of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and forty-seven, with force and arms, at
Charleston, in the district of Charleston, and State aforesaid, in and upon a cer-
tain female slave of the said Robert Rowand, named Maria, in the peace of
God, and of the said State, then and there being feloniously, maliciously, wilfully,
deliberately, and of her malice aforethought, did make an assault; and that a
certain other slave of the said Robert Rowand, named Richard, then and there,
being then and there in the presence and by the command of the said Eliza
Rowand, with a certain piece of wood, which he the said Richard in both his hands
then and there had and held, the said Maria did beat and strike in and upon the
head of her the said Maria, then and there giving to her the said Maria, by such
striking and beating as aforesaid, with the piece of wood aforesaid, divers mortal
bruises on the top, back, and sides of the head of her the said Maria, of which
several mortal bruises she, the said Maria, then and there instantly died; and
that the said Eliza Rowand was then and there present, and then and there felo-
niously, maliciously, wilfully, deliberately, and of her malice aforethought, did
order, command, and require the said slave named Richard the murder and felony
aforesaid, in manner and form aforesaid, to do and commit. And as the jurors
aforesaid, upon their oaths aforesaid, do say, that the said Eliza Rowand, her
the said slave named Maria, in the manner and by the means aforesaid, felo-
niously, maliciously, wilfully, deliberately, and of her mal
ice aforethought, did
kill and murder, against the form of the Act of the General Assembly of the
said State in such case made and provided, and against the peace and dignity of
the same State aforesaid.
And the jurors aforesaid, upon their oaths aforesaid, do further present, that
the said Eliza Rowand, not having the fear of God before her eyes, but being
moved and seduced by the instigation of the devil, on the sixth day of January,
in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and forty-seven, with force
and arms, at Charleston, in the district of Charleston, and State aforesaid, in
and upon a certain other female slave of Robert Rowand, named Maria, in the
peace of God, and of the said State, then and there being, feloniously, maliciously,
wilfully, deliberately, and of her malice aforethought, did make an assault; and
that the said Eliza Rowand, with a certain piece of wood, which she, the said Eliza
Rowand, in both her hands then and there had and held, her the said last-men-
tioned slave named Maria did then and there strike, and beat, in and upon the
head of her the said Maria, then and there giving to her the said Maria, by such
striking and beating aforesaid, with the piece of wood aforesaid, divers mortal
bruises, on the top, back, and side of the head, of her the said Maria, of which
said several mortal bruises she the said Maria then and there instantly died. And
so the jurors aforesaid, upon their oaths aforesaid, do say, that the said Eliza
Rowand her the said last-mentioned slave named Maria, in the manner and by the
means last mentioned, feloniously, maliciously, wilfully, deliberately, and of her
malice aforethought, did kill and murder, against the form of the Act of the
General Assembly of the said State in such case made and provided, and against
the peace and dignity of the same State aforesaid.
H. Bailey, Attorney-General.
As some of our readers may not have been in the habit of
endeavouring to extract anything like common sense or informa-
tion from documents so very concisely and luminously worded,
the author will just state her own opinion that the above document
is intended to charge Mrs. Eliza Rowand with having killed her
slave Maria, in one of two ways: either with beating her on the