sition by the following humane and sensible remarks:--
A being, ignorant of letters, unenlightened by religion, and deriving but little
instruction from good example, cannot be supposed to have right conceptions as to
the nature and extent of moral or political obligations. This remark, with but a
slight qualification, is applicable to the condition of the slave. It has been just
shown that the benefits of education are not conferred upon him, while his chance of acquiring a knowledge of the precepts of the gospel is so remote as scarcely to
be appreciated. He may be regarded, therefore, as almost without the capacity
to comprehend the force of laws; and, on this account, such as are designed for
his government should be recommended by their simplicity and mildness.
His condition suggests another motive for tenderness on his behalf in these
particulars. He is unable to read; and holding little or no communication with
those who are better informed than himself, how is he to become acquainted with
the fact that a law for his observance has been made? To exact obedience to a
law which has not been promulgated, which is unknown to the subject of it, has
ever been deemed most unjust and tyrannical. The reign of Caligula, were it
obnoxious to no other reproach than this, would never cease to be remembered
with abhorrence.
The lawgivers of the slave-holding States seem, in the formation of their penal
codes, to have been uninfluenced by these claims of the slave upon their com-
passionate consideration. The hardened convict moves their sympathy, and is to
be taught the laws before he is expected to obey them; yet the guiltless slave is
subjected to an extensive system of cruel enactments, of no part of which pro-
bably has he ever heard.
Parts of this system apply to the slave exclusively, and for every infraction a
large retribution is demanded; while with respect to offences for which whites as
well as slaves are amenable, punishments of much greater severity are inflicted upon
the latter than upon the former.
This heavy charge of Judge Stroud is sustained by twenty
pages of proof, showing the very great disproportion between
the number of offences made capital for slaves, and those that
are so for whites. Concerning this, we find the following cool
remark in Wheeler's Law of Slavery, page 222, note.
Much has been said of the disparity of punishment between the white in-
habitants and the slaves and negroes of the same State; that slaves are punished
with much more severity, for the commission of similar crimes, by white persons,
than the latter. The charge is undoubtedly true to a considerable extent. It
must be remembered that the primary object of the enactment of penal laws is
the protection and security of those who make them. The slave has no agency
in making them. He is, indeed, one cause of the apprehended evils to the other
class, which those laws are expected to remedy. That he should be held amenable
for a violation of those rules established for the security of the other is the
natural result of the state in which he is placed. And the severity of those rules
will always bear a relation to that danger, real or ideal, of the other class.
It has been so among all nations, and will ever continue to be so, while the
disparity between bond and free remains.
The State v. Mann, Dec. Term, 1829. 2 Devereux's N. Carolina Rep. 263.
A striking example of a legal decision to this
purport is given in Wheeler's Law of Slavery, page
224. The case, apart from legal technicalities, may
be thus briefly stated:--
The defendant, Mann, had hired a slave-woman for a year.
During this time the slave committed some slight offence, for
which the defendant undertook to chastise her. While in the
act of doing so, the slave ran off, whereat he shot at and
wounded her. The judge in the inferior Court charged the jury
that if they believed the punishment was cruel and unwarrant-
able, and disproportioned to the offence, in law the defendant
was guilty, as he had only a special property in the slave. The
warrantable, and disproportioned to the offence, found verdict
against the defendant. But on what ground? Because,
according to the law of North Carolina, cruel, unwarrantable,
disproportionate punishment of a slave from a master, is an
indictable offence? No. They decided against the defendant,
not because the punishment was cruel and unwarrantable, but
because he was not the person who had the right to inflict it,
“as he had only a special right of property in the slave.”
The defendant appealed to a higher Court, and the decision
was reversed, on the ground that the hirer has for the time being
all the rights of the master. The remarks of Judge Ruffin are
so characteristic, and so strongly express the conflict between
the feelings of the humane judge and the logical necessity of a
strict interpreter of slave-law, that we shall quote largely from
it. One cannot but admire the unflinching calmness with which
a man, evidently possessed of honourable and humane feelings,
walks through the most extreme and terrible results and con-
clusions, in obedience to the laws of legal truth. Thus he
says:--
A judge cannot but lament when such cases as the present are brought into
judgment. It is impossible that the reasons on which they go can be appreciated,
but where institutions similar to our own exist, and are thoroughly understood.
The struggle, too, in the judge's own breast, between the feelings of the man
and the duty of the magistrate, is a severe one, presenting strong temptations to
put aside such questions, if it be possible. It is useless, however, to complain of
things inherent in our political state; and it is criminal in a Court to avoid any
responsibility which the laws impose. With whatever reluctance, therefore, it is
done, the Court is compelled to express an opinion upon the extent of the do-
minion of the master over the slave in North Carolina. The indictment charges a
battery on Lydia, a slave of Elizabeth Jones. * * * The inquiry here is, whether
a cruel and unreasonable battery on a slave by the hirer is indictable. The judge
below instructed the jury that it is. He seems to have put it on the ground that
the defendant had but a special property. Our laws uniformly treat the master,
or other person having the possession and command of the slave, as entitled to
the same extent of authority. The object is the same, the service o the slave;
and the same powers must be confided. In a criminal proceeding, and, indeed, in
reference to all other persons but the general owner, the hirer and possessor of
the slave, in relation to both rights and duties, is, for the time being, the owner.
* * * But upon the general question whether the owner is answerable crimi-
naliter for a battery upon his own slave, or other exercise of authority of force
not forbidden by the statute, the Court entertains but little doubt. That he is so
liable has never been decided; nor, as far as is known, been hitherto contend
ed.
There has been no prosecution of the sort. The established habits and uniform
practice of the country in this respect is the best evidence of the portion of power
deemed by the whole community requisite to the preservation of the master's do-
minion. If we thought differently, we could not set our notions in array against
the judgment of everybody else, and say that this or that authority may be safely
lopped off. This has indeed been assimilated at the bar to the other domestic rela-
tions; and arguments drawn from the well-established principles, which confer and
restrain the authority of the parent over the child, the tutor over the pupil, the
master over the apprentice, have been pressed on us.
The Court does not recognise their application; there is no likeness between
the cases; they are in opposition to each other, and there is an impassable gulf
between them. The difference is that which exists between freedom and slavery,
and a greater cannot be imagined. In the one, the end in view is the happiness
of the youth, born to equal rights with that governor on whom the duty devolves
of training the young to usefulness in a station which he is afterwards to assume
among freemen. To such an end, and with such a subject, moral and in-
tellectual instruction seem the natural means, and, for the most part, they are
found to suffice. Moderate force is superadded only to make the others effectual.
If that fail, it is better to leave the party to his own headstrong passions, and the
ultimate correction of the law, than to allow it to be immoderately inflicted by a
private person. With slavery it is far otherwise. The end is the profit of the
master, his security, and the public safety; the subject, one doomed, in his own
person and his posterity, to live without knowledge, and without the capacity to
make anything his own, and to toil that another may reap the fruits. What moral
considerations shall be addressed to such a being to convince him, what it is im-
possible but that the most stupid must feel and know can never be true, that
he is thus to labour upon a principle of natural duty, or for the sake of his own
personal happiness? Such services can only be expected from one who has no
will of his own; who surrenders his will in implicit obedience to that of another.
Such obedience is the consequence only of uncontrolled authority over the
body. There is nothing else which can operate to produce the effect. The
power of the master must be absolute, to render the submission to
the slave perfect. I most freely confess my sense of the harshness of this
proposition. I feel it as deeply as any man can; and as a principle of moral
right, every person in his retirement must repudiate it; but, in the actual con-
dition of things, it must be so; there is no remedy. This discipline belongs
to the state of slavery. They cannot be disunited without abrogating at once
the rights of the master, and absolving the slave from his subjection. It con-
stitutes the curse of slavery to both the bond and the free portions of our popu-
ation; but it is inherent in the relation of master and slave. That there may
be particular instances of cruelty and deliberate barbarity, where in conscience
the law might properly interfere, is most probable. The difficulty is to deter-
mine where a Court may properly begin. Merely in the abstract, it may well be
asked which power of the master accords with right. The answer will probably
sweep away all of them. But we cannot look at the matter in that light. The
truth is, that we are forbidden to enter upon a train of general reasoning on the
subject. We cannot allow the right of the master to be brought into discussion
iu the courts of justice. The slave, to remain a slave, must be made sensible that
there is no appeal from his master; that his power is, in no instance, usurped
bn, is conferred by the laws of man at least, if not by the law of God. The
danger would be great, indeed, if the tribunals of justice should be called on
to graduate the punishment appropriate to every temper and every dereliction of
menial duty.
No man can anticipate the many and aggravated provocations of the master
which the slave would be constantly stimulated by his own passions, or the insti-
gation of others, to give; or the consequent wrath of the master, prompting him
to bloody vengeance upon the turbulent traitor; a vengeance generally practised
with impunity, by reason of its privacy. The Court, therefore, disclaims the
power of changing the relation in which these parts of our people stand to each
other.
* * * * * * * * *
I repeat, that I would gladly have avoided this ungrateful question; but being
brought to it, the Court is compelled to declare that while slavery exists amongst
us in its present state, or until it shall seem fit to the legislature to interpose
express enactments to the contrary, it will be the imperative duty of the judges
to recognise the full dominion of the owner over the slave, except where the exercise
of it is forbidden by statute.
And this we do upon the ground that this dominion is essential to the value of
slaves as property, to the security of the master and the public tranquillity, greatly
dependant upon their subordination; and, in fine, as most effectually securing the
general protection and comfort of the slaves themselves. Judgment below re-
versed; and judgment entered for the defendant.
No one can read this decision, so fine and clear in expres-
sion, so dignified and solemn in its earnestness, and so dreadful
in its results, without feeling at once deep respect for the man
and horror for the system. The man, judging him from this
short specimen, which is all the author knows,* has one of
that high order of minds which looks straight through all
verbiage and sophistry to the heart of every subject which it
encounters. He has, too, that noble scorn of dissimulation,
that straightforward determination not to call a bad thing by
a good name, even when most popular, and reputable, and
legal, which it is to be wished could be more frequently seen,
both in our Northern and Southern States. There is but one
sole regret; and that is, that such a man, with such a mind,
should have been merely an expositor, and not a reformer of
law.
* We except the State of Louisiana. Owing to the influence of the French
code in that State, more really humane provisions prevail there. How much
these provisions avail in point of fact will be shown when we come to that part of
the subject.
* More recently the author has met with a passage in a North Carolina
newspaper, containing some further particulars of the life of Judge Ruffin,
which have proved interesting to her, and may also to the reader.
We publish below the letter of Chief Justice Ruffin, of the Supreme Court,
resigning his seat on the Bench.
This act takes us, and no less will it take the State, by surprise. The public
are not prepared for it; and we doubt not there will scarcely be an exception to
the deep and general regret which will be felt throughout the State. Judge
Ruffin's great and un
surpassed legal learning, his untiring industry, the ease
with which he mastered the details, and comprehended the whole of the most
complicated cases, were the admiration of the Bar; and it has been a common
saying of the ablest lawyers of the State, for a long time past, that his place on
the Bench could be supplied by no other than himself.
He is now, as we learn, in the sixty-fifth year of his age, in full possession of
his usual excellent health, unaffected, as far as we can discover, in his natural
vigour and strength, and certainly without any symptom of mental decay. Forty-
five years ago he commenced the practice of the law. He has been on the Bench
twenty-eight years, of which time he has been one of the Supreme Court twenty-
three years. During this long public career he has, in a pecuniary point of view,
sacrificed many thousands; for there has been no time of it in which he might not,
with perfect ease, have doubled, by practice, the amount of his salary as judge.
“Gentlemen: I desire to retire to the walks of private life, and therefore pray
your honourable body to accept the resignation of my place on the Bench of the
Supreme Court. In surrendering this trust, I would wish to express my grateful
sense of the confidence and honours so often and so long bestowed on me by the
General Assembly. But I have no language to do it suitably. I am very sensible
that they were far beyond my deserts, and that I have made an insufficient return
of the service. Yet I can truly aver that, to the best of my ability, I have admi-
nistered the law as I understood it, and to the ends of suppressing crime and
wrong, and upholding virtue, truth, and right; aiming to give confidence to
honest men, and to confirm in all good citizens love for our country, and a pure
trust in her law and magistrates.
“In my place I hope I have contributed to these ends; and I firmly believe that
our laws will, as heretofore, be executed, and our people happy in the administra-
tion of justice, honest and contented, as long as they keep--and only so long
as they keep--the independent and sound judiciary now established in the consti-
tution, which, with all other blessings, I earnestly pray may be perpetuated to the
people of North Carolina.